A different 1860s

[eurofed]

1881-90 (part II)

Tsar Alexander II kept dodging the revolutionary assassination attempts that felled various other heads of state, royals, and ministers across Europe in this period and ruled till the end of the 1880s. His liberal agenda was to be continued by his like-minded eldest son Nicholas, while his conservative second son Alexander became King of Yugoslavia. After the emancipation of the serfs, his other greatest domestic achievement was the concession of a constitution. Thanks to his efforts, Russia shed off autocracy and became a constitutional monarchy like the rest of Europe. To be fair, the Russian constitution was much more authoritarian than the ones of Britain, Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia and more similar in spirit and character to the one of France-Spain.

The new constitution provided for a bicameral Russian parliament, without whose approval no laws were to be enacted in Russia. This legislature was composed of an upper house, known as the State Council, and a lower house, known as the State Duma. Members of the upper house were half appointed by the Tsar, with the other half being elected by various governmental, clerical and commercial interests. Members of the lower house were to be chosen by various classes of the Russian people, through a complex scheme of indirect elections — with the system being weighted to ensure the ultimate preponderance of the propertied classes. While the Duma held the power of legislation and the right to question the Tsar's ministers, it did not have control over their appointment or dismissal, which was reserved to the monarch alone. Nor could it alter the constitution, save upon the emperor's initiative. The Tsar retained an absolute veto over legislation, as well as the right to dismiss the Duma at any time, for any reason he found suitable. The emperor also had the right to issue decrees during the Duma's absence — though these lost their validity if not approved by the new parliament within two months.

Besides political reforms, the Russian government also pursued economic development. It made heavy investment in an ambitious program of railway construction, most notably the Trans-Siberian Railway, to bind the vast domains of Russia together. It pursued and encouraged industrialization by means of protective tariffs, a currency reform, a commercial treaty with Germany and Italy, the creation of an educational system to train personnel for industry, reformed commercial and industrial taxes, and state capitalism. Agrarian reforms introduced the unconditional right of individual landownership, abolished the ‘obshchina’ system, and replaced it with a capitalist-oriented form highlighting private ownership and consolidated modern farmsteads. They included development of large-scale individual farming, introduction of agricultural cooperative, development of agricultural education, dissemination of new methods of land improvement, and affordable lines of credit for peasants. Their aim was to lay the groundwork of a market-based agricultural system for Russian peasants.

As a result of the creation and expansion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and other railroads east of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, migration to Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East increased. The agrarian reforms included resettlement benefits for peasants who moved to the regions east of the Urals. The economic reforms were expected to bring significant economic development in due time. The wars in the Balkans and Asia had left Russia with a considerable debt, despite a few measures to increase revenues such as the establishment of a lucrative state monopoly on alcohol. Given the successful precedent of the Alaska Purchase, they conceived the idea to sell a portion of the Russian Far East to the USA. With cession of Alaska and acquisition of Manchuria, Kolyma and Kamchatka had lost much of their economic and strategic importance for the Russian Empire, and their mineral wealth was still unknown. On its part, the USA was skeptical about the economic value of the area, but interested in the acquisition of Kamchatka to extend its strategic and economic influence in the Pacific region. Not without some controversy in America about purchasing another “icebox”, the US purchase of Kolyma and Kamchatka was agreed upon and ratified.

The Peruvian and Bolivian armies invaded northern Chile. Argentina completed the “Conquest of the Desert” and annexed Patagonia. Having discovered some evidence of Chilean aid to the Mapuche, Argentina intervened in the War of the Pacific against Chile. Hoping in an advantageous rematch of the Second Platine War, Brazil attacked Argentina and invaded Banda Oriental. However the well-armed Argentinean army defeated the Brazilian invaders and pushed them back. Being trapped in a two-front war and losing, Chile begged for peace. The Chileans had to recognize Bolivian sovereignty on the disputed region and Argentina’s ownership of Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego, and the Straits of Magellan. To a degree, the War of the Pacific also became a proxy war between the USA and Britain, since the Americans supported Argentina and Peru-Bolivia, while Britain backed Chile and Brazil.

The Argentinean forces invaded and overrun Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. Brazil asked for peace and had to cede Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, and the territory between Rio Paraguay and Rio Paraná to Argentina. Bolivia gained a western portion of the Amazons. Victory in the War of the Pacific drove allied Peru and Bolivia closer and they decided to restore the Peru-Bolivian Confederation for mutual support and protection against Chilean and Brazilian revenge. The war considerably boosted the economic fortunes and political stability of Argentina thanks to acquisition of several valuable territories that were quickly filled by immigration and entrenchment of hegemony on the River Plate region. Immigration and economic development allowed Argentina to assimilate the conquered territories without excessive difficulty.

The war and economic growth consolidated Argentina’s role as the strongest South American power. Defeated Chile and Brazil were to fell to political instability, suffering coups and civil wars. However sheer demographic and economic power ensured Brazil kept its stature as Argentina’s middle-power rival, while Chile slid into obscurity. Political integration of the Andean region and US investments also allowed Peru-Bolivia some welcome economic development. The successful examples of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and Argentina’s unification of the River Plate region revived interest across Latin America for the regional unification experiments of the independence era.

In Central America, American diplomats secured favorable terms from Nicaragua for an agreement about construction of an inter-oceanic canal. After the Anglo-American War, the Americans had embraced the notion US national security required sole control on an inter-oceanic canal of its own and rejected previous policy of such canals being open equally to all nations and unequivocally neutralized. The status of the Mosquito Coast however stood as a major obstacle. Although Britain has given up its protectorate rights in 1860, the area remained a self-governing entity under British influence, which the Americans found intolerable for their plans to build a waterway in Nicaragua. To a lesser degree, the Americans also saw British Honduras as a threat for their canal project.

Tensions about the status of Mosquito Coast and British Honduras, already heightened by the War of the Pacific, run high, and Britain and the USA came to the brink of war. A compromise was painfully achieved with the Treaty of Managua. The Mosquito Coast lost its autonomy and Nicaragua absorbed the territory. Guatemala annexed British Honduras. The USA gained the right to build the Nicaragua Canal under its exclusive control and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was abrogated. The Americans reluctantly recognized Britain the right to build an inter-oceanic canal under its own control in the Panama department of Colombia. They added the provision the British would not occupy, colonize, or assume any dominion or protectorate over the region or any other part of Central America.

The USA persuaded the Nicaraguan government to agree to an annexation treaty thanks to the support it had given to Nicaragua on the Mosquito Coast issue, and promises of generous investments in addition to construction of the canal. The Nicaraguan elites had noticed the Spanish-speaking Greater Antilles and North Mexican territories that the USA had annexed were prospering under American rule, so they were agreeable to follow the same path. The Congress ratified the annexation treaty and immediately financed the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, which was completed in a decade.

The French had begun work on the Panama Canal, but had to stop because of engineering problems and high mortality due to disease, leading to bankruptcy of the French company. The British bought its assets, changed the project from a sea-level canal to a more realistic lock and lake canal, and re-started construction. The Colombian government proved recalcitrant to grant Britain the terms (renewable lease in perpetuity on the land proposed for the canal) it sought, so the British supported Panamanian separatist rebels with weapons and money. Separation of Panama from Colombia took place under protection of the Royal Navy and the new Panamanian government granted Britain control of the canal under the terms it wanted. The Panama Canal was built in a decade like its sister project. The USA didn’t intervene because of its previous accords with Britain, but the status of the Panama Canal became another source of tension between the two powers. The Americans blamed Britain for the establishment of Panama as a British client state, which in their eyes violated the Monroe Doctrine and the Treaty of Managua. The British retorted the Americans had broken the treaty in the first place with their annexation of Nicaragua.

British intervention in Panama made the Americans nervous about the security of the Nicaragua territory and Canal, so they got interested in securing a buffer between that territory and Panama. They offered the government of Costa Rica similar terms to the ones Nicaragua had gotten, including promises of US investment to finance a much-needed railroad to transport coffee, Costa Rica’s main export, to the Caribbean ports, in exchange for annexation. The Costa Ricans accepted and the state became another US territory in Central America. By the end of the 19th century, US public opinion had gotten confident that Spanish-speaking territories with valuable resources or strategic importance and a friendly or relatively scarce population were a gainful addition for the American nation and fairly easy to assimilate. A new row of US-UK tense diplomatic exchanges and reciprocal accusations predictably followed American annexation of Costa Rica.

After being re-elected two times, President Grant died in 1885, soon after leaving office, of throat cancer. Because of his foreign policy successes, his vigorous and mostly successful pursuit of Reconstruction, and general prosperity during his administration, he got a lasting reputation as a very good President and one of the best American generals. Public opinion was prone to forgive him for the corruption that plagued his administration and blame it on circumstances mostly beyond his control, such as the flaws of the US party system and civil service, or excuse it as the consequence of his excessive trust in his associates, a non-damning trait in a national hero. Lincoln shattered the two-term limit precedent Washington had established and replaced it with a three-term one. Grant further entrenched it, so it became traditional for successful and popular Presidents to seek and often obtain two re-elections.

[eurofed]

1881-90 (part III)

European colonization of North Africa marked the beginning in earnest of the Scramble for Africa. Up to the 1870s, the European powers directly controlled only a tiny portion of Sub-Saharan Africa, essentially in the form of coastal outposts, and exercised ‘informal imperialism’ by military influence and economic dominance. The latter years of the 19th century saw a transition to direct rule with the invasion, occupation, colonization, and annexation of African territory by European powers. In a few decades, almost the entire continent got under European control, with only Liberia still being independent.

Sub-Saharan Africa offered industrial powers like Britain, Germany, France-Spain, and Italy an open market that would garner them a trade surplus: a market that bought more from the colonial power than it sold overall. In addition, surplus capital was often more profitably invested overseas, where cheap materials, limited competition, and abundant raw materials made a greater premium possible. Another inducement for imperialism arose from the demand for raw materials unavailable in Europe, such as copper, cotton, rubber, palm oil, cocoa, diamonds, tea, and tin, to which European consumers had grown accustomed and upon which European industry had grown dependent.

The scramble for African territory also reflected a concern for the acquisition of military assets and naval bases for national prestige, strategic purposes and the exercise of power. The growing navies, and new ships driven by steam power, required coaling stations and ports for maintenance. Defense bases were needed for the protection of sea routes and communication lines; colonies with large native populations were also a source of military power. In the age of nationalism there was pressure for a nation to acquire an empire as a status symbol; the idea of ‘greatness’ became linked with the sense of ‘duty’ that many European nations used to justify their imperialistic ambitions.

The opening act and formalization of the Scramble for Africa was the Berlin Conference. German Foreign Minister Bismarck called it with the support of the British and Italians to prevent armed conflicts from incompatible claims on African territory. The representatives of Britain, Germany, Italy, France-Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, Belgium, Netherlands, Russia, Hungary, and the United States took part in the conference to work out a joint policy on the African continent. The outcome (the General Act) fixed the following points: international prohibition of slave trade by African and Islamic powers throughout the respective spheres of influence of European powers; freedom of navigation on the main rivers of Africa; a principle of effectivity (based on "effective occupation") was introduced to stop powers setting up colonies in name only; any fresh act of taking possession of any portion of the African coast would have to be notified by the power taking possession, or assuming a protectorate, to the other signatory powers; regions were defined in which each European power had an exclusive right to pursue the legal ownership of land.

The principle of effective occupation stated that powers could acquire rights over colonial lands only if they possessed them or had "effective occupation": in other words, if they had treaties with local leaders, if they flew their flag there, and if they established an administration in the territory to govern it with a police force and military garrison to keep order. The colonial power should also make use of the colony economically. This principle became important not only as a basis for the European powers to acquire territorial sovereignty in Africa, but also for determining the limits of their respective overseas possessions, as effective occupation served in several instances as a criterion for settling disputes over the boundaries between colonies.

The combination of the principles of effective occupation and sphere of influence was the result of a compromise between the position of Germany and Italy, on one hand, and Britain and France-Spain on the other hand. The Germans and Italians, being latecomers to the colonial game, believed that as far as the extension of power in Africa and Asia was concerned, no colonial power should have any legal right to a territory, unless the state exercised strong and effective political control. Britain and France-Spain already had large territorial possessions outside Europe and wanted to keep them while minimizing their responsibilities and administrative costs. The compromise allowed the European powers to conquer Africa with the minimum effort necessary to control and administer it. It guaranteed them the ability to do so gradually without excessive concern a rival power might pre-empt them by encroaching in their sphere of influence.

Definition of spheres of influence took some serious effort, but eventually was enacted on the fairly simple basis of dividing Africa in four areas for Britain, France-Spain, Germany, and Italy. The British got Southern Africa and the lower two-thirds of the Nile basin. France-Spain took Madagascar and the northwestern corner with Algeria, Morocco, the Sahel, and West Africa up to the upper half of the Niger basin. Germany got the central portion of the continent with Central Africa, southern East Africa, and the lower half of the Niger basin. Italy took Tunisia, Libya, the Horn of Africa, northern East Africa, and the upper third of the Nile basin. In certain cases a power already controlled coastal outposts in other powers’ sphere of influence. The conference established they could sell them to the sphere owner or keep them as military bases and minor trade outposts. However they could not use them to expand in the hinterland or control the region’s economy.

Britain, Germany, Italy, and France-Spain soon got busy turning the lines they drew across the map of Africa at Berlin into effective possession. In a few decades of effort, they got remarkably successful. Sometimes they experienced some setback, such as the occasional lost battle in a sequence of colonial wars and repression of native rebellions, but overall European expansion was relentless. Britain experienced the greatest difficulty when it tried to annex the Boer republics. The Boer settlers proved quite an effective foe with their guerrilla tactics. The British suffered heavy casualties and were only able to reap ultimate success by ruthless counterinsurgency tactics. In comparison, the other European powers experienced much less difficulty in their colonial wars, such as when a well-equipped Italian expeditionary force crushed the Negus’ armies and conquered Ethiopia without much difficulty.

The other European states got nothing. This had scarce political consequences for Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Hungary since they had limited interest in African colonies and little wish to challenge the great powers’ ambitions. Likewise the USA and Russia had their strategic interests in other areas of the world and no appetite for territorial expansion in the African continent. Their main concerns at the conference, which they got satisfied, were to obtain an international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine and of Liberia’s independence for the USA, and re-affirmation of the right to intervene in an extra-European state if Europeans or Christians got threatened for Russia.

The conference’s outcome was a massive blow to Portugal’s national pride with severe consequences. The General Act forced the Portuguese to give up their cherished ‘Pink Map’ plans for colonial expansion across Southern Africa. Moreover, the Portuguese colonies in Angola and Mozambique encroached in Germany’s and Britain’s spheres of influence and the two powers picked the excuse of Portugal’s debts to remove a threat to their interests. Portugal had amassed a serious amount of debt beyond its ability to pay, and acting in concert, London and Berlin forced Portugal to cede its possessions in Angola and Mozambique to Germany and Britain respectively as collateral.

This British betrayal of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance caused massive outrage and political destabilization in Portugal, the collapse of the alliance, utter discredit for the Braganza dynasty, the assassination of several members of the royal family, a republican revolution, and a bloody civil war between monarchists and republicans. The Franco-Spanish poured support across the border in weapons, money, and volunteers for the Portuguese monarchists, allowing them to reorganize and gain the upper hand. The victorious monarchists invited Franco-Spanish troops in to help them “restore order” – i.e. enact a brutal repression of republicans and liberals.

Assassinations, accidents, and executions before and during the civil war had claimed the lives of all the male members of the Portuguese royal family. The Portuguese Cortes gave the throne of Portugal to the Bourbon King of France-Spain with the Pope’s blessing. Portugal and Spain merged in the new state of Iberia, a part of the Franco-Iberian union. Portugal got a measure of regional and cultural autonomy like Catalonia-Valencia, Aragon, and Basque Country-Navarre. Long national decline, the British betrayal, and the civil war had made many Portuguese skeptical of Portugal’s ability to thrive as a separate nation and fearful of civil strife. Iberism had genuine appeal to many Spanish and Portuguese, and the Papal Catholic clergy strongly supported the union. Britain, Germany, and Italy protested Portugal’s annexation by the Bourbon Empire, but refrained from taking military action since Britain was busy fighting the Boer War and the brutality of Portuguese republicans during the civil war had made their cause unpopular in Europe.

[eurofed]

1881-90 (part IV)

Industrialization continued to grow across most of Europe and North America during the 1870s and the 1880s. It was mostly focused in Britain, Germany, the Low Countries, France, Italy, and the USA, but it also spread to Scandinavia, Hungary, Russia, Spain, Argentina, and the Japanese Empire. It brought economic development and social progress, but also many social problems tied to inequality and poor living conditions of the lower classes. The consequence were social unrest, the spread of progressive ideas, and left-wing (and in the conservative countries, liberal) agitation. The answer of the elites varied, including liberal reforms and extension of the suffrage, the world’s first experiments in social legislation, and repression combined with intensification of nationalism as a scapegoat.

Examples of reform included rudimental social-welfare legislation in Germany and Italy, Britain’s adoption of universal male suffrage, and transition of Japan and Russia to constitutional monarchy. However such reforms were often partial or incomplete: all attempts of British reformers to enact social reforms, grant devolution to Ireland, give self-government to the settler colonies, and enfranchise the Papal Catholics failed. The Russian and Japanese constitutions provided for an elected parliament but left power concentrated in the hands of the Emperor and the suffrage restricted in favor of the wealthy classes.

The Meiji constitution gave the Emperor of Japan the right to exercise executive authority, and to appoint and dismiss all government officials. The Emperor also had the sole rights to declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, dissolve the lower house of Diet, and issue Imperial ordinances in place of laws when the Diet was not in session. Most importantly, command over the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy was directly held by the Emperor, and not the Diet. The Meiji Constitution provided for a cabinet consisting of Ministers of State who answered to the Emperor rather than the Diet, and to the establishment of the Privy Council. Not mentioned in the Constitution was the genrō, an inner circle of advisors to the Emperor, who had managed the modernization process and retained considerable influence.

Under the Meiji Constitution, a legislature was established with two Houses. The Upper House or House of Peers consisted of members of the Imperial Family, hereditary peerage and members appointed by the Emperor. The Lower House or House of Representatives was elected by direct male suffrage (with property qualifications). Legislative authority was shared with the Diet, and both the Emperor and the Diet had to agree in order for a measure to become law. On the other hand, the Diet was given the authority to initiate legislation, approve all laws, and approve the budget.

Despite the authoritarian character of the Russian and Japanese political system, Russia and Japan stood as successful examples of conservative modernization, as shown by their transition to constitutional monarchy, ongoing industrialization, and foreign-policy victories. Despite its failure to modernize on its own, and the consequent loss of its independence, Korea was ultimately able to share the successful modernization and industrialization process of Japan thanks to its integration in the Japanese Empire. Their achievements sharply contrasted with the failure of other states such as the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Siam, and China to embrace the same path. The typical result was backwardness, stagnation, a widening gap with the Western world, national humiliation, territorial losses, European imperialist encroachment, and political instability.

During the 19th century, the Chinese Empire and the Qing dynasty suffered a steady process of decline. The process was marked by humiliating defeats in several wars with European powers and Japan, destructive rebellions, famine, widespread social unrest, and growing unpopularity of the dynasty. The Qing were forced to cede the control of many ports and land concessions, concede onerous economic privileges, and lose China’s peripheral territories and tributary states bit by bit to the European powers, the USA, and Japan. Foreign powers asserted a right to promote Christianity and imposed unequal treaties under which foreigners and foreign companies in China were accorded special privileges, extraterritorial rights and immunities from Chinese law, causing resentment and xenophobic reactions among the Chinese.

The dynasty tried to rally with the “self-strengthening movement”, an effort to create modernized armies, develop military industries, and promote government-sponsored industrial enterprise. However, since they shunned any real attempt to pursue political, social, and institutional modernization, such efforts mostly failed. China engaged in technological modernization only, buying modern weapons, ships, artillery, and building modern arsenals to produce these weapons, and only giving their soldiers modern weapons without institutional reform, all while refusing to reform the government or civil society according to Western standards. Government-backed projects and enterprise were burdened by the flaws of Qing government, such as nepotism, corruption, bureaucratic infighting, and lack of initiative. As a result, the ‘new’ Chinese armies remained radically inferior to modern foreign military and government-backed enterprise failed to promote economic development. To the degree they worked, these programs increased the growing power and influence of regional leaders and officials. The conservative faction remained largely dominant in the Manchu court and stifled any real attempt for more radical reforms.

Southeast Asia was almost entirely overrun by European colonialism as Britain gradually annexed or imposed its protectorate on Upper Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and northern Borneo. Siam was forced to cede Laos to France-Iberia after a brief colonial war and survived in an increasingly precarious position trapped between the British and Franco-Iberian colonial empires.

A wave of instability swept the Balkans. In Yugoslavia, the autocratic rule of King Alexander I caused a liberal revolution that soon degenerated in power struggles between different factions. Unrest flared up in Transylvania and the Serb areas of Croatia, leading to ethnic violence between Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, Serbs, and Croats. In Romania, a peasant uprising occurred and King Carol was assassinated by a fanatic nationalist. Violent clashes between Greeks and Turks exploded in Constantinople and the western coast of Anatolia, escalating into a Greek nationalist rebellion that spread to Cyprus and a war between Greece and Turkey. The South Slav Kingdom reluctantly gave free passage to the Greek army at Russia’s bidding. The Ottomans initially got the upper hand in Thrace, but the Greeks were able to stage a comeback thanks to the support of a expeditionary corps of European volunteers led by Garibaldi’s son and Russia’s mobilization at the Turkish border.

The Greek forces besieged Constantinople but their operations were hampered by armed clashes with the Yugoslavs in Macedonia and Thrace. Similar incidents took place between the Hungarians and the Romanians, and between the Croats and the Yugoslavs. The Balkans came close to a general war and international tensions flared high. A diplomatic compromise was possible because the great powers were reluctant to get dragged into a general war because of “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” when there were Africa and China still to carve.

The Rome Conference redrew the political settlement of the Balkans. Greece got sovereignty and civil administration of Cyprus but the British kept a garrison in the island and control of a few bases. The Turkish community of Cyprus was expelled from the island and forced to immigrate to Turkey. Ionia was turned into an autonomous area under Greek administration and international supervision with Turkey keeping suzerainty. The great powers reaffirmed the territorial status quo for the other Balkan states. Yugoslavia adopted a liberal constitution and Milan Obrenovic became the new King. A Russian prince of the Bagrationi noble family became the new King of Romania.

[eurofed]

These maps show Europe, North America, and the world in the late 1880s. They are meant to show international borders, so internal borders may often be alt-historically inaccurate (especially in the North American map) or not shown (as for Europe). The Nicaragua and Panama Canals are being built by the USA and the UK respectively.





This age is the apex of Euro-American imperialism. The Scramble for Africa is in full swing and seems bound to overrun all of the continent (minus Liberia's lone holdout) in a decade or so. The great powers (USA, UK, France-Iberia, Germany, Italy, and Russia) dominate the world. Japan, Argentina, and to a lesser degree Brazil stand as junior candidates to that august rank. Minor states and non-White peoples grow more exposed to their imperialist influence every year. Only China has a good chance of surviving complete colonial subjugation thanks to sheer size and population, but it has already suffered brutal losses and humiliations and more of that is on the way if it doesn't find a way to modernize soon. Turkey may soon face the fork between last-ditch major change or extinction. For Persia and Siam it seems the only realistic chance of salvation might be the great powers stalemating each other.

[whiteshore]

Maybe we could have the Gallic Empire become a one-party state with a Pan-Gallic Alliance or a National Unity Party becoming a Taisei Yokunsakai-esque organization?

[eurofed]

Apr 26, 2016 4:23:39 GMT whiteshore said:

Maybe we could have the Gallic Empire become a one-party state with a Pan-Gallic Alliance or a National Unity Party becoming a Taisei Yokunsakai-esque organization?

It seems a good idea, especially in the latter form of the Japanese example you quote. I assume they would most likely implement it in combination with turning their rubber-stamp parliament into a corporatist legislature, i.e. one including the representatives of the various trades and professions, instead of, or in combination with, the ones directly elected by the citizens in rigged or unfree elections. Corporativism is a bit of fascist ideology I assume would vibe well with TTL Gallic *fascists, also because it would fit with their idealization of the Ancient Regime. I'm only uncertain whether the Gallic regime would implement a one-party system and corporatist legislature soon after seizing power, or later to mark a further authoritarian evolution of the regime - in the meanwhile they might use a fake multi-party system, where they have a small number of far-right parties/factions (that are later consolidated in the one party) that directly support the ruling oligarchy, plus a few token 'tamed' opposition representatives and/or 'independents' that don't actually oppose or disturb the regime in any real way. There are OTL examples of both alternatives. Likewise, they could keep electing their parliament in fake elections (be it direct, corporatist, or a mix thereof) throughout the existence of the regime, or at some point dispense with the charade, and directly nominate them. Again, there are OTL precedents for both. In all likelihood they are also going to use unfree plebiscites to make a show of popular support to certain major policies, such as a change of constitution, the Franco-Spanish union, and the annexation of Portugal. Such plebiscites, although unfree and unfair, may not necessarily violate the will of the people, since the events they ratify may easily be genuinely popular.

Many French and Iberians likely welcome or at least accept the authoritarian Bourbon regime as a lesser evil after years of military defeat, national humiliation, major political instability, and civil war, the Gallic Empire is an impressive achievement of its own, and Iberian unity is genuinely popular even among the opponents of the regime. I.e. even when the Gallic Empire inevitably decays and falls to revolution, or perhaps more likely overreaches, stumbles into military catastrophe, and meets a dramatic end in the fires of the coming Great War much like its OTL counterparts and the French Second Empire, a resurrection of independent Portugal, or for that matter a birth of independent Catalonia, aren't really likely unless imposed from without by the victors as a punitive peace measure. On the other end, even the victors may easily not bother breaking down Iberia since it would in all likelihood look like the weakest and less dangerous half of the Gallic Empire. General conditions in TTL Europe and world are such that the existence of small independent nation-states does not really seem the natural course of events, and history appears to favour big empires, regional unions, and 'large' nationalisms, except perhaps in ever-fractious Eastern Europe and a few special cases like Ireland where the British may have burned a few bridges too many. On the other end, the Franco-Iberian union is more fragile and tied to the fortunes of the regime that created it, so it may more easily get undone by revolution or forcibly dissolved by the victors. Most certainly, if France loses another major war, it is going to get a peace as harsh as the ones OTL Germany got after the World Wars.

Besides Gallic *fascism, are there any other aspects of the TL you wish to discuss or comment about ?

[whiteshore]

Maybe we could have China split in two with the north being ruled by a new dynasty and the south ruled by a Republic which may or may not be ruled by an analogue to the Kuomintang after the Qing falls?

[eurofed]

Apr 27, 2016 13:46:28 GMT whiteshore said:

Maybe we could have China split in two with the north being ruled by a new dynasty and the south ruled by a Republic which may or may not be ruled by an analogue to the Kuomintang after the Qing falls?

At least temporarily it is quite likely, although in a general background situation of breakdown into warlord chaos, and in the long term China proper is in all likelihood going to reunify. As the next updates shall describe, the final decline of the Qing dynasty is going to be even more harmful for China than OTL, with the loss of all its non-Han border and insular territories (which may well be permanent depending on how future events between China and its great-power neighbors - Russia, Japan, the USA, the British Empire and later India - play out) and a Boxer rebellion that looks like a broad equivalent of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War done by an international coalition. Note to the Chinese: no matter your legitimate grievances against foreign colonialism, to vent them through a group of reactionary xenophobe fanatics that slaughter a lot of Western citizens is an excellent way to make the world turn against you and pull out its gloves. And to piss off the Western world in a crusading mood in 1900 is a very, very bad idea.

This may certainly justify a post-Qing collapse that is even more chaotic and divisive than OTL. In all likelihood, given the magnitude of national shock and humiliation the Chinese are going to suffer, TTL 20th century China won't be nice, much like late 19th century France and Spain weren't for similar reasons. I'm just not sure which kind of ideological lens the Chinese shall adopt to channel their resentful and aggressive nationalism. It depends on how events in China align with ones in the Western world.

TTL China no doubt got handed fairly bad cards, because of its usual failure to modernize timely and the Western world as a whole being stronger and just as imperialist as OTL. Of course, it is rather difficult, but far from impossible, to make things worse than OTL Japanese invasion and Maoism were, but in all likelihood China shall be substantially smaller, to its considerable rage and frustration. This is a global effect of America, Germany, Italy, France, and Russia being bigger and stronger than OTL, and Britain and Japan just as strong, so the non-White peoples end up at the receiving end of more Western imperialism, at least until the World Wars start acting as an exhausting restraint. It's the same reason why ITTL the Muslim world has permanently lost many of its OTL lands, such as Northwest Africa, the Caucasus, the northern Near East, and Central Asia, and the Armenian-Assyrian-Greek genocide has been inverted into large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Muslims.

Japan seems headed on a moderate enough course to avoid suicidal fights with Russia or the USA, so it may easily keep what it owns and maybe even grab a few extra bits if it makes the right alliance choices. They didn't get an equivalent of the Russo-Japanese War to swell their heads, and they have Russia and America on their northern border. On the other hand, they have good relations with both powers, and their successful assimilation of Korea doubles their effective resources. The Japanese might even acquire a few valuable extra bits if they opportunistically align with the right side in the coming Great War. Depending on how decolonization of the British Empire, or quite possibly its dramatic collapse after military defeat, play out, India may well turn out substantially bigger.

[whiteshore]

Maybe the Chinese turn to radical Socialism to vent out their rage and maybe whether the alt-KMT or the new dynasty reunites China depends on who wins the Great War?

P.S. Is it accurate to say that Operation Remove Kebab has been performed?

[eurofed]

Apr 28, 2016 2:28:37 GMT whiteshore said:

Maybe the Chinese turn to radical Socialism to vent out their rage and maybe whether the alt-KMT or the new dynasty reunites China depends on who wins the Great War?

P.S. Is it accurate to say that Operation Remove Kebab has been performed?

A Chinese turn to radical left-wing ideology to channel their nationalist resentment seems certainly a viable option if it happens after Franco-Iberian *fascism got discredited by being ripped a new one in the Great War. It may only have the slight difficulty such a swing would quite possibly lack the compelling precedent OTL Russian Revolution was. Make no mistake, it is quite likely if Gallic *fascism meets a fiery end in military catastrophe the backlash might involve an attempted *communist revolution in France and/or Iberia, but strategically speaking it would be quite easy for Germany and Italy to snuff it out by military intervention, and exceedingly unlikely they would let a Red tumor grow unopposed on their doorstep. They already did something similar after the Franco-German-Italian War and surely they are quite prejudiced about letting an extremist France be after a few decades of having to deal with the Gallic Empire. On the other hand, they and the Americans might find less easy or be less motivated to intervene in a British revolution, but whether it is likely to occur depends on how the defeat of the British Empire would be accomplished, how bad it turns out to be, how much military power Britain is left by the end of the war, and so on.

TTL America has spent decades preparing for a deathmatch with the British Empire, including doing its best to make the USN match the RN gun for gun, but Germany and Italy weren't really involved in a naval race with Britain. They had their military build-up focused on France-Iberia as a future enemy. This might change if Britain and the Gallic Empire align too close before the war, however. Russia certainly identified the British Empire as their likely potential enemy, but they probably didn't bother try matching British naval power. I have a fairly clear idea of who's going to fight whom in the Great War, and who's going to win, and tried to insert appropriate foreshadowings in the TL, but couldn't bring myself to write it yet. I'm still tinkering a bit with the end of the century update. The equivalent of the Xinhai Revolution and its aftermath likely occurs more or less in parallel to the Great War. Whether this means the Chinese civil war becomes a minor theater of the war, or a separate sideshow, hard to tell yet. There a couple civil wars that occur at the end of the century in Latin America which might have a similar role.

The early KMT had a sizable radical left-wing component for a while, although it get marginalized and crushed by the right-wing faction when the Chinese Civil War started. ITTL things might go the opposite way for its equivalent, and this might be the easiest way for China to swing far-left.

I miss the reference of the last bit. Kebab What ?

[whiteshore]

Is it possible that Egypt and Iran, due to the crushing defeats against Islam, have nationalist movements which focus on their pre-Islamic past as a reaction to Islam's "weakness" (no revivals of pre-Islamic faiths, but there will certainly be a lot of interest among intellectuals about studying pre-Islamic cultures)? As for the radical left-wing ideology the Chinese turn to, maybe it's basically Chinese *Ba'athism as opposed to a Chinese version of Communism?

As for the whole "Remove Kebab" thing, it's a meme in the internet.

[eurofed]

Apr 29, 2016 13:53:15 GMT whiteshore said:

Is it possible that Egypt and Iran, due to the crushing defeats against Islam, have nationalist movements which focus on their pre-Islamic past as a reaction to Islam's "weakness" (no revivals of pre-Islamic faiths, but there will certainly be a lot of interest among intellectuals about studying pre-Islamic cultures)? As for the radical left-wing ideology the Chinese turn to, maybe it's basically Chinese *Ba'athism as opposed to a Chinese version of Communism?

As for the whole "Remove Kebab" thing, it's a meme in the internet.

As a matter of fact, Chinese radical nationalism may well take the ideological trappings of something much like East Asian *Baathism, especially if it is the consequence of the radical faction of the *KMT becoming dominant and defeating the moderates and the reformist monarchists. IOTL these guys went communist or pro-Soviet radical left-wing because of the influence of the Russian Revolution and the Comintern and were eventually purged by the dominant radical right-wing faction. ITTL the opposite may happen, and it is exceedingly unlikely classical *Communism would take root in early 20th century China if the only Red revolutionary precedents in the Western world are swiftly crushed like the French Commune or an analogue of the OTL 1919 German Spartakist uprising in France, Britain, or Iberia. In these conditions it seems rather more likely the radical *KMT faction would adopt something like *Baathism.

<Googles references to the meme> Ahh, I see. Well, the next updates are also supposed to include a summary coverage of important ethnic issues and the state of things about them in America and Europe, but broadly speaking, Islam has more or less lost any significant presence in the Balkans, Cyprus, Ionia, the Caucasus, northern (Russian) Near East, northwest Africa, and Russian Central Asia (including East Turkestan/Xinjiang), and the change seems permanent in the foreseeable future. This happened as a combination of extensive ethnic cleansing, forced cultural assimilation, European settlement, and opportunist conversion to Christianity or adoption of secularism. In certain cases (e.g. Turks, Kurds, Northern Caucasus Muslims, Maghreb Arabs) it was mostly the effect of ethnic cleansing, in others (e.g. Bosniaks, Albanians, Azeris) it was largely the consequence of the natives opportunistically adopting the dominant culture to fit in and avoid the same fate. Given these precedents, the Russians, the Greeks, and the Middle Eastern Christians have serious plans to enact the same demographic changes in other territories they have expansionist ambitions about, such as the Levant, Mesopotamia, Constantinople and the Straits, and the rest of the Anatolian coast.

Admittedly I have given little thought to the role Zionism might play, if any, ITTL, also because America, Germany, Italy, and to a lesser degree Russia are less anti-Semitic than OTL, so circumstances encourage the assimilation of Jews in European and American society. The only areas they may feel uncomfortable are the Gallic Empire (because the regime doesn't really like them, although not to Nazi/Stalinist extremes) and to a lesser degree the PLC lands because they are the worst ethnic/confessional trouble spot of the Russian Empire (and Pole nationalists tend to use the Gallic Empire as a patron and model). OTOH, the Russian government ITTL does not really encourage or favor persecution or harassment of loyal Jews. In these circumstances, quite likely the Gallic or Polish Jews that want a better deal opt for immigration to the USA, Argentina, or the CEMU bloc as the natural solution, and few really bother about ambitious plans for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Much like France, Iberia, and China, the Muslim world seems another area of the world that has suffered severe setbacks and humiliations ITTL and may turn to a siege mentality and resentful ideological hostility because of that. As the next update shall describe, this is driving the Ottomans (and maybe the Persians too but their situation is a bit more complex) at long last to embrace a last-ditch serious modernization attempt (a mix of OTL Young Turks and Kemalism enlarged to the Arabs that largely uproots the premises for an equivalent of the Arab Revolt, Hashemites, and Saudis to arise in its effort to expand its power base) to avoid subjugation and a catastrophic extinction of their state. The 'Young Ottomans' are embracing Turkish and Arab nationalism under the Ottoman umbrella as an ideological channel for that, but external circumstances are such to make their ultimate success unlikely (i.e. they face a strong risk of picking the wrong side and being crushed in the coming Great War, much like OTL). In the aftermath of this, the Muslims are likely to seek a different ideological banner to rally to, out of desperation.

It might be their own form of *Baathism (if being more radical, it looks as something sufficiently different from what the Young Ottomans are using and would be discredited by their failure; theoretically speaking, they might well use China as inspiration) or Islamist Jihadism much like OTL (if Islam is not too discredited for an attempt to return to an idealized Caliphate/Golden Age to be believable; but tentatively speaking, I think this might be really likely only if the Russians and their proxies succeed in their ambitious plans about the Near East). Theoretically speaking, a rally back to the glorious pre-Islamic past might be a believable third option for Egypt and Persia, but probably only if the other two options fail or appear to be based on discredited premises. This may be true for Muslim India too, but also depends on their relations with the Hindu majority; so far, things are developing rather like OTL in India, but this might change fast if Islam starts really seeming a doomed cause. As a matter of fact, those (mostly Christian at this point) Middle Easterners that regard the Ottoman Empire and Muslim/Arab civilization (even in the modernized, Westernized, secular form the Young Ottomans advocate) as lost causes tend to tap into the pre-Islamic past of the region in addition to an extension of Europe for a substitute identity.

[whiteshore]

Maybe we could have Persian secular nationalists, due to Persians being non-Arab, focus on their pre-Islamic past under the Achaemenids and Sassanids while secular nationalists in Egypt are divided between the Pan-Arabians and the Neo-Kemet people?

[eurofed]

1891-1900 (part I)

The last third of the 19th century, commonly known as the “Gilded Age”, witnessed the flourishing of the Second Industrial Revolution in America and Europe, and its spread to Russia, Japan, and the Southern Cone, with its consequences of rapid economic and population growth, establishment of a globalized modern industrial economy, social changes and tensions, and the imperialistic division of the world between the great powers. The socioeconomic issues created by industrialization eventually ushered in the Progressive Era, a period of social activism and reform that occurred between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, while the resurgent imperialistic tensions between the great powers resulted in the Great War.

The Gilded Age got most remarkable for the creation of a modern industrial economy. The corporation became the dominant form of business organization, and a managerial revolution transformed business operations. The businessmen of the Second Industrial Revolution grew into a powerful and proud upper class who led a lifestyle of opulence and considerable leisure (which also caused the first development of the tourism industry). This was most noticeable in America, where the super-rich industrialists and financiers enjoyed full social dominance, and a bit less so in Europe, where the bourgeois upper class shared the apex of the social ladder with the portion of the traditional landed elites that successfully weathered transition to industrial economy. The upper class’ wealth was resented by critics who believed the wealthy elites cheated to get their money, lorded it over the common people, and ruthlessly exploited the working man. The power and luxury of the ruling elites contrasted with the plight of the working class, that suffered poor working and living conditions.

This contrast triggered the growth of labor union movements and left-wing political parties that tried to improve the lot of the working class. It also drove the growing middle class to seek an improvement of their own living conditions and share of wealth through a series of social reform movements and progressive political movements. To be fair, the wealth of the period was not just highlighted by the upper class’ opulence, but also by the rise of philanthropy (especially common in America, but also known in Europe) to endow thousands of colleges, hospitals, museums, academies, schools, opera houses, public libraries, symphony orchestras, and charities.

As it concerns the US political system during the last third of the 19th century, it was characterized by intense voter interest, routinely high voter turnout, unflinching party loyalty, dependence on party platforms and nominating conventions, hierarchical party organizations, and the systematic use of government jobs as patronage for party workers. Cities developed ward and citywide "bosses" who could depend on the votes of clients, especially recent immigrants. Newspapers were the primary communication system, with the great majority closely linked to one party or the other. In politics, the two parties engaged in very elaborate get-out-the-vote campaigns that succeeded in pushing turnout to very high levels. It was financed by the "spoils system" whereby the winning party distributed most local, state and national government jobs and many government contracts to its loyal supporters. Large cities were dominated by political machines, in which constituents supported a candidate in exchange for anticipated patronage — favors back from the government, once that candidate was elected — and candidates were selected based on their willingness to play along.

The Republican party remained dominant and in control of the Congress and the Presidency during the Reconstruction Era and the first part of the Gilded Age. The American people was grateful to the Republicans and kept them in power for the successful leadership they had provided to the nation during its time of trial in the Civil War and the Anglo-American War. Economic growth, foreign-policy successes, and the mostly positive outcome of Reconstruction were other reasons for the prolonged political dominance of the Republicans. Throughout the Union, businessmen, shop owners, skilled craftsmen and workers, clerks, and professionals favored the Republicans as did more modern, commercially oriented farmers. In the South, the Republicans also won strong support from the newly enfranchised freedmen and the Black and ‘poor White’ middle class created by the Reconstruction reforms. The party kept pursuing its established agenda of protectionism, government intervention in the economy to foster modernization and industrialization, vigorous defense of American national security and US interests abroad with a powerful military, and a strong federal government. Nonetheless, as time went on, a growing amount of dissatisfaction emerged in several sectors of society about the Republican dominance and its policies.

The ruling party was perceived as excessively subservient to the upper class, and its advocacy of government intervention in the economy as bent towards favoritism of business interests and matched by a “laissez-faire” attitude towards the social inequalities and injustices created by industrialization. Americans' sense of civic virtue was shocked by the scandals associated with the Gilded Age: corrupt state governments, massive fraud in cities controlled by political machines, political payoffs to secure government contracts, and recurring evidence of government corruption. There was a sense that excessive ties between the government and the business elite (the “invisible government”) inevitably led to favoritism, bribery, kickbacks, inefficiency, waste, and corruption. Reaction to these issues gradually split the Republican party into two different factions, the pro-business conservatives and the pro-reform Progressives.

The latter faction gradually took a distinct identity and gained strength towards the end of the Gilded Age, merging with a vaster array of social reform movements that emerged in American society towards the end of the 19th century. One main goal of the Progressive movement was purification of government, as Progressives tried to eliminate corruption by exposing and undercutting political machines and bosses. A second theme was achieving efficiency in every sector of society by identifying old ways that needed modernizing, and emphasizing scientific, medical and engineering solutions. Many people led efforts to reform local government, education, medicine, finance, insurance, industry, railroads, churches, and many other areas. Initially the movement operated chiefly at local levels; later it expanded to state and national levels. Progressives drew strong support from the middle class, and supporters included many lawyers, teachers, physicians, ministers, and business people.

The Progressives strongly supported scientific methods as applied to economics, government, industry, finance, medicine, schooling, theology, education, and even the family. The Progressives had a complex relationship with the US political system: many of them clustered within the Republican Party, whose main ideology of government intervention in economy and society was compatible with their own aims; however, they were also repulsed by the subservience of the conservative faction to business interests and party machines and its frequent corruption. As a consequence Progressive activists at times made up the pro-reform wing of the Republican Party, in other moments they took the character of a distinct political faction and even supported a separate Progressive Party.

As it concerns the Democratic Party, it remained the political underdog during the Reconstruction and the early Gilded Age, its appeal tarnished and crippled by its association with the old slaveocracy elites that had betrayed the nation. Only gradually it managed to rebuild its image and reorganize a broad-based political coalition. The latter was made up of pro-business conservatives, hard-scrabble old-stock farmers, the conservative middle-class, Southern segregationist Whites, and unskilled laborers. The party stood for agrarianism, a free market, low tariffs, low taxes, states’ rights, less spending, and, in general, a laissez-faire and decentralized, limited government. The conservative wing generally dominated the party during the first part of the Gilded Age; however, as time went on, a competitive pro-reform faction grew out of agrarian unrest for falling commodity prices and high railroad rates. This new faction, the Populists (so named because People’s Party was the most common label they used when they organized as a separate political movement), advocated the interests of the small farmers and the rural middle class against the economic elites. Much like the similar case of the Republicans and the Progressives, the relationship of the Populists with the Democratic party wavered during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era. Sometimes it was more like the Populists making up the pro-reform wing of the Democrats, sometimes it was more akin to being a distinct political movement and even a separate political party.

Yet another political faction took shape out of the reaction of the industrial working class to the poor working and living conditions that prevailed during this period. Such a reaction initially manifested in the form of craft-oriented labor unions that grew strong in the USA since the 1870s. These unions often used strikes as a method to attain higher wages, shorter hours, and union control over working conditions and hiring. The first major manifestations of this strategy on a national level were a series of strikes in the railroad sector that took place in the 1870s and 1880s, often took a violent character, and were suppressed by the government or resulted in ultimate failure. These failures and revulsion at use of violence led to the decline of the radical labor movement and the rise of more moderate labor unions.

They instead advocated gradual improvement of working and living conditions through organization and cooperation with political movements that supported social reforms. The unions especially wanted restrictions on judges who intervened in labor disputes, usually on the side of the employer. Union activists and left-wing pro-labor social reformers often cooperated or even merged with sympathetic Populists and Progressives, but eventually coalesced in their own political faction. The latter took a variety of names, but most often was identified as the Labor party, and got support from trade unionists, progressive social reformers, populist farmers, and unskilled workers. The moderate wing of this movement often cooperated with the progressive wings of the other parties, but the radical wing was largely marginalized and ostracized by the rest of the political spectrum.

The three main reform-minded factions of the US political spectrum kept a relationship that wavered between effective cooperation on issues of common interest and antagonistic competition fueled by ideological differences, such as the interventionist vs. libertarian divide between the Progressives and the Populists, and the more radical left-wing character of the Labor movement. The late Gilded Age and the Progressive Age saw the rise of manifold single-issue reform movements, that addressed domestic issues such as government regulation of railroads and large corporations ("trusts"), the protective tariff, the role of labor unions, civil service reform, child labor, the need for a new banking system, corruption in party politics, primary elections, direct election of senators, efficiency in government, women's suffrage, government regulation of working and living conditions of the middle and lower classes, a graduated income tax, and abolition of national banks. Typically one or more of the reformist political movements espoused these issues as part of their own platforms.

During the first part of the Gilded Age, the Republican party maintained the political dominance that it had enjoyed since the Civil War. However, trouble was brewing for the Republicans under the facade of success. During the late ‘70s and the early ‘80s, dissatisfaction was brewing up in the public opinion about the policies of the ruling party and its corruption, while the Democratic party was getting revitalized through the growing influence of the Populist movement. This allowed the Democrats to seize control of the Congress in 1884 and win the Presidential election of 1888. A landmark civil service reform was passed which gradually curtailed the spoils system to senior positions, freeing up most of the jobs for a nonpartisan merit-based evaluation. A regulatory agency was created for interstate railroad travel, although its powers were initially limited. Other reforms however got stalemated in the Congress due to the influence of the conservative Democrat faction, to the frustration of public opinion.

The Progressive movement was increasingly getting into shape and it acquired growing influence both in US society and within a Republican party reeling from defeat. The 1892 election saw the victory of a Progressive-Republican candidate for the Presidency and a pro-reform coalition of Populist and Progressive candidates seized control of the Congress. They passed several measures that produced a sizable array of reform legislation, including the first peacetime graduated income tax, increased powers of the railroad regulatory agency, an anti-trust act to prevent large firms from controlling a single industry, laws to ensure the safety of foodstuffs and drugs, a child labor regulation act, and a federal job safety code. Some of these measures, however, were struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Frustration for this obstacle helped the President be re-elected with a strong majority and the pro-reform coalition to expand its majority in the Congress. This in turn opened the way to a new age of constitutional reform since the Reconstruction.

Constitutional amendments were passed to enforce direct election of senators and women’s suffrage, forbid restriction of voting rights because of language, and allow an income tax. When the Supreme Court struck down the child labor and the job safety laws, the Populist-Progressive majority of the Congress reacted by passing two other constitutional amendments that empowered the Congress to regulate child labor and education without prejudice for the free exercise of religion and to enact regulations of business, property, and labor for the sake of public health, safety, general welfare, and protection of the environment. Frustrated with what they perceived as the slow pace of ratification due to the increasingly large number of states in the Union and obstructionist attitude of some state legislatures, they also passed another amendment that lowered the ratification threshold to 2/3 of the states and allowed to use state referendums to ratify constitutional amendments. The Progressive and Populist movements combined into a vast and successful lobbying effort to get the threshold referendum ratified by state conventions. This also provided momentum to have all the other Progressive amendments ratified in relatively short order through a mix of state conventions and referendums. Laws were subsequently passed to regulate child labor, establish a graduated federal income tax and inheritance tax, and set up a federal job safety and health code.

Progressive-Populist activism at the federal level was mirrored by a similar effort at the state and local level. Many states created the initiative, referendum, and recall processes for citizens to directly introduce or approve proposed laws or amendments to the state constitution, and to give voters power to recall elected officials. The use of state and national primary elections to reduce the power of bosses and machines spread across the nation. The Progressives worked hard to reform and modernize local and state governments and the education system, professionalize medicine, law, and social sciences. Although controversial, the vigorous reform effort of the reformist movements met the favor of the majority of the US public opinion, allowing them to keep control of the Congress and the Presidency throughout the 1890s and pursue further reforms.

The President’s assassination in 1897 by an anarchist enabled Theodore Roosevelt, one of the leaders of the Progressive faction of the Republican Party, to succeed him. He had risen to national prominence and got the Vice Presidency because of his charismatic and exuberant personality, vast range of interests, and many accomplishments (statesman, author, explorer, soldier, naturalist, and reformer), as well as his heroism during the Big Swords War. Once he became President, he vigorously pursued enactment of the Progressive platform with the Congress into a sizable array of reform legislation and executive regulation. Conservation of the nation's natural resources and beautiful places was another high priority for Allen, and he greatly raised the national visibility of the issue. The result was strengthened anti-trust and railroad regulation legislation, the ban of federal injunctions against nonviolent labor disputes, a workers’ compensation law for work-related injuries and diseases, minimum-wage and maximum workday laws, a postal savings banks system, a low-interest credit system for farmers, campaign reform laws, a program of conservation, reclamation and irrigation of American land, establishment of a national park service, and creation of the Federal Reserve system.

Roosevelt pursued a foreign policy of vigorous defense of US interests in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific and strengthening of American military power. His vast popularity and the success of his reform program allowed him to get an effortless victory in the 1900 election. Efforts also grew to set up seminal welfare systems to provide coverage for sickness and pension plans, although those efforts kept a patchwork character. Calls to set up large scale welfare plans by legislation failed for the time being. Another progressive reform that floundered was prohibition of alcoholic beverages by constitutional amendment. Although prohibition was strongly backed by a few Christian denominations and the women’s suffrage movement, it also met fierce opposition by many Old Catholics and immigrant communities that eventually stalemated it. Personal opposition of the President also helped kill the momentum for prohibition.

[eurofed]

1891-1900 (part II)

In Europe, background social issues driven by the Second Industrial Revolution were very much the same as in America. However the more conservative and hierarchical character of European society kept the transformation of the political and cultural landscape a bit more subdued. In the long term, the radical scope of ongoing socioeconomic changes would largely, but not entirely, smooth out the difference between the two sides of the Atlantic. The business upper class created by industrialization still rose to the apex of the social ladder, but they shared it with those elements of the landed elites that had successfully adapted to an industrial society. Those two elements gradually merged to form a unified ruling elite, with the “nouveau riche” bourgeois element being prevalent the economic field and the aristocratic and “old money” element being found more often in the professional officer corps in and the upper echelons of the civil service. Of course, plenty of contrary examples existed, and the officer corps and the civil service also saw an increasing influx of bourgeois upper and middle class elements due to the vastly increasing sizes of the bureaucracy and the army in the Industrial Age. Industrialization was also creating a middle class of ever-increasing size that pressured to better its lifestyle and its share of power, and a vast number of industrial workers that were eager to ameliorate their poor working and living conditions.

In the liberal constitutional monarchies of Britain, Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia, the political system had developed sufficiently democratic to be stable and allow peaceful expression of those social issues. As a rule, in these countries a party system of 3-5 major parties or factions gradually took form. These typically included the conservatives, that drew support from the business and landed elites, the right-wing nationalist element of the middle class, and the non-politicized farmers; the liberals, that got support from the urban middle class and the skilled workers; the Christian democrats that drew support from the rural middle class and the politicized farmers; and the left-wing labor movements, that got support from the trade unions and the unskilled workers. Since in these countries the political system and the constitution had already evolved to be liberal in character, the political struggle was mainly characterized by the tug-of-war between conservatives and progressives either to maintain the status quo favorable to the upper class or to provide various social reforms that would satisfy the concerns of the middle and working classes.

A few of those reforms got approved over time, especially in the last decade of the 19th century, when progressive mass parties gradually swelled in following and influence. These included a graduated income tax and inheritance tax, job safety laws, reduction of working hours, regulation of child labor, and an end to government interference in peaceful labor disputes to back the employers. For those European countries that had established them (Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia) this also included expansion of their basic welfare systems, although they remained quite partial and limited by modern standards. The landmark political reforms that occurred essentially sealed the transition of Germany and Italy to parliamentary democracy, including abolition of the three-class suffrage and reform of the constitution of Prussia and the other German states to match the liberal character of the German federal system, and adoption of universal male suffrage in Italy.

Despite this general course, the British political system remained dominated by conservatives that failed to enact much-needed reforms to ameliorate the burden of the British lower classes or the festering Irish problem, and to appease the growing unease of many settler colonies and India about their political status. After the brutal repression of the Irish nationalist insurrection in the 1860s-70s, the island remained quite restive and ever more resentful of British rule, simmering ever close to the brink of rebellion, even if police pressure and the support of the Protestant minority managed to keep the situation under control. Over time, various attempts were made to try and pacify the island by granting it self-rule and emancipation of the Papal Catholics, but the dominant conservatives with the support of a ‘unionist” faction of liberals defeated pretty much all these efforts except for a few minor measures to lessen the second-class status of the Papal Catholics somewhat. Much the same way, the British Parliament stalemated all attempts to enact most of the social reforms that were established in America, Germany, and Italy.

In Oceania, the British colonies on the main landmass of Australia and in the islands of New Zealand continued their development at a brisk pace. Gold rushes and agricultural industries brought prosperity and parliamentary governments with limited autonomy began to be established throughout the colonies from the mid-19th century. European explorers were sent deep into the interior and British settlers continued their expansion across the continent and the islands into the lands of the Indigenous Australians and Maori, who were increasingly marginalized through a series of land wars. The development of railways and the telegraph brought the disparate settlements closer together and a stronger sense of national identity emerged. A Federal Council was formed in the 1880s to coordinate the activities of the various colonial governments. In the 1890s, a movement for the seven colonies to come together in a self-ruling federation on the model of the USA and Argentina gathered strength and momentum.

However there was still strong resistance in the British Parliament to grant extensive self-rule to any portion of the British Empire, since they feared it might become a gateway for disloyalty to the Empire. It did not help to lay British suspicions to rest that the proposed Constitution of Australia largely used the US one as a model. The colonies voted to unite and submitted the draft of their Federal Constitution for the Commonwealth of Australia to the British Parliament. The British government however derailed the whole process by insisting that British courts retain their jurisdiction over Australia, which the Australians balked to. Frustration with delayed self-rule drove several Australians to question their imperial loyalties and embrace the more radical vision of a separate nation or turn their sympathies to America.

Pretty much the same process that occurred in Australasia also took place in the Canadian colonies. If any, however, Britain got even more suspicious of renewed calls for self-rule in British North America. Due to previous experiences, the British feared any such development would become a gateway for destabilization of the colonies and an American invasion. So they entrenched the status of BNA as an armed outpost of the British Empire with limited autonomy. This frustrated the liberal segment of Canadian public opinion and caused them to increase their sympathies for the US system. In comparison, there was much less discontent and potential unrest in the British settler colonies of Southern Africa, even if they had strong aspirations of their own to autonomy and federal union. As a rule, Southern African settlers were rather more content with their colonial status quo than their Canadian and Australian peers. This mainly occurred because the British government tolerated or supported their brutal treatment of the Blacks and their extensive confiscation of valuable native lands, and helped them destroy or subjugate hostile African tribes.

During the last third of the 19th century, Russia and Japan clung to a course that pursued modernization and an hybrid path between the liberalism of Britain, America, and Central Europe and the authoritarianism of France-Iberia. The Alexandrine reforms established substantial liberal elements in the Russian political system and granted the Duma (parliament) a sizable deal of power and influence. However the Tsar kept direct control of the civil service and the army, and authority over the government was shared between the throne and the legislature in a constant tug-of-war. This dualism remained unsettled in an uneasy but apparently stable equilibrium throughout the Gilded Age. The economic reforms passed in this period started a modernization process in the Russian agrarian sector towards a market-based model. In the long term this was bound to substantially ameliorate the backwardness of the Russian peasantry and indirectly boost industrialization. Education levels were steadily increasing, to close the embarrassing literacy rate gap with Europe and America. Agricultural productivity was on the rise, and the excess rural population released by modernization moved in the cities to boost the ranks of the industrial workers, settled the new lands in Asia made available by expansion of the Russian Empire, or emigrated to the New World.

Much like the other industrial powers, Russia also faced the social tensions created by ongoing industrialization; in comparison to the democratic great powers of America and Europe they were addressed in a less prompt and extensive manner by the political system, which was still largely focused on dealing with the incomplete transition to liberalism. Nonetheless, the power-sharing agreement between the Tsar, the traditional aristocratic elites, the business upper class, and the conservative middle classes was strong enough to keep Russia stable for the time being. The main exception was Poland-Lithuania. The former PLC lands remained an hotbed of resentment, unrest, and latent rebellion against its Tsarist overlords, even if the Russian security apparatus was able to keep discontent in relative check.

More or less the same way, the Japanese Empire enjoyed domestic stability thanks to the Meiji reforms, modernization with vigorous industrialization, foreign policy successes, and fostering of patriotic loyalty through propaganda and the education system. Pretty much the only issue that caused considerable unrest was the restricted suffrage, and it got settled at the end of the century when the ruling elites relented and allowed universal male suffrage to be enacted. The measure was extended to Korea, and enfranchisement further eased ongoing political and cultural integration of the Koreans in the Japanese Empire.

Due to its authoritarian political character, France-Iberia was mostly unable to ease the political and social tensions caused by industrialization through reforms. However a few measures of paternalistic social protection were adopted that could be justified as paternalistic care of the regime for the welfare of the masses or to reinforce the economic and military power of the empire. The regime otherwise doubled down on its repressive policies and increased its efforts to vent domestic tensions through nationalist and imperialist policies and propaganda. This was remarkably effective to a degree, but it had the side effect of increasing international tensions in Europe. A typical example was the Franco-Iberian efforts to destabilize Belgium and Switzerland to fulfill their expansionist ambitions on both countries by supporting the unrest of pro-French ethnic nationalists and Papal Catholic conservatives.

[whiteshore]

Which of the European great powers is the most powerful and why?

[eurofed]

May 3, 2016 3:10:54 GMT whiteshore said:

Maybe we could have Persian secular nationalists, due to Persians being non-Arab, focus on their pre-Islamic past under the Achaemenids and Sassanids while secular nationalists in Egypt are divided between the Pan-Arabians and the Neo-Kemet people?

Quite possibly. An issue with Pan-Arabism ITTL is the Young Ottomans are already going to use a mix of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Arabism under the Ottoman imperial umbrella as their rallying ideal (with a lot of Islamic favoritism in practice, also b/c of TTL circumstances). So the ideology is getting somehow tied to the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. The state has been long trapped in a spiral of seemingly terminal decline but it may have gotten a path to rebirth by the turn of the century with the Young Ottoman revolution. Of course, it may easily turn to utter disaster if the OE picks the wrong side in the coming Great War. If it does, Pan-Arabism may or may not get too tainted by defeat to look like an appealing alternative ideal to the humiliated Arabs. In such a case, pre-Islamic nationalism may indeed be the obvious alternative, especially for the Egyptians. For the Mashriq Arabs, the equivalent would be Ancient Mesopotamia and/or Persia, but it also depends a lot on the post-war political situation (i.e. how much freedom Russia and its allies/clients get to reshape the Near East to their liking). At the moment, Egyptians and Near East Arabs also face a different situation since the former are under British colonial rule while the latter are independent. The situation of the Persians is somewhat different and more complex, but indeed, if/when they lose faith in Islam as a rallying ideal, their pre-Islamic glorious past would be the obvious alternative ideal. Given the mighty blows and grevious losses the Umma has suffered ITTL, it is entirely possible Islam might come to be seen as a lost cause by Arabs/Muslims that seek a path to rebirth, outrageous as it may seem by an OTL perspective. Especially if they witness further setbacks with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and even more serious territorial losses. On the other hand, it is also entirely possible history rhymes and a mix of anger and desperation creates maddened attachment to radical Islamism and gives birth to something fairly similar to OTL Jihadism. Circumstances may also pave the way to that path, since humiliation may easily create a vicious vengeance complex and make extremism popular. Even if the Arabs pick a different rallying ideal, it may easily be in a definitely not-nice version, kinda like it already happened for the French and Iberians and might happen to the Chinese in the future.

[eurofed]

Jun 13, 2016 9:42:12 GMT whiteshore said:

Which of the European great powers is the most powerful and why?

Good question. Broadly speaking, I would say it is a relatively close race with the USA, Russia, the German-Italian proto-EU, and the British Empire being in this rough pecking order but all within striking distance of each other. More properly speaking, all of them are either established or nascent/candidate superpowers. The Gallic Empire is not really on the same level, but it is definitely strong enough to make itself and the rest of the world believe otherwise. If and when 20th century events follow the path of least resistance you might expect the destruction of the British and Gallic empires and the rise of a tripolar global system with the realized superpower triad of the North American USA, German/Italian-led united Europe-plus, and super-sized Russia.

Probably the most powerful of them is the USA, since in addition to all of its vast OTL potential, it also has a more industrialized, non-Jim Crow South thanks to a more successful Reconstruction, as well as the resources of Western Canada, Northern Mexico, the Greater Antilles, and Central America, all of these regions getting rather more developed than OTL in demographic and/or socio-economic terms thanks to integration in the US system. This acts as a good argument to persuade many Americans, Canadians, and Hispanic Americans that unification of North America under the Stars and Stripes is inevitable and beneficial. America missed acquisition of its OTL Pacific territories (at least so far; things may easily change in the future), but got part of the Russian Far East as compensation (basically a swap between climate/population and natural resources). The USA became somewhat more progressive than OTL, which means it can put the talents of its minority citizens to greater use, absorb a greater amount of immigration and annexed territories w/o a nativist backlash, and suffer less internal tensions. It is on a trajectory to assimilate all of North America (quite possibly Australasia and/or part of South America as well) w/o excessive trouble, besides the inevitable war to crush British opposition. Established antagonism with the British Empire drove the Americans to keep their military well-prepared for a major war in the Americas or the Pacific, or a global naval conflict with the RN.

Russia is somewhat stronger than OTL because its conservative modernization, transition to constitutional monarchy, and foreign policy have been more successful. Broadly speaking, they have evolved into a more conservative and backward analogue of OTL Kaiserreich, which means less destructive domestic tensions and more socio-economic development. They still have a considerable gap with America and Europe, but not so damning as OTL. Foreign policy successes due to favorable circumstances allowed them to make substantial territorial and sphere of influence gains in Southeastern Europe, the Near East, and Central/Northeastern Asia. Barring a military catastrophe similar to OTL WWI, they certainly have potential for a more successful 20th century. Their military is definitely stronger than OTL Tsarist Russia thanks to a greater industrial base and lessened social tensions, but not any close to Soviet levels.

Germany has all of its considerable pre-WWI potential, only substantially enhanced by gainful assimilation of German Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, successful transition to a stable liberal democracy, and a more favorable alliance system. Instead of being shackled to the Habsburg corpse and encircled by hostile rivals, they have a complete national unification with valuable Cisleithania lands, a strong and loyal Italy as their main ally, and a friendly relationship with Russia to cover their backs. Both Germany and Russia have been successful enough to be content with the post-Habsburg/Ottoman status quo in Central/Eastern Europe. In rather similar terms if on a lesser scale, Italy has also achieved transition to a major industrialized power (it is the equivalent of OTL France in economic, military, and prestige terms) and a stable liberal democracy. Barring a military or economic disaster similar to OTL World Wars or the Great Depression, both Berlin and Rome enjoy a level of domestic stability similar to OTL Western powers. As a matter of fact, the German-Italian strategic partnership is so close and stable that in practice it may often be treated as a united whole by the rest of the world. Their joint trade bloc and sphere of influence in the central portion of the continent is in many ways the seed of TTL EU/NATO equivalent and a united Europe. Their obvious and long-established potential enemy is the Gallic Empire. The German army is as awesome as its OTL self, only scaled up for TTL greater resources. As it concerns the Italian army, pick any OTL stereotype about its ineptitude and invert it, thanks to close imitation of the German model, the good industrial base to live up to it, and a tradition of success since the wars of independence.

The British Empire is not substantially different from OTL, except rise of an expansionist USA turned Canada into a failed project, and the wars and rebellions in North America and Ireland drove the British to keep their colonies on a tight leash, which lessens the risk of slow and peaceful dissolution but increases the danger of another revolutionary collapse supported by external intervention. Most importantly, their strategic situation is much less favorable than OTL since they are trapped in a two-front imperial rivalry with America and Russia. Unlike OTL slow and graceful decline, if events follow the most likely path, ITTL the British Empire may face a sudden and catastrophic military/revolutionary collapse similar to OTL multi-national empires and TTL Austria. Their military is not radically different from OTL, except as it concerns adaptation to different strategic circumstances. Defense of the empire and its strategic interests from the American and Russian threats and colonial rebellions is the top strategic priority. According to established tradition, another one may be an intervention on the continent to preserve the balance of power, which ITTL evolved into a tripolar dynamic between Russia, the German-Italian bloc, and the Gallic empire.

We have already discussed the political features of the Gallic empire. It shows pretty much all the typical features, strengths, and weaknesses of its OTL Axis analogues and seems ultimately headed to a similar fate. Its creation allowed France and Spain to pool their resources and remain a worthy major power despite their individual decline and the growing power of its rivals. Its regime admittedly did a decent job of building up its resources by means of top-driven, authoritarian industrialization and modernization. As a consequence, Iberia is not so backward as OTL and France not so crippled by the loss of border territories with considerable economic or strategic value. Nonetheless, they are strong enough to be a credible threat to their enemies and to be deceived by their own hubris, not so strong as to fulfil their ambitions barring exceptionally favorable circumstances. Imperial expansion inside and outside Europe allowed them to grow considerably without excessive risk for a good while, but room for that is close to exhausted and they are headed to the hard choice between accepting external limits which may trap them into stagnation or gambling everything in a general war to break them. They definitely tried hard to build up their military to suit the standards of an expansionist-revanchist fascist power to the best of their resources.

Japan is not radically different from OTL in its essential features, except TTL circumstances paved the way to successful assimilation of Korea as a willing partner (which effectively doubles their resources) and lessened the risk of runaway extremist militarism (earlier achievement of male universal suffrage and enfranchisement of the Koreans, no victory disease from the Russo-Japanese War, Russia and America being not so hostile as to threaten their vital interests but strong enough that to challenge them in normal circumstances is unthinkable). It might still possibly turn bad but chances are good that it evolves into gradual entrenchment of budding Taisho democracy and continuation of a sustainable foreign policy of cautious opportunism. Their military is not substantially different from OTL, except as it concerns full integration of Korean manpower and economic resources.

[eurofed]

1891-1900 (part III)

As it concerns the state of ethnic issues in Europe and America by the end of the 19th century, certain areas (e.g. Ireland, Poland-Lithuania, Transylvania, eastern Croatia, Turkish Straits, Ionia) harbored serious nationalist tensions that might easily explode again in favorable circumstances. In others (e.g. Bohemia-Moravia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Albania) minorities were basically content with the status quo and/or sufficiently liable to assimilation by the dominant nationality. This was typically the result of a mix of a liberal political regime, sufficient equality and autonomy for the minority, economic prosperity and strong prestige of the state, cultural influence of the dominant nationality, and lack of serious bloody clashes in the past.

The latter was also true for the border areas Germany and Italy annexed after the FPIW; French loyalists were certainly hostile but most of them had emigrated. This however did not stop the French from having an overwhelming revanchist complex about their 'lost provinces'. They were in serious denial about the fact inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, Nice, and Corsica liked the status quo. The Bourbon empire also focused on destabilization of the Low Countries and Switzerland as a gateway for expansion like they had done in the past with Spain and Portugal. They had somewhat better chances in these cases since the successful German, Italian, and 'Gallic' unifications projected a significant attraction beyond their borders on areas with appropriate ethno-linguistic and cultural ties that threatened the stability of neighbor states.

The most vulnerable area in this regard was Belgium since its national identity was always fragile to begin with. Most political, cultural, and religious factors that drove the success of the Belgian Revolution a few generations ago were declining in importance or even getting reversed to create increasing alienation between the Flemish and the Walloons. By the end of the century the national unity of the Belgian Kingdom looked more and more in doubt as greater and greater political polarization fuelled by ethno-linguistic and religious conflicts and unsatisfactory economic performance took root between the Flemish and Walloon communities. As the ethnic division got deeper it looked like only political inertia, the King, a shrinking political elite invested into national unity, and the influence of Britain allowed Belgium to continue existing. Peaceful partition of Belgium between the Netherlands and France seemed a natural solution but international tensions between France-Iberia and the German-Italian alliance made it doubtful it could take place without triggering an European conflict.

In comparison, the Netherlands and Switzerland also felt the attractive force of successful ethno-linguistic nationalisms projecting from their neighbors, but prosperity resulting from economic ties with the CEMU bloc was a double-edged sword in this regard. As it made Pan-Germanism more and more popular and undermined the solidity of Dutch and Swiss national identities, it also made the Netherlands and Switzerland strong and prosperous enough to make the status quo sufficiently stable in normal conditions. However popularity of pro-French irredentism was also making serious inroads in French-speaking western Switzerland thanks to the support of France-Iberia and potentially threatened the security of the Swiss Confederation. The overall situation made the Netherlands and Switzerland align closely with the German-Italian bloc, although both countries remained officially neutral.

In the Bourbon empire, welfare of the Franco-Iberian union was in all likelihood fused at the hip with the fortunes of the right-wing regime that created it. On the other hand, regional autonomy and lingering shock from Carlist and Portuguese civil wars had considerably lessened potential popularity of regional separatism across Iberia. Even many liberal and leftist opponents of the Bourbon regime supported national unity of the Iberian Peninsula with a federal system, so it was getting solid non-partisan roots of its own. Much like the parallel cases of Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, and post-Civil War USA, Iberia was in all evidence here to stay barring an extreme catastrophe or division being imposed from without.

In the Russian Empire, certain areas (e.g. most of Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia) were not so vulnerable to potential nationalist destabilization as they might have been, because of more liberal policies, greater prosperity, ongoing settler colonization, or past ethnic cleansing. Things were a little more troublesome in the Baltic since the attractive force of successful Nordic and German unifications countered factors favorable to Russia. Many Finns and Baltics that disliked Russian rule wished for union with Scandinavia or Germany. The PLC lands were the main nationalist trouble spot of the Russian Empire for the foreseeable future.

In the Balkans and the Near East, population transfers during the collapse of Ottoman rule had greatly downplayed the potential for nationalist instability in certain areas but left things unchanged in others. Of course, even in the former case this was not necessarily going to stop an ambitious regional power from ignoring facts on the ground in favor of its own claims. The Turkish Straits and Ionia remained potential ethno-religious flashpoints of the highest order due to the co-existence of mutually hostile Greek and Turkish communities, the problematic state of the Ottoman 'sick man of Europe', and the opposite ambitions of Greek and Turkish nationalists.

In North America, the outcome of Reconstruction and acquisition of several important Spanish-speaking territories caused US society to develop an attitude towards racial issues that was basically similar to the Latin American one. Racial identification was based on a mix of appearance, known ancestry, class, wealth, education, and self-identification. If you looked like a White, and/or you had the typical financial status, education, and mindset of a White, society treated you like a White. Few really cared about the one-drop rule notion and the idea never developed any mainstream support in American society.

Therefore, US hostility to, and brutal repression of, Amerindians got essentially focused on the ‘Wild Indians’ that violently opposed American colonization and wastefully hoarded valuable land to support a barbaric lifestyle. Few cared to discriminate Europeanized mixed-bloods and even ‘Civilized Indians’ that embraced Christianity and an European lifestyle got relative tolerance. As a consequence, there also was relatively little prejudice against assimilation of Romance-speakers in American society and US territorial expansion in the Western Hemisphere. Successful assimilation, stability, and prosperity of Western Canada, Northern Mexico, the Greater Antilles, and part of Central America under US rule persuaded many Americans, Canadians, and Hispanic Americans that ’Manifest Destiny’ unification of North America by the USA was inevitable, economically and politically beneficial, or necessary for security reasons. The most ambitious supporters of US expansionism even added at least part of South America, Australasia, or the Pacific region to this agenda.

Its realization essentially was a matter of opportunity, getting an excuse, and thinking the prize was worth the effort or the land to be acquired was an asset instead of a burden. It was also an issue of no other great power, especially the British Empire, getting in the way. However this was becoming less of an insurmountable obstacle every year due to growth of US power. Even those who opposed continental political union often supported Pan-Americanism, a movement for closer ties and cooperation among the states of the Americas, through diplomatic, political, economic, and social means. Political instability of Latin American states, their recurrent conflicts, suspicion of US power, and polarization caused by Anglo-American rivalry represented important obstacles to its fulfillment. Nonetheless growing popularity of Pan-Americanism and the successful examples of the USA and Argentina were among the reasons by the end of the century a drive for regional integration mostly reorganized the political map of South America in a few large states. Another outcome of the movement was the formation of the Pan-American Conference, an international organization for inter-American economic and political cooperation.

Due to the great-power status and general success of Italy and Russia, no sane WASP or Northern European would dare regard Southern Europeans or Eastern Europeans as racially inferior. Thanks to friendly relations between America and the German-Italian bloc, German and Italian immigrants were usually welcome and highly regarded in the Americas. However, thanks to general prosperity at home and the opportunity to immigrate in the colonies, not so many went to the New World. Nonetheless demographic growth ensured a significant number still made the trip. There was a significant number of liberal-minded French and Iberians that went to the USA or Argentina to escape political oppression at home. For similar reasons, a sizable amount of Irish, Poles, Jews, and other Eastern European nationalities also immigrated to the New World.

[eurofed]

1891-1900 (part IV)

In the American public, sympathy for the plight of Ireland and Poland contrasted with strong antipathy for Papal Catholicism, so acceptance of these immigrants usually required conversion to Old Catholicism. Most Catholic immigrants to the USA or Argentina usually were willing to compromise on this issue for the sake of assimilation; the ones that wanted to cling to their religion mostly went to Brazil instead. Demographic growth and agricultural reforms ensured many Russian peasants that were unsatisfied with their status and could not or would not find employment as industrial workers in the cities or settlers in the Asian territories became immigrants to the New World. There also was a large number of Asian immigrants, and although they suffered some serious prejudice, the vast size of the Union and relatively limited levels of racism for 19th century standards ensured no legal barriers were ever established in America to Asian immigration.

American Blacks continued to suffer a lot of socially-tolerated individual racism and socio-economic inequality, but no equivalent of Jim Crow-style legal segregation or one-drop rule. Many Blacks remained a discriminated, exploited, and abused underclass, but Reconstruction reforms had allowed the growth of a sizable Black middle class that was not hamstrung by legal segregation. Schools were mostly de facto, but not de jure segregated. Individual racial discrimination was frequent and tolerated by law in housing, employment, and at the workplace, but not in public accommodations. Racially-mixed people that fit the mix of appearance, class, education, wealth, and self-identification criteria to look like Whites were usually accepted as such. This made life fairly easy for certain racially-mixed couples, such as White and Caucasian-looking mulatto. There was much more social hostility to White and Black or African-looking mulatto couples, especially if the African-looking member was the male, but miscegenation was not outlawed.

Europeans and Americans had grown accustomed to use ethnic cleansing and settler colonization to entrench their control of valuable territories that were inhabited by people of a different race or religion. Their imperialist brutality might escalate to genocide as a result of extensive military repression, scorched earth policies, large-scale deportation, severe exploitation, or unsustainable living conditions combined with callous or culpable neglect of their humanitarian consequences. A few notable cases in the past had been colonization of the Americas, post-Ottoman ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Europe and the Near East, and ongoing European settler colonization of Northwest Africa. Many other similar cases, perhaps individually less extensive but frequent enough for their sum to be equivalent in scope, occurred in a patchwork pattern throughout the Scramble for Africa.

European and American public opinion as a rule remained almost entirely uncaring or unaware of these tragedies, due to a combination of racist prejudice, imperialist greed, distance, and lack of media coverage. A partial exception occurred for the Franco-Iberian empire since its colonial policy became infamous and often caused humanitarian disasters due to its extreme violence, ruthless exploitation of resources, and mistreatment of indigenous peoples. Widespread international criticism occurred but the Franco-Iberian government was usually able to counter and withstand it by propaganda, suppression of evidence, censure for the domestic public, marginal reforms, and sheer refusal to bow to foreign pressure.

In this period, a widespread sense of inherent superiority of European civilization and ethnicity was part of normal worldview for an average White person. Europe’s economic, technological, political, and military dominance of the world was sufficient reason in the eyes of most Whites to justify a supremacist mindset as a plain fact of life. The less prejudiced usually framed European superiority in cultural terms, so they were willing to treat assimilated non-Whites as equals. They usually justified imperialism as the Whites’ right and obligation to rule over, and encourage the cultural development of, people from other cultural backgrounds until they could take their place in the world and assimilate in European civilization. They might also be willing to acknowledge valuable aspects and ideas from other civilizations, especially the most sophisticated ones such as China or India.

The more prejudiced typically assumed the inborn inferiority of other ethnic groups, justified their indefinite dependence, subjugation, and in extreme cases gradual but inevitable disappearance by attrition to be replaced by expansion of ‘superior’ peoples, and saw almost nothing of value in other cultures. For obvious reasons this difference typically got rather more important in this period for assimilated non-White inhabitants of the Americas than for colonized Africans and Asians except in the long term. Very few opposed imperialism; almost nobody accepted other cultures as inherently equal or did not regard the least advanced ones as savage, barbaric, and entirely devoid of value. Exoticism did create a few important exceptions of relatively widespread appreciation of non-Western ideas, but usually only in such niche fields as art, design, and occultism.

Racism was thus widespread, plainly accepted, and created a powerful ideological and psychological justification for imperialist domination, colonial exploitation, and brutal use of force to crush resistance of non-Whites. At the same time, it universally acknowledged all Europeans as equals. Rival or hostile European nations might, and often did, frame their bad relations in terms of chauvinism and jingoism, never as the kind of racist prejudice shown for non-Whites. Apart from patriotic pride and national stereotypes, European cultures and ethno-linguistic groups widely recognized each other as similar enough to belong in the same category and (often bickering) family. Just like Europe’s global dominance created a widespread perception of superiority, the achievements of great powers that belonged to different European cultural groups were similar enough to make them widely seen as equal.

Even long-standing prejudice against Jews was usually interpreted in religious and cultural terms and might be nullified by conversion and assimilation. On the other hand, Islam was widely seen as alien and hostile enough to get Arabs and Berbers typically classified and mistreated as non-Whites regardless of common ethnic, except perhaps in the case of conversion and cultural assimilation. Europeans had often regarded Muslims as hostile and wicked but worthy of respect in past centuries but with the rise of Europe's global dominance and the decline of the Muslim powers this had been mostly replaced by contempt. On the other hand, Europeans and Americans that were sufficiently informed about Asian affairs often acknowledged the Japanese Empire’s modernization achievements as impressive enough to classify the Japanese and Koreans in a different and superior category than other Asians.

An unspoken but strong cultural and psychological barrier existed against using the kind of extreme brutality with fellow Europeans that great powers routinely employed with non-Whites. Nobody had yet made the mental leap to use ethnic cleansing to settle a persistent and intractable nationalist conflict in a developed country, apart from the special case of Muslim minorities. It would likely take a sufficiently radical shock, such as another general war or revolutionary wave, to make it happen. Mass murder of Whites in 'civilized' Europe or America seemed outlandish unless something went really bad in a war or revolution. The only case people seriously contemplated this possibility to fear or advocate it was a repetition of the Jacobin Reign of Terror as a result of a leftist revolution.

Western powers usually heeded the laws of war as commonly understood in their armed conflicts, even if their explicit codification into international law was an ongoing process at the end of the 19th century. Insurgents, on the other hand, were usually treated as bandits, rebels, and traitors and punished as the worst kind of felons in the best of cases, summarily executed if caught in the worst of cases. In this regard, the American Civil War was a noticeable exception since the Union and the Confederacy in practice treated each other as belligerent nations during the conflict. Repression of neo-Confederate paramilitary groups during Reconstruction instead followed the usual pattern, albeit the mildest portion of the spectrum.

Police repression was widely used to suppress leftist and nationalist disloyalty pretty much everywhere in the Western world and other kinds of political dissent in authoritarian countries. Terrorism in the form of assassination and bombing did exist as an unwelcome novelty of late 19th century. Just like impromptu rioting when favorable circumstances happened, it was a favorite tactic of radical nationalists in such turbulent places as Ireland, Poland, and the Balkans and often used across the Western world by militant leftist groups that believed in bloody ‘propaganda of the deed’ and revolutionary violence. In both cases it made the users widely feared and reviled outside their sympathizers' circles.

Unfortunately festering ethnic conflicts, serious social inequality, and poor living conditions of the lower classes made the sympathizer crowd large enough for the problem to be infrequent but persistent. States were never slackers, inefficient, or gentle in the repression of leftist or nationalist terrorism and rioting. The laws they created for this goal often got used against the labor movement and nationalist dissent as a whole. For this reason an growing portion of the left and the labor movement gradually became increasingly critical of violence as a disastrous and counterproductive tactic. They instead advocated peaceful, gradual, and systematic organization of left-wing parties and unions.