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Post by futurist on Jan 8, 2019 3:34:56 GMT
What if Germany would have offered a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine and perhaps Malmedy as well--in addition to a full German withdrawal from Belgium, France, and perhaps Luxembourg as well--in exchange for getting a free hand in the East?
Would Britain and France have accepted this German offer? Or would they have fought on in the knowledge that the U.S. was already in the war and thus they are likely to win?
For the record, giving Germany a free hand in the East would essentially mean that Germany has won the war even if it has to make some territorial concessions in the West. Would such a German victory have actually been an acceptable prospect by the British and French publics in 1917 and 1918?
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Post by steve59 on Jan 8, 2019 9:25:15 GMT
What if Germany would have offered a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine and perhaps Malmedy as well--in addition to a full German withdrawal from Belgium, France, and perhaps Luxembourg as well--in exchange for getting a free hand in the East? Would Britain and France have accepted this German offer? Or would they have fought on in the knowledge that the U.S. was already in the war and thus they are likely to win? For the record, giving Germany a free hand in the East would essentially mean that Germany has won the war even if it has to make some territorial concessions in the West. Would such a German victory have actually been an acceptable prospect by the British and French publics in 1917 and 1918?
I think the last point would be the breaker in the deal. It would mean that Germany, if able to maintain control on the vast gains in the east, would be massively stronger in a potential later conflict, especially since the Anglo-French would be concerned that they wouldn't have US support in such a conflict. Germany, already drained as it is may not be able to maintain that control, especially with pressure for social and political reform inside Germany itself that is likely, but that is unclear at the time and not something the allies could really afford to rely on.
Where it might work would be if presented to the German population and to a lesser degree allied public opinion for morale reasons and then waged a purely defensive war in the west which at the very least is likely to prolong the war and might result, with better management of Germany, might lead to a negotiated settlement which sees a basic return to the 1914 border in the west and Germany maintaining some gains in the east. Especially since by that time there would probably be growing concern about the state Lenin was building in Russia. However that would need a much better leader rather than the lunatic that was Ludendorff, who had largely taken over from the idiocy of Kaiser Wilhelm.
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