A different Soviet bloc

[eurofed]

The main idea of this scenario is an event sequence, either after WWI or during WWII, that makes Soviet Russia fail to mutilate Germany and subjugate half of it, but succeed in its centuries-old goal of taking over Southeastern Europe, Anatolia, and Persia to reach the warm seas. During TTL's Cold War, the Iron Curtain lies at the pre-WWII eastern border of Germany and Italy (give or take a few minor bits such as Prussia, Czechia, and Slovenia), but the Soviet bloc includes Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia (no Titoist split ITTL), Bulgaria, Albania, mainland Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Various possible PoDs may be used to create this scenario. One is the Soviets managing in 1918-21 to defeat Poland, overrun Finland and the Baltic states, save the Hungarian Reds from destruction and cooperate with them to crush Romania. Alternatively, no Nazis, a more aggressive Soviet leadership than Stalin, an anti-Communist WWII that catches the European powers unprepared and ends in a compromise peace favorable to the USSR even if the Red Army fails to conquer Western Europe. Yet another possibility is the Heer overthrowing the Nazi regime in 1943-44 and achieving a de facto conditional surrender with the Western powers that lets them occupy all of Germany (but East Prussia that is lost to the Soviets) in exchange for guarantees to keep post-Anschluss Germany intact and free from Soviet occupation. The Red Army then scrambles to occupy the Balkans and the Near East to make up for the difference. The main difficulty I perceive is to let the USSR take over Turkey and Iran w/o driving the Western powers into a military confrontation with the Soviets, but I think it is doable with the right butterflies.

Depending on the PoD and political butterflies, the Soviet leaders may organize their empire in various possible ways (showed in the maps). One option is an OTL-style system of Sovietized client states (with the possible exception of Finland becoming a SSR) that keep OTL borders. Another possibility is Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania becoming SSRs, while the Yugoslav states, Bulgaria, Albania, and mainland Greece are merged in a Communist Balkan Federation. Turkey and Iran become Sovietized client states in any case. In this latter variant, a significant deal of border adjustment takes place, such as Finnmark and Lappland becoming a Lapp SSR, the Finnish SSR getting Eastern Karelia, the Polish SSR getting Lwow (and East Prussia in a variant of the scenario), the Hungarian SSR getting its 1942 borders, the Romanian SSR keeping Moldova, the Banat region becoming a multi-ethnic SSR, Iranian Azerbaijan merging with the Soviet portion, Turkish and Iranian Kurdistan forming a Kurd SSR, and Soviet Armenia annexing most of Western Armenia (with an ethnic cleansing of the Turkish population to be replaced by Armenian and Russian settlers).

ITTL Germany is united, democratic, and keeps Pomerania, Silesia, and Austria in any case. Depending on the PoD, it may lose East Prussia or gain West Prussia and Upper Silesia. The Czech republic is part of the Western bloc, and depending on the PoD the Sudetenland may be part of it with extensive autonomy rights or belong to Germany, but ethnic cleansing of the German population never takes place. Italy keeps its pre-WWII borders and Slovenia may be part of Communist Yugoslavia/Balkan Federation or be a pro-Western independent republic. NATO exists much like OTL, except depending on the PoD it may just be a Western European integrated defence organization with Britain and the White Dominions, include the USA as well, or have a global dimension with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea. Depending on the PoD, the Japanese Empire may survive, have experienced liberalization, and keep the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, Taiwan, all of Sakhalin, the Kurils, and Hainan. Alternatively, Japan and Korea are united, independent, and belong in the Western bloc. Greek right-wingers, Britain, Italy, and the other Western powers cooperated to keep the Greek Ionian and Aegean islands, Crete, the Dodecanese, and Cyprus free from the Communist onslaught and merged them to form a pro-Western 'free Greece' state.

ITTL the Western European core of the EU includes Germany, France, Italy, Benelux, Spain, Portugal (ITTL Iberia returned to democracy faster than OTL), the Czech republic, and possibly Slovenia. Thanks to the looming Soviet threat, it experienced a deeper degree of quasi-federal integration than OTL. Since its inception the European integration process included economic, security, and political aspects that grew to include a common market, a common army, and a supranational democratic government with a directly elected lower chamber, an upper chamber made by the states' representatives, and an executive responsible to the European parliament to oversee all aspects of integration. By the end of the 20th century, it grew into a federal superstate in all but name, with monetary and fiscal integration, supranational taxation and budget, full security, judicial, and foreign-policy integration, complete freedom of movement for people and goods, a common citizenship, a Pan-European semi-presidential government with a continental party system. Britain and the Nordic countries are solid members of NATO, but depending on political butterflies they may have joined the European federalization process in full or have pursued integration processes of their own (Britain with the rest of the Anglosphere, the Nordic countries among themselves to form a Nordic Union) and keep a looser bond of trade and security cooperation with the EU. In any case, the Soviet threat at their northern-eastern border made the Nordic countries much less nationalist, Euroskeptic, and prone to neutrality than OTL. Depending on the PoD, Sweden may include the Aaland islands.

ITTL the USSR is still recognizably Leninist-Stalinist in character and stays so throughout its history, but Stalin may or may not ever be its supreme leader. In any case, its leadership was significantly more aggressive and expansionist than OTL. ITTL the Soviet leaders managed to keep an iron grip on all of their bloc. The likes of Tito and Mao with aspirations to autonomy got a bullet in the head or a one-way trip to the gulags for their trouble. In Asia, the USSR annexed Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria (won in a war with Japan that failed to conquer Korea) as SSRs. Depending on the PoD and butterflies, either all of mainland China proper belongs to the PRC and is aligned to Moscow, or it got divided between Communist North China and pro-Western South China, with a demarcation line at the Huai River-Qin Mountains line. Taiwan and Hainan may belong to Japan, form the RoC, or be part of South China. Tibet is independent. Afghanistan is under Soviet control.

You are welcome to discuss the effects on Cold War and post-Cold War history of these changes.

Attachments:

[Krall]

An interesting scenario - are you planning on expanding this to a full timeline?

[eurofed]

Mar 18, 2016 16:23:46 GMT Krall said:

An interesting scenario - are you planning on expanding this to a full timeline?

Maybe, although my RL situation is such I'm still hesitant to undergo the committment of writing full TLs. In any case, I'd like to get some significant feedback on the scenario to help me develop it and choose between the various possible PoD alternatives and main butterflies not already set in stone. I'm a bit uncertain about variants, as shown by the fact I posted two slightly different maps of TTL Cold War Europe. Although I'd perhaps prefer to pick the option that diverges from OTL Cold War the more, for various reasons.

Moreover, there are important areas of the world my established scenario does not really mention, such as the rest of the Middle East and Asia. Israel may or may not exist at all, depending on chosen PoD - although if it does it is quite possible it is more successful than OTL, having a bigger Jewish population and component than OTL and including all of Mandatory Palestine (thanks to more or all European Jews surviving if there are no Nazis or are overthrown earlier, many Eastern European Jews emigrating to Palestine to escape the Communist onslaught, and the Arabs fleeing or being expelled as usual). Moreover, with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan being under the Soviet thumb, it is quite possible the Western powers let the Sykes-Picot Agreement go in the dustbin of history and allow Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Kuwait to merge into an Hashemite Kingdom of Greater Syria to be an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle East. Such a Pan-Arab Mashriq state might well absorb Khuzestan as well during the downfall of Iran and would naturally get Mandatory Palestine if the Jewish homeland fails to form. For pretty much the same reasons, the British and the Indian nationalists might agree to drop the idea of partition and form a Greater India with Pakistan and Ceylon. Southeast Asia may go very differently depending on whether it has the PRC or South China on its northern border. I'm uncertain how decolonization of Africa would turn out ITTL, many butterflies are possible but probably the PoD is too late to create a radical difference in outcome (e.g. perhaps part of North Africa may get Europeanized enough to stay bound to the EU if WWII is not so destructive to Europe).

[orvillethird]

I think it's a great idea, though Israel might go communist. My only problem would be that even with the West hanging onto Germany, they may want to give West Poland its own state and not put it under German rule.

[eurofed]

Mar 22, 2016 2:18:41 GMT orvillethird said:

I think it's a great idea, though Israel might go communist. My only problem would be that even with the West hanging onto Germany, they may want to give West Poland its own state and not put it under German rule.

If Greater Israel does form ITTL, an interesting inversion of OTL Cold War dynamics might certainly take place depending on the PoD and political butterflies, with Israel going pro-Soviet together with Turkey and Iran. In such a case, Egypt, Greater Syria (even more likely in such a case), and Saudi Arabia would in all likelihood align with the West. I do not see it either alternative as especially likely in these circumstances, but it's definitely possible. In such a case, Islamism might be much less of a problem for the West since Cold War tensions would drive conservative Muslims to focus their hostility on Communism and pro-Soviet Israel and Iran (fuelling Arab-Persian enmity) first and foremost. This is likely to occur to some degree even if Israel sides with the West. Arab-Israeli hostility would of course still be quite fierce ITTL if probably a bit less bitter in the long term for the lack of an occupied Arab population in West Bank and Gaza. Of course, once Communism falls, history may rhyme and violent Islamist loonies refocus their hatred on the liberal West anyway.  

In this scenario we can certainly expect a lot of Muslim resistance to Communist rule in Sovietized Turkey and Iran, although Leninism-Stalinism at the mid-20th century apex of its strength and brutality had certainly the ruthless methods available to break the back of any such resistance, rather more so than OTL 1980s USSR in Afghanistan, at least until the USSR itself starts to weaken. A possible interesting butterfly of this scenario, regardless of the side Israel takes, is the looming Soviet strategic threat on the Middle East from Communist Turkey and Iran might persuade the USA and the EU to pursue energy independence from Arab oil by developing nuclear power, renewable energy sources, and/or more secure fossil-fuel sources elsewhere. Alternatively, the West as a whole might get even more determined than OTL to defend its interests in the Middle East by all means necessary.

West Poland is certainly possible as well in a variant of this scenario, but it would require military butterflies that let either the Anglo-Americans in late WWII or post-WWI Weimar Germany be even more successful and the Iron Curtain be established further east, say on the Vistula and the Danube. In such a case, you would have West Poland, quite likely West Hungary too, and quite possibly pro-Western independent Croatia as well. I think I might perhaps create a variant of the map that represents such a situation. I assume in such a case the Soviets would perhaps let East Poland and East Hungary (and by extension Slovakia and Romania) exist as nominally independent Sovietized client states for political reasons in the post-WWII variant  (in the post-WWI they may simply not care given their internationalist stance and make them SSRs), although the Finnish SSR and the Communist Balkan Federation are still quite possible. In such a case, indeed West Poland, West Hungary, and Croatia would exist and be the frontline of the Western bloc and NATO/EU members during the Cold War.

In the version I picked in the OP, where the pre-WWII eastern border of Germany, Czechia, and Italy becomes the final demarcation line (with the possible exception of East Prussia and Slovenia for strategic reasons), West Poland is simply not feasible. In the post-WWII variant because all of Poland (with East Prussia) is on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain, in the post-WWI one because if Weimar Germany is able to stop the Reds at its own border after they conquer Eastern Europe, it would simply re-annex Danzig, West Prussia and Upper Silesia. The Germans almost surely would not care to set up a rump "free Poland" in the Corridor given their own feelings on the issue, they would claim at the very least the 1807 border as the price of their military effort, and I simply do not see the Entente powers caring enough about the Poles to strongarm the Germans into setting up a tiny Polish state in West Prussia. The British, the Americans, and the Italians would quickly realign to support a strong Weimar Germany as an anti-Soviet bulwark in this scenario, and the French would be overruled by the combined pressure of the other Western powers. Also because in these circumstances you may almost surely expect the people of West Prussia and Upper Silesia to choose union with Germany in a plebiscite if Poland has fallen to the Reds.

In the WWII PoD version, the infamous Oder-Neisse border, division of Germany, and independent Austria cannot exist because post-Nazi Germans are able to bargain a de facto conditional unilateral surrender to the Western Allies and a shorter, less costly war in Europe for a guarantee of 1938 ethnic borders (minus East Prussia that is most likely lost to the Red Army anyway and the Sudetenland that may be returned to Czechia but with no ethnic cleansing of Germans), national unity, no Morgenthau Plan-style deindustrialization, and no Soviet occupation for Germany. In addition to a successful Valkyrie-style anti-Nazi coup on 1943-44, I can think of various PoDs that may make the Western Allies pragmatic, suspicious of the USSR, and not blinded by anti-German hatred enough to be willing and take this deal. 

A possible event sequence includes an Entente intervention in the Winter War and its bombing of Baku, a Soviet invasion of Turkey and Iran, a temporary German-Soviet alliance, and WWII eventually turning into a three-way fight. Nazi Germany reluctantly accepts the USSR as an Axis member for a while, until Barbarossa occurs. FDR drops dead or gets incapacitated by an early stroke in 1938-40, and another, less pro-Soviet internationalist Democratic or Republican (say any of Cordell Hull, Farley, Willkie, or Dewey; the other pro-Soviet idiot Wallace had no chance w/o FDR's patronage) is elected President in 1940 and 1944. He's still anti-fascist but just as much anti-communist and not so Germanophobe as FDR. Even if Barbarossa may drive the Western Allies and the USSR to nominal cobelligerance, trust and cooperation between them remains non-existent, and they keep treating each other as enemies throughout the war. The USSR never gets any Lend-Lease or at least it is greatly curtailed from the beginning and shut off when the Red Army gets close to prewar borders.

As a result, Soviet ability to overrun Central Europe before the war ends is greatly curtailed. Nonetheless, the USSR is able to leverage its control of the Near East and support of local Communist partisans as a strategic springboard to take over the Balkans. A successful anti-Nazi coup occurs in 1943-44 because the German Resistance gets more support in the Wehrmacht since the Western Allies show more willingness to deal with it. After more favorable peace terms prove impossible, the post-Nazi junta is able to bargain a de facto conditional surrender to the Western Allies and acceptance of their military occupation for a guarantee of internationally-recognized/ethnic borders, national unity, no deindustrialization or other collective punishment, and no Soviet occupation for Axis countries. For Germany this means 1938 borders, with the exception of East Prussia, which is lost to the Red Army anyway, and the Sudetenland which is returned to Czechia but with no ethnic cleansing and autonomy rights for the Germans. ITTL De Gaulle dies during the Fall of France so Free France does not exist. Temporary cobelligerance between Germany and the USSR is more than enough to persuade Spain and Vichy France to join the Axis. Spain invades and annexes Portugal, so ITTL Iberia returns to democracy after the war like the rest of Western Europe, and may join EU and NATO from the beginning. The Anglo-Americans treat postwar France like a defeated enemy nation so it turns out less nationalist than OTL.

In these circumstances, the Anglo-Americans would sure love to liberate the rest of Europe in addition to France, Benelux, Iberia, Scandinavia, Germany, Czechia, and Italy but they may be more or less successful in this depending on military butterflies. In the version of the scenario described in the OP, they only manage to reach the Oder and the Iron Curtain is on the eastern borders of pre-WWII Germany, Czechia, Italy, and Slovenia. In another version, they get farther, the Iron Curtain is on the Vistula and the Danube, and Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia are divided. The Western Allies fail to liberate the Balkans (despite the complaints of the British) since the Americans choose to focus on Western Europe first and they get busy conquering the Arab world and invading Italy, Iberia, and France, so the Soviets grab the region by default. Once the European Axis surrenders the Americans are eager to focus on Japan and a bit war-weary, so they accept a compromise deal with the Soviets that leaves them in control of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and Iran. They fail to realize the USSR utterly exhausted its own resources fighting the Germans w/o Lend-Lease and would fold like a house of cards if America continued the war. War in Europe ends well before American nukes become available. Western failure to liberate the Balkans and continue the war to the decisive defeat of the USSR and liberation of Eastern Europe gets endlessly and bitterly regretted by the Western world and anti-Communist dissidents during the Cold War. Nonetheless, the Americans are wary enough of the USSR to take care and occupy all of Korea during the downfall of Japan and force the Soviets to pull out of the Levant and Mesopotamia. China and Indochina may go in different ways.

[eurofed]

This map describes a more pro-Western version of the same basic scenario, with the Iron Curtain being placed on the Vistula-Danube line. This demarcation line divides Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia but keeps the Balkans and the Near East a Soviet playground. It largely reproduces the Eastern Front frontline in late 1944, so I assume it makes some strategic sense. This variant still assumes the Soviets annex Finland, eastern Anatolia, and northwestern Persia, and create the Balkan Federation out of the fusion of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and mainland Greece. However since Poland and Hungary are divided the Soviets let their halves of these nations and by extension Slovakia and Romania exist as Communist client states for political reasons - this is more likely with a WWII PoD, since with a post-WWI one they are less likely to care due to their strong internationalist viewpoint at the time. For the same reasons, East Poland, East Hungary, and Romania are assumed to get a few ATL territorial compensations (East Prussia and Lwow, Northern Transylvania, and Moldova respectively) to reinforce them against their Western counterparts and/or consolation prizes. Insular South Greece exists much like in the OP version.

This version assumes France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, Spain, Portugal, West Poland, Czechia, West Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia qualify to be founding members of the evolving quasi-federal EU or at least join it by late Cold War. On the other hand, I'm uncertain whether Malta and South Greece would fulfill EU membership standards by the same time, and whether TTL Britain, Ireland, and Scandinavia would care to embrace an European integration process that aims to a clear federal superstate endpoint. So these states are only marked as NATO members - Soviet Finland means Swedish neutrality is dead and buried. The only European states that still care and can afford to adopt a neutral stance are Ireland, Switzerland, and the microstates. I'm fine with picking either this variant or the OP one as the default version of the scenario. Pick whatever look most interesting to you. Certain ATL features that show up in all maps of mine, however, are necessary components of the scenario.

[eurofed]

ITTL the strategic dynamic between the blocs is interesting. The West's worst nightmare is a Communist seizure of the Arab oilfields rather than a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, although of course the latter remains another most serious concern. The Soviet bloc has the upper hand in the Middle East (even more so if it is allied with Greater Israel) and may easily threaten to choke the West's energy lifeline if the USA and the EU don't pursue energy independence. However the European army alone is likely more than enough to stop the Red Army dead in its tracks in the European theater by conventional means, American assistance being a very helpful overkill. On the other hand, a lot of US military power is tied down to help defend Japan and Korea from a Sino-Soviet onslaught. The Western bloc as a whole is rather stronger than OTL since it includes two superpowers, the USA and the EU (the latter with all the choice bits of Central Europe). The USSR likely strives to compensate through a tight grip on its own clients, a close bond with the PRC, and even more brute-force resource extraction from its own territories and its allies'. Quite likely also even more destabilization attempts and proxy meddling in the Third World. The Soviet bloc can probably compensate lack of Central European industry with control of Near Eastern and Central Asian resources, and more so avoidance of the Sino-Soviet split. Nonetheless, long-term competition with America and Europe looks even more unsustainable than OTL for Soviet Russia and Red China. This may easily be a reason for Communism to fall earlier and in a messier way than OTL, with no equivalent of the PRC reforms. Of course, nuclear deterrent works as an equalizer for both sides. India's role may vary according to political butterflies but most likely Soviet control of Central Asia and China as well as likely non-existence of Pakistan would drive the Indians to align with the West. On the other hand, if the RoC includes South China, Indian neutrality gets a bit more likely, but not that likely since they would still have to fear the Soviets on their north-western flank.

In this context, NATO warplans in all likelihood provide for a quick and major deployment of American, European, British, and Commonwealth forces in the Middle East whenever a military confrontation with the Soviet bloc is threatened, similar to what happened IOTL during the two Gulf wars if on a bigger scale. South Greece with Cyprus gets to be rather useful for this, since the Western bloc has no other reliable bases available in the Med east of Italy. Theoretically speaking, the optimal solution would be to include the Arab countries in NATO and/or place a lot of Western military bases in North Africa and the Middle East but this would be rather difficult for various reasons. Soviet warplans in all likelihood envisage a quick seizure of the Levant, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, a blockade of the Persian Gulf, and interdiction of the Eastern Med. On the other hand, the Western powers would be rather stupid if they don't sponsor a lot of infrastructure to bypass the Persian Gulf and have Arab oil and gas be shipped through the Med and the Red Sea.

[orvillethird]

Of course, OTL in which the West used the Wahabi sect of Islam to push for anti-Soviet Jihad worked....but it worked too well, as we have seen since the Embassy Bombings in North Africa.

[eurofed]

The outcome of the Arab world is certainly one of the most interesting topics of this scenario. Its history surely may essentially follow OTL’s footsteps, and so end in more or less the same sorry state. It also has the potential to turn out significantly better, depending on what happens during the Cold War. The Western bloc, unless it pursues a radically different policy (quite possible) of energy independence from Arab oil, needs to secure a fairly reliable strategic and economic grip on the Arab world despite the looming Soviet threat. To be any stable, this needs to be beneficial enough to the Arabs that they aren’t driven to rebellion against Western imperialism and they are willing to aside resentment for previous colonial domination.

A fairly cheap and effective for the West to help win the sympathies of the Arabs would be generous investment for infrastructure in the Arab countries (especially the ones that may boost agriculture, water availability, and industrialization) and Western support for Pan-Arabism during decolonization. Consolidation of the Arab world in a few Pan-Arab states thanks to Western support would help improve the stability of the region and its defense against the Soviet threat since Pan-Arabism had solid popular support during the Cold War. Sensible options would include merger of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and Khuzestan in an Hashemite Kingdom of Greater Syria, a Maghreb Union under the leadership of Morocco, the merger of Egypt and North Sudan, and a Greater Arabia union of Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Yemen, possibly w/o the Saudi dynasty on top.

Optimally, North Africa should get the option during decolonization to get self-rule but stay bound to Europe with solid free trade and security ties that may promote secondary industrialization, growth of a middle class, and eventually democratization, with the very long term goal of inclusion in the European integration process. If done early enough this kind of policy may prevent the Algerian War, the Suez Crisis, and their negative consequences. Complete union of Europe is sure to generate a lot of economic growth that may easily spill over in its neighborhood. This is sure to involve Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism but may easily affect North Africa and the rest of the Arab world to a lesser degree in the late phase of the Cold War. Industrialization and solid economic, political, and security ties between Europe and the Arab world would a lot to heal the woes of the Middle East. It would be easier ITTL since the West and the Arabs would share a common enemy in the Communist bloc looming in the North and the divisive element of Israel may easily swing to the Soviet side.

In the long term, even a pro-Soviet Israel is fairly likely to switch sides to the Western bloc because of its democratic and capitalist character, and since over time the greater success of the Western world would be more and more evident. If it happens late enough, however, it would not that much of a poison pill for West-Arab relations it would otherwise be. ITTL the Arab-Israeli relationship has the potential to turn somewhat less bitter and hostile since no equivalent of West Bank and Gaza exists and all of Mandatory Palestine got strongly Jewish in character during the birth of Israel.

Conversely, the Arab world has the potential to turn as bad as OTL if the same conditions reproduce: no real economic growth and industrialization occurs apart from the fossil-fuel revenues, the latter get squandered by corrupt aristocratic and bureaucratic elites, the region remains trapped in the diabolical choice between despotism and extremism, popular resentment embraces anti-Western radicalism out of frustration for the above and the West’s support for corrupt and tyrannical regimes.

As it concerns the portion of the Muslim world under Soviet control, the USSR is surely going to try and use anti-colonial resentment of the Arab elites and masses as a tool to destabilize the region. Unless the West screws it bad, this is not going to be very effective since Muslim public opinion is going to be rather suspicious and resentful of the USSR for its brutal domination of a big portion of the Umma. Sovietized Turkey and Persia are likely going to turn out not much different from Soviet Central Asia in character, if rather more rebellious and resentful. After Soviet conquest there is going to be a lot of armed resistance and popular opposition to Communist rule, but the USSR in this period may be expected to break the back of such rebellions with extreme ruthlessness, all the way to extensive use of poison gas, mass killings, and deportations if necessary. Because of this, we may expect TTL Communist Turkey and Iran to resemble more the most restive portions of OTL Eastern Europe rather than OTL Afghanistan, at least until the Communist bloc comes close to a fall.

Soviet rule would likely bring a fair deal of modernization and industrialization to the Near East, but as usual of poor quality and dubious livability once the system collapses. The outcome of the Near East after Communism falls largely depends on how quickly and effectively the West can intervene to stabilize and provide socio-economic relief to these countries, whether reformist moderates or nationalist-Islamists radicals get on top in the regime change, and whether America and Europe make the very poor choice to support Islamism as an anti-Communist proxy during the Cold War. Depending on these factors, post-Communist Turkey and Iran may turn fairly decent members of the international community or rogue states bent on dealing misery on their neighbors and the rest of the world. Afghanistan and the ‘Stans likely won’t turn very different from OTL.

[Kubo Caskett]

If this TL takes place around the end of WWII, then I would expect a situation in Germany similar to Japan's where the evil regime goes away after a surrender (though it would have to be a coup by the Wehrmacht) but has a good share of "revisionists" who have plenty of influence in German society (and no doubt p###ing off its neighbors).

[eurofed]

Mar 26, 2016 0:08:10 GMT Kubo Caskett said:

If this TL takes place around the end of WWII, then I would expect a situation in Germany similar to Japan's where the evil regime goes away after a surrender (though it would have to be a coup by the Wehrmacht) but has a good share of "revisionists" who have plenty of influence in German society (and no doubt p###ing off its neighbors).

If we pick the WWII scenario described above, the analogy does not seem really fitting, for various reasons. First, Germany still gets Anglo-American occupation, and the Western Allies still use that time to remold German society in their image. Second, Germany is still embedded in, and gently muzzled by, the NATO/EU framework, which is considerably stronger than OTL if any. Third, TTL Germans are somewhat less focused on eternal national guilt and self-loathing than OTL, but they have reason to, since here Germany partially redeemed itself by bringing down the Nazis on its own and containing the damage they caused. Rather than OTL Germany or OTL Japan, perhaps the best analogy for TTL Germany is OTL Italy, which acknowledges its fascist past, but does not let it dominate its national consciousness and international relations, either as a subject of guilt or of denial. The main difference with OTL as it concerns German attitude towards Nazism is because of the Wehrmacht's role in bringing down the regime, pretty much all the blame for Nazi crimes is cast on the Nazi leaders and party, the SS, and the Gestapo, while the Heer is largely seen in a positive or neutral image, and there is less guilt-ridden anti-militarism. There is a lot of the idea that the guilty ones were the card-carrying Nazis and ideological true believers in genocidal racism, while the German people at large was duped or coerced by them in going the wrong way and fighting for a wrong cause.

As it concerns the other European nations, they do not harbor any more anti-German resentment than OTL, for various reasons: the EU is a huge success story ITTL, and history shows how strong it may be as an agent of reconciliation; the Nazis did relatively little damage for their standards to Western Europe, and ITTL all the most important nations (Germany, Italy, France, Spain) share some significant guilt in fascism's crimes and some significant opposition to fascism. As it concerns Eastern Europe, the folks lucky enough to be on the right side of the Iron Curtain (Czechs, West Poles, West Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats) are far too dependent on support from the rest of EU/NATO, of which Germany is a most important component, to keep their freedom and prosperity, to be able and afford much resentment; a few of them even share an Axis past. ITTL the growth of a solid Pan-European identity and political system thanks to federalization drives Europe to focus much less on its blood-soaked nationalist past as an object of nostalgia or resentment. For the peoples unlucky enough to be in the Soviet bloc, history shows firsthand experience of Communism does wonders to put Nazism in much more of a relative perspective. If anything, TTL Communism seems headed to be even more brutal and destructive than OTL, and fall in a messier way. Once it happens, TTL Eastern Europe is going to experience more or less the same experience as OTL, which demonstrably left behind little lasting resentment for WWII events. If anything TTL the process shall be even more successful since the federal EU is much more capable to reform, rehabilitate, and integrate Eastern Europe thanks to its greater resources and stronger organization.

East Poland, East Hungary, and Slovakia by extension shall be grandfathered in the EU more or less like the DDR, if perhaps in bit more gradual and flexible way because of more stringent membership qualifications. Finland, Lappland, and the Baltic states shall more or less follow OTL Baltic template for the region. Theoretically speaking, there is the potential for a lot of ethnic strife to happen about contested lands between East Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Albania, and North Greece when the Balkan Federation inevitably dissolves, of a kind that would dwarf OTL post-Yugoslav wars. But TTL NATO/EU look strong and united enough to pacify and stabilize the area rather more quickly and effectively than OTL. Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and North Greece shall likely take as much as OTL Romania and Bulgaria to join NATO/EU (North Greece is far too big in comparison to South Greece for the latter to assimilate and grandfather the former in the Western bloc). TTL Western bloc is so strong and prosperous that in all likelihood Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus states shall be inexorably driven to join NATO/EU, regardless of Russia's feelings on the matter and attempts to meddle. Any Russian attempt to pull something similar to the Donbass War shall be curbstomped by the Western powers quickly and efficiently, although a negotiated compromise about Crimea is possible, or quite possibly ITTL Crimea never becomes part of Ukraine in the first place. Provided Islamism is not a serious global problem and/or Turkey does not fall prey to it, the same may easily apply to Turkey as well.