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Post by steve59 on Jul 4, 2017 9:42:38 GMT
Originally quoted by steve59: That is the most likely scenario. Having a South German state while trying to expand into the Balkans would result in a far bloodier collapse that makes the collapse of Austria-Hungary look like the Velvet Divorce. I could see Austria and Saxony compromising on where their spheres of influence would lie. Saxony, with its control over northern and western Germany, would no doubt focus on maritime trade with Scandinavia and Britain while Austria would probably reorient itself towards the Adriatic. OTL Great Northern War did have an episode where Poland under Augustus II (from Saxony) fought together with Russia against Sweden before he was overthrown. It wouldn't be farfetched to have Poland and Russia form an uneasy alliance in the face of their targeted common enemy, from Sweden to the Ottoman Turks. I don't mean total Polish conquest of the Balkans and annexing it, I meant that Poland might install client kings who would be friendly to Polish interests. They would still follow the faith of their subjects though. I could imagine Saxony ditching North America for parts of Africa (I wouldn't be surprised if the lands of what is now OTL South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola may end up controlled by the Saxon colonists) and perhaps a lot of trading posts dotted around the world. Heck, they could even establish smaller colonies on the Indian subcontinent. I suspect that both Saxony and Russia would want a rump Polish state to serve as a buffer between the two nations. Moreover, there's always Sweden or united Scandinavia to serve as another buffer zone. However, Russia would be hemmed in by a rump Polish state and a much stronger Sweden or Scandinavia. OK take your point about occasional Polish/Russian co-operation, although IIRC that was more a case of the Saxon Wettin claimant to the Polish crown being supported by Russia against a Polish candidate for the throne supported by Sweden. However even in this case it was fairly short lived and the two nations were basically contesting the same region so were natural rivals. Also thanks for the explanation of the Polish protectorates in the Balkans. Doubt they would be able to maintain influence that far south although if Russia was too heavy handed about seeking to influence Greece especially that might make Poland as a protector look more attractive. This does assume that Poland avoids its OTL constitutional problems and resultant decline. Swedish colonial expansion would depend on the time-scale and when they feel secure enough in N Germany to look far overseas. Suspect that the Dutch would be pretty securely established in the Cape before this but Saxony could well pick up some places in southern or possibly eastern Africa [which was colonised fairly lately] along with a Caribbean island or two and possibly some outposts in India and N America. Their military strength in Europe might protect those from attack from European rivals as long as Saxony isn't involved in a great war. However until the industrial age their going to be at a distinct disadvantage compared to Britain, France and the Netherlands because of geography and the greater priority that the Saxons would have to place on their army. As I said to MN my understanding is that Russia was the main driver for the partition of Poland, albeit that Prussia was quite eager as well. In this situation you might have Saxony and Austria opposing partition, provided they are on friendly terms and not too pre-occupied with events elsewhere. I think that Russia would still seek to absorb the eastern Polish lands with the bulk of them being Orthodox and the coastal ones being important for giving Russia access to the Baltic. [Although again Sweden is an important figure here as well]. Presuming the Polish decline occurs as OTL when Russia starts getting near the Polish heartland the two German powers have to decide whether to oppose further Russian gains or as Austria did OTL join in to take a share of the partition, gaining territory and a directly controlled buffer against Russia.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 4, 2017 18:29:49 GMT
As it concerns Alsace and Lorraine, we should be mindful that for all the nationalist drama the French made about the region in 1870-1914, France only acquired the region (including the Franche-Comte) by gradual conquest that exploited the post-TYW weakness and disunity of the HRE during the 17th-18th century, previously it had belonged to the Empire pretty much since the time France and Germany became recognizable states. Therefore, it is perfectly possible and probably even likely ITTL the rise of Saxony to great power status, which happens considerably earlier than OTL Prussia, and its strategic focus on northern and western Germany harness enough of Germany's latent might that the French bid to push the border away from the Meuse gets essentially frustrated. This is especially likely if and when Saxony and Austria can establish a sensible division of their spheres of influence between Saxon northern-western Germany and Habsburg southern Germany-northern Italy, and an alliance of convenience can be forged to protect these areas from French expansionist greed. We should not take for granted TTL France is any especially likely to conquer Alsace, Lorraine, or Franche-Comte, not any more so than OTL France was able to expand in the Low Countries, western Germany, or northern Italy.
Moreover, as it concerns the division of Imperial lands between the Saxon and Habsburg spheres of influence, we should also be mindful that in comparison to the Austro-Prussian case, early inclusion of Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Silesia, and Bohemia-Moravia in the Wettin core is inevitably going to push the 'natural' geopolitical demarcation line between the German great powers considerably southward than OTL. E.g. one can make the case such a border shall more or less lie on the Metz-Nuremberg line, so only southern Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comte, Baden, Wurttemberg, Old Bavaria, Switzerland, and North italy shall be 'naturally' pulled in the Habsburg sphere of influence, while Luxemburg, northern Lorraine, Palatinate, and Franconia shall be 'naturally' pulled into the Wettin sphere of influence, just like Rhineland-Westphalia and Hanover. The Southern Netherlands would be largely cut off from Habsburg reach sooner rather than later, so their acquisition by France or partition between the French and the Dutch seems the natural outcome.
I agree the natural outcome for Prussia ITTL seems either its full assimilation in Poland or its acquisition by Saxony or Sweden if the PLC undergoes the same decay process as OTL and a partial partition of its lands occurs. In the latter case, a complete partition may well be avoided if Saxony, Sweden, and Austria are interested to keep a reasonably small Commonwealth alive in its Polish-Lithuanian core as a buffer against Russia. If the PLC weakens, however, its maximum size was bloated and overextended, and I don't see how Russia may be reasonbly kept out of its eastern territories, much less how the PLC may be expected to project any influence in the Balkans. If Russia grabs its piece, Austria may or may not be interested in Galicia. ITTL its entire strategic vector is pushed southward, so it might go both ways. Much the same way, Wettin strategic interests lie more westward than the Hohenzollern, and Sweden may well be more successful in the Baltic thanks to Saxon help, so both powers may or may or may be interested in grabbing Prussia. Thanks to trade revenues, however, a case may done, esp. if such wealth would look 'wasted' in the hands of a weak Poland threatened by Russian ambitions.
If Poland remains strong, it can certainly keep almost all its maximum territory (a few minor losses in the East seem kind of inevitable with the rise of Russia) and absorb Prussia, but even in the case of a strong PLC cooperating with the other regional powers to kick the Ottomans out of the Europe sooner rather than later, I have serious difficulty for geopolitical reasons to visualize their possible gains going much further than say Moldavia and Novorossiya, as well Bulgaria and Greece if they become the dominant power of the Black Sea. In the case Russia rises to displace Poland in the region and a partition of the Ottoman Empire occurs, those lands would instead be the natural bounty of the Russians, as well as much of Anatolia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia they can grab (forget Persia, they were too weak in this age to contest Russia if Turkey goes down). In the unlikely case both Poland and Russia are strong and can agree to cooperate against the Ottomans, a possible scheme might be eastern Balkans to Poland, Near East to Russia, but expect serious squabbling for division of the spoils. In any case, if the Ottomans fall, Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia, and Albania naturally belong in the Austria spoils, no buts or ifs.
A more successful Netherlands (or Britain for that matter) does not seem the right analogy for Saxony, since it is too much skewed in the favor of naval power, trade, and colonial expansion. Much as their early hegemony of northern and western Germany would make them much more interested in naval power and colonialism, the same reason and their position in the center of Europe would make them strongly interested in land power, territorial expansion in Europe, and as much as militarist as France or Austria, if not necessarily as enamored of its army as OTL Prussia. The best analogy seems France, half militarist-expansionist land power, half trade-oriented colonial power.
Judging from insight, one may certainly argue massive expansion in Italy and/or the Balkans might be unwise for the Habsburg once romantic nationalism becomes a thing, but such a possible danger would be entirely outside the perspective of Ancient Regime monarchs and nobles. As the rise of Saxony would cut Austria off from the northern two-thirds of Germany, Italy and the Balkans would look like the natural alternative for Austria, being valuable (Italy rather more so than everything beyond Hungary, but the Balkan lands were valuable enough), close to the Habsburg core, and ripe for the taking if only France and the Ottomans could be kicked out. The natural strategic extensions of Hungary in the Balkans would be the Habsurg spoils if the Ottomans are crushed. In Italy, Venice (especially if its decay has set in), Tuscany, Parma, and Modena could be easily grabbed, Milan and Naples too if Spain weakens and experiences major succession trouble like OTL. This wouldn't expose Austria to any significant overstretch before the rise of nationalism, the main issue would be to secure enough alliance support to defeat regional rivals, i.e. Saxony against France for Italy, Poland and/or Russia against the Ottomans for the Balkans. If Spain remains sufficiently strong it would remain in control of South Italy and outside Austria's reach, although I think a deal could made for Milan in exchange for concessions elsewhere, and to divide the Italian lands between the Austrian and Spanish spheres of influence.
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 4, 2017 20:33:05 GMT
As it concerns Alsace and Lorraine, we should be mindful that for all the nationalist drama the French made about the region in 1870-1914, France only acquired the region (including the Franche-Comte) by gradual conquest that exploited the post-TYW weakness and disunity of the HRE during the 17th-18th century, previously it had belonged to the Empire pretty much since the time France and Germany became recognizable states. Therefore, it is perfectly possible and probably even likely ITTL the rise of Saxony to great power status, which happens considerably earlier than OTL Prussia, and its strategic focus on northern and western Germany harness enough of Germany's latent might that the French bid to push the border away from the Meuse gets essentially frustrated. This is especially likely if and when Saxony and Austria can establish a sensible division of their spheres of influence between Saxon northern-western Germany and Habsburg southern Germany-northern Italy, and an alliance of convenience can be forged to protect these areas from French expansionist greed. We should not take for granted TTL France is any especially likely to conquer Alsace. Lorraine, or Franche-Comte, not any more so than OTL France was able to expand in the Low Countries, western Germany, or northern Italy. Moreover, as it concerns the division of Imperial lands between the Saxon and Habsburg spheres of influence, we should also be mindful that in comparison to the Austro-Prussian case, early inclusion of Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Silesia, and Bohemia-Moravia in the Wettin core is inevitably going to push the 'natural' geopolitical demarcation line between the German great powers considerably southward than OTL. E.g. one can make the case such a border shall more or less lie on the Metz-Nuremberg line, so only southern Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comte, Baden, Wurttemberg, Old Bavaria, Switzerland, and North italy shall be 'naturally' pulled in the Habsburg sphere of influence, while Luxemburg, northern Lorraine, Palatinate, and Franconia shall be 'naturally' pulled into the Wettin sphere of influence, just like Rhineland-Westphalia and Hanover. The Southern Netherlands would be largely cut off from Habsburg reach sooner rather than later, so their acquisition by France or partition between the French and the Dutch seems the natural outcome. I agree the natural outcome for Prussia ITTL seems either its full assimilation in Poland or its acquisition by Saxony or Sweden if the PLC undergoes the same decay process as OTL and a partial partition of its lands occurs. In the latter case, a complete partition may well be avoided if Saxony, Sweden, and Austria are interested to keep a reasonably small Commonwealth alive in its Polish-Lithuanian core as a buffer against Russia. If the PLC weakens, however, its maximum size was bloated and overextended, and I don't see how Russia may be reasonbly kept out of its eastern territories, much less how the PLC may be expected to project any influence in the Balkans. If Russia grabs its piece, Austria may or may not be interested in Galicia. ITTL its entire strategic vector is pushed southward, so it might go both ways. Much the same way, Wettin strategic interests lie more westward than the Hohenzollern, and Sweden may well be more successful in the Baltic thanks to Saxon help, so both powers may or may or may be interested in grabbing Prussia. Thanks to trade revenues, however, a case may done, esp. if such wealth would look 'wasted' in the hands of a weak Poland threatened by Russian ambitions. If Poland remains strong, it can certainly keep almost all its maximum territory (a few minor losses in the East seem kind of inevitable with the rise of Russia) and absorb Prussia, but even in the case of a strong PLC cooperating with the other regional powers to kick the Ottomans out of the Europe sooner rather than later, I have serious difficulty for geopolitical reasons to visualize their possible gains going much further than say Moldavia and Novorossiya, as well Bulgaria and Greece if they become the dominant power of the Black Sea. In the case Russia rises to displace Poland in the region and a partition of the Ottoman Empire occurs, those lands would instead be the natural bounty of the Russians, as well as much of Anatolia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia they can grab (forget Persia, they were too weak in this age to contest Russia if Turkey goes down). In the unlikely case both Poland and Russia are strong and can agree to cooperate against the Ottomans, a possible scheme might be eastern Balkans to Poland, Near East to Russia, but expect serious squabbling for division of the spoils. In any case, if the Ottomans fall, Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia, and Albania naturally belong in the Austria spoils, no buts or ifs. A more successful Netherlands (or Britain for that matter) does not seem the right analogy for Saxony, since it is too much skewed in the favor of naval power, trade, and colonial expansion. Much as their early hegemony of northern and western Germany would make them much more interested in naval power and colonialism, the same reason and their position in the center of Europe would make them strongly interested in land power, territorial expansion in Europe, and as much as militarist as France or Austria, if not necessarily as enamored of its army as OTL Prussia. The best analogy seems France, half militarist-expansionist land power, half trade-oriented colonial power. Judging from insight, one may certainly argue massive expansion in Italy and/or the Balkans might be unwise for the Habsburg once romantic nationalism becomes a thing, but such a possible danger would be entirely outside the perspective of Ancient Regime monarchs and nobles. As the rise of Saxony would cut Austria off from the northern two-thirds of Germany, Italy and the Balkans would look like the natural alternative for Austria, being valuable (Italy rather more so than everything beyond Hungary, but the Balkan lands were valuable enough), close to the Habsburg core, and ripe for the taking if only France and the Ottomans could be kicked out. The natural strategic extensions of Hungary in the Balkans would be the Habsurg spoils if the Ottomans are crushed. In Italy, Venice (especially if its decay has set in), Tuscany, Parma, and Modena could be easily grabbed, Milan and Naples too if Spain weakens and experiences major succession trouble like OTL. This wouldn't expose Austria to any significant overstretch before the rise of nationalism, the main issue would be to secure enough alliance support to defeat regional rivals, i.e. Saxony against France for Italy, Poland and/or Russia against the Ottomans for the Balkans. If Spain remains sufficiently strong it would remain in control of South Italy and outside Austria's reach, although I think a deal could made for Milan in exchange for concessions elsewhere, and to divide the Italian lands between the Austrian and Spanish spheres of influence. I could think of a worsened conflict between Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic Knights in the 1519-21 Polish-Teutonic War where Albert of Hohenzollern dies in that conflict, leading Poland to annex Ducal Prussia entirely. Or in some weird compromise in a similar manner to the events that led to the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia but involving Sweden instead of Brandenburg, which you could have either the Stures or a minor noble family like the Vasas taking control of Prussia. And if Sweden really wanted to go ahead with its Baltic ambitions, they could simply lop off rump Lithuania and acquire Polish Livonia in order to attach it to its Estonian holdings.
Because of the ruling Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg and their potential marriage to the Wettins, it would be inevitable that Saxony can possibly place a claim on Prussia. However, any event involving the Poles and the Teutonic Knights would make the claim useless. However, the real question that I need to ask is, which Wettin prince or princess would be a good match for a Brandenburg branch of the Hohenzollern prince or princess in order to make this union work? Saxony or Brandenburg would still have to acquire Pomerania at some point. Perhaps a good trade in this case would be Swedish Pomerania going to Brandenburg-Saxony in exchange for Prussia going to Sweden.
I also think that a strong coalition of Poland-Lithuania (regardless of how strong or weak they are) and Sweden would be a good barrier to preventing Russia from expanding into the Baltic Sea region, and in this scenario Sweden would have control over Ingria. However, as a compromise Russia can keep Karelia while they're barred from the Baltic. Historically, the Poles and the Ottomans also had decent relations due to their common hatred of Russia, but that could easily change if the Poles intend on taking part, but having Serbia, Wallachia and Albania fall under Austrian influence also works too.
With Austria's case, in addition to its planned liberation of Hungary from Ottoman vassalage, I could see it expand right up to the Drina River, marking that river as the border between the Austrian and Polish spheres of influence. Bosnia would definitely be attached to Hungary through Croatia while Austria proper would have included Istria, Styria, Venice, Tyrol, Lichtenstein, Bavaria and several other minor southern German duchies. The Italian peninsula might also become the center of a fierce major competition between Austrian, French and Spanish interests.
I could take a guess that there might be a few Anatolian successor states that would be forcibly smashed by Russian ambitions if they got their wish in Anatolia, dismantling the Ottomans in the process while the eastern Balkans end up under Polish influence. I agree that Saxony's political and national development might be similar to that of France's own national development in that they would divide their attention between colonial trade and military prowess. However, if I were to take a guess at what the Saxons will do in terms of building their colonies (especially settler colonies), I'd say that they would do the French did and send only single males with experience in the fur trade while intermarrying with indigenous women on a similar manner to how the Metis came to being.
As for Russia and the fate of the Ottomans in Anatolia, my ideal guess will be that several new states might also be established as well. I can see Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Kurdistan, an enlarged Armenia Kingdom, and Mesopotamia/Iraq would be established as pro-Russian client states, while the Mameluk dynasty would be restored in Egypt to oversee the Hejaz region.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 4, 2017 21:12:54 GMT
I could think of a worsened conflict between Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic Knights in the 1519-21 Polish-Teutonic War where Albert of Hohenzollern dies in that conflict, leading Poland to annex Ducal Prussia entirely. Or in some weird compromise in a similar manner to the events that led to the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia but involving Sweden instead of Brandenburg, which you could have either the Stures or a minor noble family like the Vasas taking control of Prussia. And if Sweden really wanted to go ahead with its Baltic ambitions, they could simply lop off rump Lithuania and acquire Polish Livonia in order to attach it to its Estonian holdings. Because of the ruling Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg and their potential marriage to the Wettins, it would be inevitable that Saxony can possibly place a claim on Prussia. However, any event involving the Poles and the Teutonic Knights would make the claim useless. However, the real question that I need to ask is, which Wettin prince or princess would be a good match for a Brandenburg branch of the Hohenzollern prince or princess in order to make this union work? Saxony or Brandenburg would still have to acquire Pomerania at some point. Perhaps a good trade in this case would be Swedish Pomerania going to Brandenburg-Saxony in exchange for Prussia going to Sweden. I also think that a strong coalition of Poland-Lithuania (regardless of how strong or weak they are) and Sweden would be a good barrier to preventing Russia from expanding into the Baltic Sea region, and in this scenario Sweden would have control over Ingria. However, as a compromise Russia can keep Karelia while they're barred from the Baltic. Historically, the Poles and the Ottomans also had decent relations due to their common hatred of Russia, but that could easily change if the Poles intend on taking part, but having Serbia, Wallachia and Albania fall under Austrian influence also works too. With Austria's case, in addition to its planned liberation of Hungary from Ottoman vassalage, I could see it expand right up to the Drina River, marking that river as the border between the Austrian and Polish spheres of influence. Bosnia would definitely be attached to Hungary through Croatia while Austria proper would have included Istria, Styria, Venice, Tyrol, Lichtenstein, Bavaria and several other minor southern German duchies. The Italian peninsula might also become the center of a fierce major competition between Austrian, French and Spanish interests. I could take a guess that there might be a few Anatolian successor states that would be forcibly smashed by Russian ambitions if they got their wish in Anatolia, dismantling the Ottomans in the process while the eastern Balkans end up under Polish influence. I agree that Saxony's political and national development might be similar to that of France's own national development in that they would divide their attention between colonial trade and military prowess. However, if I were to take a guess at what the Saxons will do in terms of building their colonies (especially settler colonies), I'd say that they would do the French did and send only single males with experience in the fur trade while intermarrying with indigenous women on a similar manner to how the Metis came to being. As for Russia and the fate of the Ottomans in Anatolia, my ideal guess will be that several new states might also be established as well. I can see Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Kurdistan, an enlarged Armenia Kingdom, and Mesopotamia/Iraq would be established as pro-Russian client states, while the Mameluk dynasty would be restored in Egypt to oversee the Hejaz region. I agree on the outcomes you describe for Prussia and Sweden. Pomerania to the Wettin would the necessary price of friendship between Sweden and Saxony, but the potential gains for Sweden from such an alliance elsewhere would be so great (keeping Russia outside of the Baltic and at least the western half of the PLC, shared influence in Poland, hegemony in Scandinavia) I can easily see the Swedes paying it. I cannot see even a strong Poland projecting much worthwhile influence in Serbia, Wallachia, and Albania if Austria remains as strong as OTL for geopolitical and strategic reasons, they look like the natural turf of Austria. Even Russia was unable to dominate the region until it had defeated the opposition of the German powers. Moldavia, Bulgaria, and Greece would be another matter, but only if the Poles can beat Russia to Southern Ukraine and become the dominant power of the Black Sea. As a rough guess of how an expanded Habsburg empire would be organized, Austria proper would include an expanded Further Austria, most of Switzerland, old Bavaria, and as much of North Italy as Vienna could grab; Hungary-Croatia would absorb Wallachia (nearly done OTL); Serbia would become another Habsburg sub-kingdom (ditto); Bosnia might go to Serbia, Croatia, or be divided. North Italy would be fiercely contested between France and Austria with Spain trying to hold on South Italy as long as it can avoid its decay (but I can see an Austria and Spain doing a deal about Milan, esp. if the Habsburg remain on the throne in both states). If Spain does suffer its succession crisis then everything is in the air. One possible outcome for Italy that makes some geopolitical sense might be Austrian Milan, Venetia, Emilia-Romagna, and Tuscany; French Savoy and Genoa; continued Spanish rule of Naples and Sicily, and a diminished Papal States (quite possibly nothing more than Latium) remaining independent. IF Poland and Russia both get strong and can agree on a sensible scheme for division of the Ottoman spoils with Austria, I agree the western Balkans would become Austria's share, the eastern Balkans Poland's spoils, and the Near East Russia's share. In such a case, the effects of preventing the Armenian-Assyrian-Greek genocide (and quite possibly inverting it into a serious ethnic cleansing of Muslims in any Christian-Muslim mixed areas, if OTL patterns of Russian conquest are valid) must be taken into account. In other words, eastern Anatolia and northern Syria-Iraq may be directly annexed by Russia or form a vassal Kingdom or Armenia. The rest of the Levant and Mesopotamia might form a client Kingdom of Syria dominated by local Christians. Forget about the Kurds, without their opportunist expansion to fill the void created by the Armenian-Assyrian genocide, they shall remain irrelevant. Egypt probably becomes another client state of Russia dominated by the Copts. I suppose Cyprus would become part of restored Greece in exchange for concessions elsewhere (e.g. shared control of the Straits).
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 4, 2017 21:43:48 GMT
If Venice was added to Austria's domains, I could also see some of the Venetian holdings going to the Austrians as a result, with Crete being possibly held under a pro-Hapsburg monarch. Then there's also a question of how much of Ottoman Rumelia would the Turks lose. Would they fight tooth and nail to keep all of Thrace, or would they completely lose everything, including Edirne and Constantinople? Given that it would take a long time to dislodge the Turks from the Balkans, Austria and Poland would definitely need Russia to open up a second front in the Caucasus against the Ottomans in order to increase the pressure.
However, the fall of the Ottomans might in a way help revive the Mameluks, or some completely different dynasty actually emerges to replace the departed Ottomans, or even most remotely possible or impossible, Spain and Portugal conquering a good chunk of North Africa. Having a Russian informal control of Anatolia might actually give them more warm water ports than they would normally receive IOTL, with Cyprus becoming a potential candidate for direct Russian annexation or vassalage while the ports of Smyrna and Trebizond would be helpful for the Russians.
As for Saxony itself, I have already mentioned that they could get some colonies in Africa if North America is a no go. Alternatively, the Saxons could build their empire on the Dutch model, with only one crown jewel and several trading ports. However, North America would have far too many competing interests for Saxony to establish itself, with the English, French and Dutch given the leg up on colonization.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 4, 2017 22:45:04 GMT
If Venice was added to Austria's domains, I could also see some of the Venetian holdings going to the Austrians as a result, with Crete being possibly held under a pro-Hapsburg monarch. Then there's also a question of how much of Ottoman Rumelia would the Turks lose. Would they fight tooth and nail to keep all of Thrace, or would they completely lose everything, including Edirne and Constantinople? Given that it would take a long time to dislodge the Turks from the Balkans, Austria and Poland would definitely need Russia to open up a second front in the Caucasus against the Ottomans in order to increase the pressure. However, the fall of the Ottomans might in a way help revive the Mameluks, or some completely different dynasty actually emerges to replace the departed Ottomans, or even most remotely possible or impossible, Spain and Portugal conquering a good chunk of North Africa. Having a Russian informal control of Anatolia might actually give them more warm water ports than they would normally receive IOTL, with Cyprus becoming a potential candidate for direct Russian annexation or vassalage while the ports of Smyrna and Trebizond would be helpful for the Russians. As for Saxony itself, I have already mentioned that they could get some colonies in Africa if North America is a no go. Alternatively, the Saxons could build their empire on the Dutch model, with only one crown jewel and several trading ports. However, North America would have far too many competing interests for Saxony to establish itself, with the English, French and Dutch given the leg up on colonization. It goes without saying that if Venice is absorbed by Austria then everything the Republic owned in the Adriatic shall be included in the bargain. Its Eastern Med holdings, assuming they still stand, are more liable to diplomatic and military butterflies. As it concerns the collapse of the Ottoman Empire I might expect a two-phase sequence where first the Ottomans are kicked back into their 1914 borders minus a variable portion of Greater Armenia, then a final phase when their Near East core is overwhelmed and conquered. An early decline and collapse of the Ottomans can certainly (re)awaken the potential ambitions of Spain and France on North Africa in a major way, and w/o Turk support the Barbary States would be highly vulnerable (also because their piracy and slavery made them fiercely hated by all Christian nations with a coast or trade interests in the Med; e.g. expect Italians to enthusiastically support an offensive in North Africa). Portugal's role ITTL may vary, the Iberian Union may never occur at all, or never collapse (my geopolitical sympathies are on the latter). Whatever Muslim dynasty rules Egypt might certainly exploit the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and become the surviving main Islamic power besides Persia.
On the other hand such a collapse, esp. if accompanied by European conquest of Northwest Africa and the Near East, would make Egypt too rather vulnerable to colonization as the Med becomes a Christian lake. The regions Smyrna and Trebizond belonged to had a sizable Greek population before their WWI ethnic cleansing, if OTL patterns are inverted due to European conquest and the Turks are kicked out they can easily be directly annexed by Christian states. Much like Greater Armenia-Assyria, Russia would be in an optimal position to do so for the coast of eastern Anatolia, for the western coast the solution may vary (annexation, or creation of a vassal Greek kingdom that would be the natural candidate to get Cyprus). Of course, if the general settlement leaves Greece in the Russian sphere of influence, then the obvious solution is to hand everything in the Aegean Sea plus Cyprus to a client Greater Greece.
Saxony's colonization policies may vary, although demographically, economically, and militarily they shall be the full equivalent of England, France, and apex Spain, and it is reasonable to expect they shall play the colonial game on a level field with the English and the French. The rise of another seafaring great power that owns two-thirds of the resources of the HRE/Greater Germany shall inevitably and greatly diminish the shares of second-tier powers such as Portugal (assuming it exists at all, and is not absorbed by an united Iberia for good) and the Netherlands. Forget about either power holding such a crown jewel prize as Indonesia. If you ask my opinion, almost everything the Dutch shall own ITTL shall be because they are a good proxy and another trade hub (besides the Hansa region of Germany) of Saxony.
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Post by steve59 on Jul 4, 2017 23:45:29 GMT
As I've said before, at least pre-industrialisation, I can't see Saxony being a colonial power on the level of Britain or France due to geography. They have inferior access to the oceans, being to easily restricted by rivals, as Germany found in two world wars even when the strongest industrial/military power in Europe. Also they face potential rivals on all fronts and while some will be friendly its doubtful any can be relied on indefinitely and some will be enemies. As such the army and central control to arrange the funds to maintain it are going to be a higher priority than the navy and merchant trade. It sound end up doing better than the Dutch eventually although it will start somewhat later but it will need great skill and/or real luck to match OTL Britain and France prior to the mid 19thC.
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 5, 2017 23:38:57 GMT
I don't see the Dutch as being willing vassals and proxies of their Saxon rival just across the border. If anything, the Dutch would invest far more in their mercantile trade. And butterflies would have made the UK either unrecognizable or non-existent. I think that because Saxony might be surrounded by rivals, I agree with steve59 that Saxony wouldn't be a huge colonial player as England, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. Their position in Europe would make them a good mediator for international trade.
For one thing, I suspect that there might be attempts to create a dual Greco-Bulgarian union in place of having the Poles extend their influence to Bulgaria and creating a Greater Greece that includes Macedonia and Thrace. In the near east, a Greater Armenia that is allied firmly to Russia would be a major game changer. On the other hand, having a Greco-Bulgarian Union might also be a good compromise for Austria, Poland and Russia if the rest of Europe doesn't want a strong Russia in control of the Bosporus Straits.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 6, 2017 22:38:52 GMT
As it concerns the Dutch-Saxon relationship, I think it greatly depends on how much threatening and overbearing France turns out for the Nehterlands. The more the Dutch feels threatened by an expansionist Catholic France, the more they may turn willing to accept a patron-client close relationship with a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor power. After all, the Netherlands may easily develop strong and gainful economic ties with an united North Germany. In the right circumstances (e.g. the French invade and enact a brutal occupation of the Netherlands for a while, then the Saxons kick them out), the Dutch may even accept joining Saxony as the lesser evil, especially if they are still granted some autonomy and Lutheran Saxony grants toleration to the Calvinist Dutch. After all, Dutch independence was a still relatively recent thing, and the Dutch elites included a strong faction that supported a de facto monarchy, so Republicanism need not be too much of a real obstacle. This way, if Saxony reabsorbs the Czech and the Dutch, Austria does the same with the Swiss, and both act to keep the French border pinned on the Meuse, TTL Germany would not suffer any significant territorial loss from its HRE apex, although it may well get a lasting division between Saxon North Germany and Austrian South Germany.
As it concerns Saxony being surrounded by potential rivals, I may point out in this age the same was entirely true of OTL France too, but it didn't stop the French from building a sizable colonial empire and presence in global trade. No good reason why it should be any different for Saxony. Admittedly, in both cases their strategic situation would make the French or the North Germans give maximum priority to land power and continental interests, but that need not be the end of the story. The assumption they would have a poor access to the sea is criticizable and arising from a misleading analogy with the Napoleonic and World Wars. Back in the 16th-18th century, no seafaring European power got any close to the kind of overwhelming naval supremacy that enabled Britain to enact blockades of its enemies in the 19th-20th century. Back then, colonial and trade rivalries that did came to fighting was either expressed by harassment of trade routes in the colonial areas, or escalated to full-fledged land wars in Europe. But in both cases, such conflicts typically occurred about the most valuable areas and were acted through privateering, not blockade. The Early Modern powers simply didn't have the resources, technology, or organization for that. Moreover, blockade or privateering were acts of wars, and even rivals did not fight all the time, there were peaceful periods lasting decades when nobody is going to care much about the colonial endeavors of the other powers. Last but not least, ITTL there are good reasons why Saxony may end up having a close alliance with the Netherlands and Sweden, or quite possibly a united Scandinavia, and in such a case you cannot really describe Saxony's access to sea as 'poor'. Nobody is ever going to set up a tight interdiction patrol in the North Sea to prevent the Saxons from doing global trade or colonization.
I agree a Greco-Bulgarian union might be seen as a good solution for TTL post-Ottoman Balkans. Greater Armenia-Assyria is definitely going to happen if Russia conquers Anatolia, although it might turn out a Russian vassal kingdom or an integral part of the Russian Empire.
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 7, 2017 5:42:01 GMT
As it concerns the Dutch-Saxon relationship, I think it greatly depends on how much threatening and overbearing France turns out for the Nehterlands. The more the Dutch feels threatened by an expansionist Catholic France, the more they may turn willing to accept a patron-client close relationship with a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor power. After all, the Netherlands may easily develop strong and gainful economic ties with an united North Germany. In the right circumstances (e.g. the French invade and enact a brutal occupation of the Netherlands for a while, then the Saxons kick them out), the Dutch may even accept joining Saxony as the lesser evil, especially if they are still granted some autonomy and Lutheran Saxony grants toleration to the Calvinist Dutch. After all, Dutch independence was a still relatively recent thing, and the Dutch elites included a strong faction that supported a de facto monarchy, so Republicanism need not be too much of a real obstacle. This way, if Saxony reabsorbs the Czech and the Dutch, Austria does the same with the Swiss, and both act to keep the French border pinned on the Meuse, TTL Germany would not suffer any significant territorial loss from its HRE apex, although it may well get a lasting division between Saxon North Germany and Austrian South Germany. As it concerns Saxony being surrounded by potential rivals, I may point out in this age the same was entirely true of OTL France too, but it didn't stop the French from building a sizable colonial empire and presence in global trade. No good reason why it should be any different for Saxony. Admittedly, in both cases their strategic situation would make the French or the North Germans give maximum priority to land power and continental interests, but that need not be the end of the story. The assumption they would have a poor access to the sea is criticizable and arising from a misleading analogy with the Napoleonic and World Wars. Back in the 16th-18th century, no seafaring European power got any close to the kind of overwhelming naval supremacy that enabled Britain to enact blockades of its enemies in the 19th-20th century. Back then, colonial and trade rivalries that did came to fighting was either expressed by harassment of trade routes in the colonial areas, or escalated to full-fledged land wars in Europe. But in both cases, such conflicts typically occurred about the most valuable areas and were acted through privateering, not blockade. The Early Modern powers simply didn't have the resources, technology, or organization for that. Moreover, blockade or privateering were acts of wars, and even rivals did not fight all the time, there were peaceful periods lasting decades when nobody is going to care much about the colonial endeavors of the other powers. Last but not least, ITTL there are good reasons why Saxony may end up having a close alliance with the Netherlands and Sweden, or quite possibly a united Scandinavia, and in such a case you cannot really describe Saxony's access to sea as 'poor'. Nobody is ever going to set up a tight interdiction patrol in the North Sea to prevent the Saxons from doing global trade or colonization. I agree a Greco-Bulgarian union might be seen as a good solution for TTL post-Ottoman Balkans. Greater Armenia-Assyria is definitely going to happen if Russia conquers Anatolia, although it might turn out a Russian vassal kingdom or an integral part of the Russian Empire. AS well as a potential unified Arabia led by either the Yemenis or the Omanis since they were the only ones with an actual power to unify the Arabian Peninsula unless the Mamelukes return to power, or Egypt becomes independent under a new ruler who would be a former Ottoman Pasha turned Khedive, on a similar level to Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt. I could also see Greater Armenia becoming an integral part of Russia, but I'm not too versed on Assyrian history to know where they'll be settled. The only difference between TTL Saxony and OTL France was that France also had a Mediterranean coastline access as well as an Atlantic coastline, while Saxony's possible coastlines would straddle the North and Baltic Seas, both of which are on the same side and not on two opposite sides. However, a close relationship with Scandinavia and the Netherlands might have an economic benefit in that the Saxons will reap the profits generated from the Baltic and North Sea trade routes. Coupled with the potential Saxon colonization of Africa, the Americas and even parts of Australia.
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Post by steve59 on Jul 7, 2017 11:41:43 GMT
As it concerns the Dutch-Saxon relationship, I think it greatly depends on how much threatening and overbearing France turns out for the Nehterlands. The more the Dutch feels threatened by an expansionist Catholic France, the more they may turn willing to accept a patron-client close relationship with a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor power. After all, the Netherlands may easily develop strong and gainful economic ties with an united North Germany. In the right circumstances (e.g. the French invade and enact a brutal occupation of the Netherlands for a while, then the Saxons kick them out), the Dutch may even accept joining Saxony as the lesser evil, especially if they are still granted some autonomy and Lutheran Saxony grants toleration to the Calvinist Dutch. After all, Dutch independence was a still relatively recent thing, and the Dutch elites included a strong faction that supported a de facto monarchy, so Republicanism need not be too much of a real obstacle. This way, if Saxony reabsorbs the Czech and the Dutch, Austria does the same with the Swiss, and both act to keep the French border pinned on the Meuse, TTL Germany would not suffer any significant territorial loss from its HRE apex, although it may well get a lasting division between Saxon North Germany and Austrian South Germany. As it concerns Saxony being surrounded by potential rivals, I may point out in this age the same was entirely true of OTL France too, but it didn't stop the French from building a sizable colonial empire and presence in global trade. No good reason why it should be any different for Saxony. Admittedly, in both cases their strategic situation would make the French or the North Germans give maximum priority to land power and continental interests, but that need not be the end of the story. The assumption they would have a poor access to the sea is criticizable and arising from a misleading analogy with the Napoleonic and World Wars. Back in the 16th-18th century, no seafaring European power got any close to the kind of overwhelming naval supremacy that enabled Britain to enact blockades of its enemies in the 19th-20th century. Back then, colonial and trade rivalries that did came to fighting was either expressed by harassment of trade routes in the colonial areas, or escalated to full-fledged land wars in Europe. But in both cases, such conflicts typically occurred about the most valuable areas and were acted through privateering, not blockade. The Early Modern powers simply didn't have the resources, technology, or organization for that. Moreover, blockade or privateering were acts of wars, and even rivals did not fight all the time, there were peaceful periods lasting decades when nobody is going to care much about the colonial endeavors of the other powers. Last but not least, ITTL there are good reasons why Saxony may end up having a close alliance with the Netherlands and Sweden, or quite possibly a united Scandinavia, and in such a case you cannot really describe Saxony's access to sea as 'poor'. Nobody is ever going to set up a tight interdiction patrol in the North Sea to prevent the Saxons from doing global trade or colonization. I agree a Greco-Bulgarian union might be seen as a good solution for TTL post-Ottoman Balkans. Greater Armenia-Assyria is definitely going to happen if Russia conquers Anatolia, although it might turn out a Russian vassal kingdom or an integral part of the Russian Empire. The Dutch had a strong national identity already, in response to their independence wars with Spain and as late as the 1680's made clear they would fight to the bitter end to maintain it, even when faced with an Anglo-French combination against them. |I can see them being close friends of the Saxons, as the dominant power in Germany, in the same way as they were allies of the Hapsburg's OTL and for the same reason. Because both are threatened by an expansive France. Also the Dutch already have a significant and wealthy overseas empire which gives them both economic and military power [given the navy needed to defend and expand this empire] and strong cultural identities. As such I think it extremely unlikely they would welcome being absorbed by a Saxon kingdom. Not to mention such an increase in Saxon power would cause a storm of unrest amongst its neighbours. The Dutch did have a monarchy but it was a distinctly Dutch one, strongly associated with their winning independence from Spanish domination, which is a different thing from accepting a foreign dynasty. France was threatened with encirclement briefly under the Hapsburg high-point when united under Charles V. Also later the fact that the Spanish Hapsburg's inherited the former Burgundian lands meant this continued for a while. However the size of both empires meant they also had serious commitments elsewhere and plenty of opponents determined to prevent them getting more powerful. The southern Burgundian lands were largely conquered by France early while the Dutch rebellion largely removed any Spanish threat from the west. Coupled with the Spanish decline from ~1640 this meant that the French only really faced military threats from the east, which only became significant after the Prussians unified Germany from 1870. This is vastly different from the position of Saxony, with France to the west, Austria to the south, Poland then later probably Russia to the east and possibly a unified Scandinavia to the north. True some of those will be allies at some points but some will be hostile or will be ambivalent. This is a more more threatening position than France when it was building up its empire in the 17th and 18thC. Yes it wasn't until the 18thC that the RN got the organisational and technological basis for prolonged close blockades of enemies such as the French and Spanish. However the Dutch had some capacities before that and in turn suffered severely from Britain's geographical advantage across its shipping routes during the Anglo-Dutch wars despite winning most of the battles. If you stand astride your opponents main trade routes then you don't need a close blockade to greatly disrupt and reduce their trade. Furthermore this doesn't require continuous warfare. A few years in which merchant ships, fishing operations and the like are disrupted by enemy attacks can seriously set back their development. As well as make difficult supply and trading with colonies let alone reinforcing them when threatened. Peace gives an opportunity to rebuild but if there's the danger of the same happening during the next war then it would discourage merchants from investing in such activities. Saxony would have two routes to the Atlantic, via the North sea IF it gained a port there and via the Baltic when it gains ports there. Both are vulnerable to Dutch or English/British pressure plus also French attacks operating from Dunkirk say. [privateers from that port frequently cause considerable losses to British shipping in the 18thC. Also a Saxon force to reinforce a threatened colony is going to have to run the gauntlet of potential attacks from those powers. Including having to go through the English Channel or take the longer and stormier route around Scotland and Ireland. Which in earlier years and for a relatively inexperienced force can be bloody dangerous, as the Spanish found out in 1588. Even later is going to be a risky route for merchants even without warfare or pirates. Furthermore trade from the Baltic is restricted by both wealth and the need to pass through the straits. The latter is not a problem IF there is a unified Scandinavian kingdom AND its friendly THROUGHOUT the period of Sweden developing this large colonial empire your suggesting. Even then it might well insist on Sound Dues being paid, which would be a burden on such commerce. At any point there is conflict with the state that controls the straits and its likely there will be tension at some times or other over a period of say a couple of centuries or more then this commerce pretty much stops totally. When this occurs a unified and strong Scandinavian state, being that much more powerful, is going to make this far more difficult to remove. An alliance with Sweden while Denmark controls the straits can put a lot of pressure on the Danes to be careful but it can still be potentially disruptive and the Danes will insist on the Dues while they can simply because it is so important a source of funds for the monarchy. No doubt you can point out that in such circumstances there's an easy solution with Sweden and Saxony overrunning Denmark and annexing it between them. However this leaves an even more powerful Swedish kingdom in control of the straits. Palmerston's famous phase about interests being more permanent than allies is something that applies to ALL powers. As such while I can see a Saxon state dominating northern Germany, being a great power in Europe and having a colonial empire, prior to the industrial period its highly unlikely to have major territorial colonies outside Europe. Very likely it will have some outposts in the Caribbean and Africa and possibly like Sweden a colony in N America. However like Sweden its likely to lose the latter once a better positioned power [Britain or France] gets majority established in N America and even wealthy sugar colonies are likely to be vulnerable when fighting one of the great naval powers. They may be able, as France often was, to regain them in the resultant peace, but that requires making concessions elsewhere and Saxony, unlike France or Spain are less likely to have other possessions to trade to get them returned. Also the monarchy could well decide that, no matter how wealthy such colonies are the costs of maintaining an oceanic fleet and garrisons to support them, plus the possibility of them being lost again, that its better to invest resources into defending territories closer to home. If it gets started quickly enough it might get somewhere big and also possibly hold onto it but for at least the 1st century of this greater Saxony/Brandenburg its priority will be securing its position in N Germany and there will be little interest in or assess for investment so far from its core territories. Plus it starts off as a pretty much land locked territory until the union with Brandenburg and even then may not have much/any coastal assets. It was only from about 1900 after all that Prussia made the controversial and dubious decision to build a large navy, which even then was for influencing events in Europe rather than defending what colonial empire it had.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 8, 2017 13:20:27 GMT
AS well as a potential unified Arabia led by either the Yemenis or the Omanis since they were the only ones with an actual power to unify the Arabian Peninsula unless the Mamelukes return to power, or Egypt becomes independent under a new ruler who would be a former Ottoman Pasha turned Khedive, on a similar level to Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt. I could also see Greater Armenia becoming an integral part of Russia, but I'm not too versed on Assyrian history to know where they'll be settled.
These all seem quite plausible and likely developments ITTL in the wake of an early Ottoman collapse. As it concerns the Armenians and Assyrians, before their genocide they were the plurality community in the so-called 'six Armenian vilayets' as well as the area currently occupied by the Kurds (which rose from minor nationality to major Middle Eastern player precisely by filling the empty space created by the Armenian-Assyrian genocide). Broadly speaking, the Armenians filled the northern-central portion of eastern Turkey, the Pontic Greeks had a significant presence in the coastal area of the same, Armenians and Assyrians co-existed in the southern third of eastern Turkey, Assyrians filled the northern belt of Syria and Iraq, as well as the western portion of northwestern Iran.
It seems very likely in case of early Ottoman collapse and Russian conquest of the Near East, the Turks and the other Muslim nationalities would be kicked out from the areas with an important Christian community (inverting OTL events) and the Assyrians and Pontic Greeks would join the Armenians in Russian Greater Armenia. Moreover, since IOTL Russia was able to conquer Southern Caucasus by defeating Turkey and Persia in rapid sequence, it is reasonable ITTL an early collapse of the Ottoman Empire from a concerted Austro-Polish-Russian-Spanish strategic offensive would create a power vacuum Russia could exploit to repeat the process on a bigger scale. In other words, in addition to the Armenian-Assyrian areas of eastern Anatolia and northern Levant-Mesopotamia, it may well get the Azeri-Assyrian areas of northwestern Persia.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 8, 2017 14:39:47 GMT
Yep, before the Cold War states rarely had permanent alliances and close partnerships, short of a patron-client relationship. Yet there were cases of such bonds working the vast majority of the time, because of complementary strategic interests, economic bonds, dynastic ties, and/or common rivals. As things stand ITTL, Saxony could easily have that kind of semi-permanent friendly relationship with the Netherlands and Sweden/Scandinavia, even if infrequent quarrels may certainly still happen because of trade conflicts. Yes, Dutch national identity was a thing after victory in the long rebellion against Spain. Nonetheless it was still a recent thing, Saxony was a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor, the Dutch would reap vast economic gains by being the second main trade hub of Saxon Northern Germany besides the Hansa region, and military cooperation with Saxony would increase the Dutch's ability to defend their trade and colonial interests, and both powers would greatly benefit from a semi-stable alliance against France.
These would also be good reasons why in the case France really becomes an existential threat for the Dutch, they might accept the lesser evil of a merger with Saxony, if the Saxon kings would grant the Dutch some autonomy and full toleration for Calvinists. Accepting a foreign dynasty or a personal union with another state was far from outlandish in early modern Europe, provided the interests of the two partners seemed compatible/convergent. One should not overemphasize cultural differences between the Dutch and northern Germans, since they happened within a spectrum of variance in the Germanic world and political separation from the HRE was still a recent thing in this age.
Who exactly should be highly upset by a Dutch-Saxon union? France certainly, but they would be hostile anyway, their overt ambitions on the Low Countries would be the main reason such a merger might occur in the first place. Sweden/Scandinavia? They would have little reason to care, their main interests lie elsewhere and they would have reasons to wish Saxony's friendship against Poland and/or Russia. Austria? When they are in an hostile mood towards the Saxons quite possibly, but past a point, chances are they gave up their interests in the Low Countries from lack of decent strategic connection and refocused on South Germany, North Italy, and the Balkans once northern and western Germany became Saxony's turf. This is going to ensure most likely they are only hostile to Saxony half of the time, rest of the time they shall be neutral or friendly. England? Maybe to some degree, but we should not make the mistake of projecting the viewpoint of 19th-20th century British on their ancestors. In this age, the English were much more concerned with keeping Spain and France off their backs, that was the main reason they supported the Dutch, rather than any sophisticated, entrenched concern to preserve the continental balance of power. They may well turn to regard Saxon control of the Netherlands as a tolerable lesser evil, esp. if Saxony is a reliable ally of theirs against their Catholic rivals.
Strong denial of a strategic analogy between TTL Saxony and OTL France seems questionable and probably based on a misleading analogy with Germany's situation in WWI. Yea, Spain suffered decline past the mid 17th century, but was still a demonstrable significant threat for the French up to the Spanish Succession War or the Napoleonic Wars, depending on how one looks at it. If the Dutch were not a serious concern with France after their independence, they cannot be a serious rival for Saxony, you cannot have it both ways. The Dutch (assuming they remain independent) and the Swedes have their reasons to stay friendly to Saxony most of the time, Austria would be neutral or an ally of convenience against France or distracted by its Med and Balkan concerns at least half of the time. Poland may easily suffer decay after a while and seek a protector against the Russians. France and Russia are the only powers that may be expected to be rivals almost all the time.
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 9, 2017 6:54:21 GMT
Yep, before the Cold War states rarely had permanent alliances and close partnerships, short of a patron-client relationship. Yet there were cases of such bonds working the vast majority of the time, because of complementary strategic interests, economic bonds, dynastic ties, and/or common rivals. As things stand ITTL, Saxony could easily have that kind of semi-permanent friendly relationship with the Netherlands and Sweden/Scandinavia, even if infrequent quarrels may certainly still happen because of trade conflicts. Yes, Dutch national identity was a thing after victory in the long rebellion against Spain. Nonetheless it was still a recent thing, Saxony was a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor, the Dutch would reap vast economic gains by being the second main trade hub of Saxon Northern Germany besides the Hansa region, and military cooperation with Saxony would increase the Dutch's ability to defend their trade and colonial interests, and both powers would greatly benefit from a semi-stable alliance against France.
These would also be good reasons why in the case France really becomes an existential threat for the Dutch, they might accept the lesser evil of a merger with Saxony, if the Saxon kings would grant the Dutch some autonomy and full toleration for Calvinists. Accepting a foreign dynasty or a personal union with another state was far from outlandish in early modern Europe, provided the interests of the two partners seemed compatible/convergent. One should not overemphasize cultural differences between the Dutch and northern Germans, since they happened within a spectrum of variance in the Germanic world and political separation from the HRE was still a recent thing in this age.
Who exactly should be highly upset by a Dutch-Saxon union? France certainly, but they would be hostile anyway, their overt ambitions on the Low Countries would be the main reason such a merger might occur in the first place. Sweden/Scandinavia? They would have little reason to care, their main interests lie elsewhere and they would have reasons to wish Saxony's friendship against Poland and/or Russia. Austria? When they are in an hostile mood towards the Saxons quite possibly, but past a point, chances are they gave up their interests in the Low Countries from lack of decent strategic connection and refocused on South Germany, North Italy, and the Balkans once northern and western Germany became Saxony's turf. This is going to ensure most likely they are only hostile to Saxony half of the time, rest of the time they shall be neutral or friendly. England? Maybe to some degree, but we should not make the mistake of projecting the viewpoint of 19th-20th century British on their ancestors. In this age, the English were much more concerned with keeping Spain and France off their backs, that was the main reason they supported the Dutch, rather than any sophisticated, entrenched concern to preserve the continental balance of power. They may well turn to regard Saxon control of the Netherlands as a tolerable lesser evil, esp. if Saxony is a reliable ally of theirs against their Catholic rivals.
Strong denial of a strategic analogy between TTL Saxony and OTL France seems questionable and probably based on a misleading analogy with Germany's situation in WWI. Yea, Spain suffered decline past the mid 17th century, but was still a demonstrable significant threat for the French up to the Spanish Succession War or the Napoleonic Wars, depending on how one looks at it. If the Dutch were not a serious concern with France after their independence, they cannot be a serious rival for Saxony, you cannot have it both ways. The Dutch (assuming they remain independent) and the Swedes have their reasons to stay friendly to Saxony most of the time, Austria would be neutral or an ally of convenience against France or distracted by its Med and Balkan concerns at least half of the time. Poland may easily suffer decay after a while and seek a protector against the Russians. France and Russia are the only powers that may be expected to be rivals almost all the time. One other thing: England to an extent was surrounded by actual and potential rivals and enemies as well as OTL France. There's Scotland, which had a strong alliance with France as part of the Auld Alliance, and there's Norway, the third Auld Alliance member. However, the English were allied to the Portuguese so that kinda balance things out. So in any case England's potential alliance with Saxony could be a major game changer that might also carry some risks as well.
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Post by steve59 on Jul 9, 2017 11:09:01 GMT
Yep, before the Cold War states rarely had permanent alliances and close partnerships, short of a patron-client relationship. Yet there were cases of such bonds working the vast majority of the time, because of complementary strategic interests, economic bonds, dynastic ties, and/or common rivals. As things stand ITTL, Saxony could easily have that kind of semi-permanent friendly relationship with the Netherlands and Sweden/Scandinavia, even if infrequent quarrels may certainly still happen because of trade conflicts. Yes, Dutch national identity was a thing after victory in the long rebellion against Spain. Nonetheless it was still a recent thing, Saxony was a fellow Germanic and Protestant neighbor, the Dutch would reap vast economic gains by being the second main trade hub of Saxon Northern Germany besides the Hansa region, and military cooperation with Saxony would increase the Dutch's ability to defend their trade and colonial interests, and both powers would greatly benefit from a semi-stable alliance against France.
Yes there could be persistent friendship between the Dutch and Saxons but that doesn't assume the Dutch would necessarily be willing to give up their independence. Plus if things develop as OTL the Dutch will be Calvinist and the Saxons Lutheran. They might view it as the lesser evil but the vast bulk of them would still view it as an evil. Hence what would make Saxony press such an idea to the point that the Dutch feel forced to accept rather than fight? The Netherlands are important as a buffer for their western border and is probably triggering a major conflict and alienating a lot of the Dutch worth this. Note there is a difference between a personal union, which might occur if dynastic marriages led to a single joint heir and a prolonged governmental union. France certainly. Plus since a prolonged unification of the Dutch state and empire with the Saxons gives the latter a major increase in power, just about all other neighbours of Saxony. Depending on the circumstances this could well make Saxony the new hegemony power that others would feel obliged to ally to resist. Austria would see that its primary rival for power in Germany/Central Europe has received a big increase in power and feel it might either get some similar increase elsewhere or take steps to reduce/prevent this Saxon increase. Their less interested in holding the southern Netherlands than keeping them and the northern ones outside the control of a rival. England would definitely be concerned about a great power gaining control of the Netherlands. While France may still seem a greater threat this is going to close the gap considerably. Russia would also be concerned. If Denmark still holds the Baltic entrance then it would be very concerned about Saxony annexing small neighbours, especially since its smaller [in power terms] and even more strategically useful for Saxony. If Sweden has conquered it the concern will be less but still there. I'm not saying that everybody will gang up on Saxony, although that's not impossible. However it will make a lot of people a lot more uneasy about Saxon intentions, especially since the annexation is unlikely to be welcomed by most of the Dutch. Also you continue to overlook how old and wide-spread the concept of balance of power is. Don't forget that when the Austrian Hapsburg's looked like they might centralise Germany under their rule in the 30 Years War not only was Catholic France aiding the Protestant resistance but you even had the Papacy maneuvering against them. No their based on a better knowledge of history and basic geography: a) Spain, its empire not-withstanding, was very much a 2nd rank power from about 1650 and never a realistic threat to France, even without the frequent alliances between the two, which admittedly may not occur this time. b) The Dutch were a serious colonial power and as a member of an alliance against potential French hegemony, in part because although 2nd rank in terms of population their position in Europe, wealth and political ideas make them opponents of French expansion. They may well have friendly relations with Saxony, especially if both are worried by say France under a Louis XIV type leader but that doesn't mean the Dutch won't oppose Saxon threats to their interests, especially if the latter starts encroaching on their colonies and trading interest. England and the Netherlands had many common interests but it didn't stop them fighting three bitter wars in the 17thC, which as I pointed out were seriously for the Dutch because of their location. If the Saxons, as I expect, aren't a major colonial power prior to the late 19thC then they and the Dutch are going to have very close interests and few clashes but that will change if Saxony starts challenging Dutch independence. c) As you say Saxony and Austria are likely to be allies of convenience against a preeminent France. However they are still going to be prominent rivals within both Germany and central Europe. Just as Austria and Prussia were OTL and that definitely included the weaker power [Prussia] seeking to prevent the stronger [Austria] gaining extra advantages - allying with France, refusing to support Austria against revolutionary France, blocking the agreement in the 1780's for Austria to swap the southern Netherlands for Bavaria. As such Austria, which is probably going to be the weaker of the two isn't going to be happy with Saxony getting too much stronger. d) If as seems to be suggested, Saxony is allied with Sweden and protecting Poland against Russian encroachment its definitely going to be hostile to further Saxon increases in size/power. Hence you can almost certainly include it in any anti-Saxon alliance after an attempt to annex the Netherlands. e) England/Britain is also going to be concerned that Saxony is getting markedly stronger, that its [almost certainly] doing it by a naked land-grab and that a 2nd rank imperial competitor [from say ~1700 anyway OTL] is being replaced by a great power. At the very least its likely to 'support' a continued Dutch resistance in the Dutch colonies to stop their resources going to what looks now like a major potential threat. f) The geography is plain. Saxony has a possibly relatively short Baltic coastline, especially if it doesn't end up with E Prussia. Apart from being dependent on the climate and whoever controls the Baltic entrances this has to pass through the North Sea and then either the Channel or take a long route through stormy waters around Scotland and Ireland. It may also have some coastline on the North Sea. Both routes can be harried by both an independent/hostile Dutch and France as well as Britain. The latter route is very vulnerable to British hostility. In comparison France, as well as the Med coastline has a long section from Brittany to the Spanish border. Britain was able increasing from about 1700 to mount fairly continuous blockages of the Biscay ports and as time went on frequently to the Med ones but it wasn't easy. In the Saxon case they have to sail through relatively narrow sea before they reach the ocean. Similarly on land, other than a weak Spain, which would be handicapped by the Pyrenees France only has to bother about its eastern border. Again with the latter the Alps in the southeast make attacks there difficult even if Savoy isn't in existence. Saxony has France to its west, Austria to its south and Russia somewhere to its east even if the north is consistently friendly. While there will be times that some of those borders are friendly it will never be certain any of them will.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 9, 2017 17:59:57 GMT
Yes there could be persistent friendship between the Dutch and Saxons but that doesn't assume the Dutch would necessarily be willing to give up their independence. Plus if things develop as OTL the Dutch will be Calvinist and the Saxons Lutheran. Yep, this is reasonable although the Saxons may well enact toleration of Calvinism. I think it much depends on the political stance of Calvinists. If their radical offshoots in Saxony become a front to push for republicanism and democracy like it happened in other parts of Europe, I can easily see the Saxon monarchs persecuting it like it happened in Tudor/Stuart England and France. In the Netherlands Calvinism became the dominant religion of the elites so its hijacking by would-be radical revolutionaries was less of a problem than it would have been if it stayed a minority. This is reasonable as well although I may point out that in Early Modern Europe dynastic marriages were a very common means of establishing, entrenching, and perpetuating an alliance. If ITTL the Netherlands become a reasonably stable de facto hereditary monarchy and they have a fairly good friendship with Saxony, a Saxon-Dutch personal union due to repeated dynastic marriages becomes a very real possibility, and in due time it may well evolve to a real union like it happened for Britain, Spain, and the PLC. If it happens through such means, the union may easily be accepted by many Dutch and most of Europe w/o much opposition. No doubt a rebellion or two may well happen against the union, but I can easily see it crushed. IF the Saxon-Dutch kings grant tolerance to Calvinists and do not attempt to limit Dutch autonomy too much too soon, the union may well become entrenched over time, esp. because of the existing cultural and religious affinities and thanks to the benefits both partners would achieve from full cooperation in the economic, military, and colonial fields. Over time, of course, the Dutch colonies would become the colonial empire of such an enlarged North Germanic state as it progresses to a real union, much like it happened to Britain and Spain (and nearly happened to Iberia). If the Saxon-Dutch union happens by dynastic means, France of course would strongly oppose it under any reasonable (and not so reasonable) pretext, since it would be a big obstacle to its own strategic interests and expansionist plans. Dynastic unions were among the most acceptable means of territorial expansion in premodern Europe, and the English were involved in building such a union of their own, so I can't see them deploying too much of a serious opposition, unless the Saxon-Dutch go out of their way and threaten their trade and colonial interests. Much the same way, the Habsburg had long used dynastic marriages as a major tool to expand their power and influence in Europe, so they would be hard-pressed to complain too much if the Wettin do the same. I expect they would redouble their efforts to see territorial compensations of their own in Southern and Eastern Europe. E.g. quite possibly they can bargain their acceptance of the union for Saxon support to Habsburg plans elsewhere. Russia would of course react negatively as well, but only if they are an established rival of Saxony like France. Otherwise they were too distant to care. As a rule, only clearly established rivals of Saxony would react negatively to a peaceful dynastic union. The Netherlands were not so powerful its union with Saxon North Germany would upset the balance of power in Europe at large. Sure, but such actors had their own specific reasons to do so. France had a vested interest to try and keep Germany weak and divided to pursue its own imperialist-expansionist plans in Western Europe. The Papacy had an established tradition to oppose any agent that tried to centralize Italy to protect its own theocratic independence, be them the Lombard kings, German emperors, successful Italian states, Spain, or France as the case may be. It was much less veneration for the balance of power for its own sake than catering to their own strategic interests. It was in clear decay since 1650, but I strongly object to rank it as a 2nd rank power until the 19th century. The other great powers, including France, kept it treating as a peer up to the Napoleonic Wars. Of course the Dutch would oppose a Saxon threat to their interests but if such a union happens peacefully by dynastic means and with due care for their autonomy and religious tolerance it is easy to see most Dutch go along with it, esp. since they have much to gain from being the other main trade hub of North Germany with no custom barriers and harnessing Saxon military power to protect their colonies and trade interests. The Saxons, on the other hand, would gain a very wealthy province and unrestricted access to the North Sea. They would also gain a colonial empire by default. If the union occurs I expect its colonial strategy and policy would gradually shift from the OTL Dutch one to something fairly similar to the other seafaring great powers. Sure but this implies Austria would not porbably be a sworn rival of Saxony all the time. Kinda like OTL, it would be an ambiguous relationship, rivals perhaps 50% of the time, allies of convenience the other 50% of the time. Broadly speaking, the Habsburg face two possible strategies to deal with the rise of Saxony to be the strongest German power: oppose them, which might work if they get powerful and successful allies but has a strong potential to backlash disastrously, leading them to lose any influence in Germany or even their own German lands. Or seek Saxon support for expansion elsewhere. It might go both ways, or quite possibly a complex mix of both. It also depends a lot on how much France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire make themselves trouble for Austria. I may point out that if and when Saxony and Austria can agree on a grand compromise to divide Germany on the Metz-Nuremburg line (or something much like it) between their spheres of influence, a Saxon-Dutch union would stop being a direct threat to Austrian interests. More like an argument for Vienna to bargain concessions elsehere: "Ok, you got the Netherlands by marriage, lucky you. Been there, I know how it goes. If you wish I go along with it support me in my acquisition of the Italian duchies, whose dynasties are about to lapse". Or Venice under various possible pretexts, or possibly Milan & Naples if an equivalent of the Spanish Succession War occurs. I suppose Russia is the subject here. If so yeah. On the other hand, England/Britain may well not object too much to a Saxon-Dutch peaceful union, esp. if its kings guarantee London continued support against France & Spain and some kind of reasonable compromise about the colonies. After all, the British and the Dutch did fight a few wars about conflicting colonial interests, but were allies against the Catholic powers most of the time.
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Post by steve59 on Jul 10, 2017 21:16:59 GMT
If by chance there was a Saxon-Netherland union by peaceful dynastic means that was widely supported in both countries that is different but this is pretty unlikely. The Netherlands had a strong separate identity and also as you have referred a couple of times a significant republican [in the early modern period meaning of the word], element. This is not going to sit well with the sort of fairly centralised monarchy that your expecting from Saxony.
Also even with such unions sometimes they caused tension and requirements for either changes of boundaries or balancing gains for them.
I think when you say "It was much less veneration for the balance of power for its own sake than catering to their own strategic interests." it shows you still have a basic misunderstanding of the role and nature of the 'balance of power'. It was less an aim as you see fixated with as the result of numerous parties seeking to avoid any single state becoming too powerful.
In terms of opposition to such a union, quick replies on some of your points. a) Yes Austria will vary between a rival, sometimes bitter and an ally of Saxony. Of course a substantial boost to Saxon power as you propose here is something that would naturallt push them toward the former rather than the latter stance.
b) Similarly with England/Britain. After the Dutch stated to decline, and especially after the strain of the war of the Spanish Succession relations improved in part because the Dutch were not a substantial threat to British interests. Now if that state, with its important colonies is made potentially massively more powerful by union with Saxony this because a cruical concern again.
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Post by eurofed on Jul 12, 2017 21:06:59 GMT
The republican element in the Netherlands has been a definite minority throughout the vast majority of the Dutch state's existence, since it was a de facto monarchy for 70% of the time before the French Revolution and a de jure one since that. Much the same way, the Dutch had a separate identity after their anti-Habsburg revolt, but in all evidence it is was not any stronger than the one of certain regions of Britain, Spain, or the PLC. If anything, the Netherlands would have been independent for much less time than Scotland or Aragon. Yet this composite character did not stop the unity of Britain or Spain to get entrenched and endure for centuries, and even the PLC fell for domestic and foreign reasons that nothing to do with its multi-national character. I think it is wrong to romanticize the Dutch nationalism in being any more powerful or successful than those other historical examples. In all evidence, its OTL success had much more to do with the dire weakness of the HRE in its late period and the screw-ups of the Habsburg than anything else. I acknowledged myself the Saxon-Dutch kings would have to grant tolerance to Calvinists and respect the autonomy of the Dutch for at least as long it took the other historical successful unions to evolve from personal to real. Provided its happens, however, it is hard to see how and why Dutch nationalism or republicanism should make the Dutch any more difficult to keep bound than the Scots, Catalans, or Lithuanians.
As it concerns the reactions of other European powers to a successful Saxon-Dutch dynastic union, yes this event would probably motivate them to seek compensations for themselves as a counterbalance, but it might easily mean seeking Saxony's assent or support for balancing gains of theirs elsewhere rather than extreme hostility to Saxony itself, at least in certain cases and part of the time. Most of them might potentially reap compensations in other areas of Europe that were in the same league as Saxony's acquisition of the Netherlands. E.g. Austria might get its own spoils in South Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, potentially as valuable as the Saxon gains if we take the Italians lands into account. England/Britain could make some deal about the colonies. Russia might seek compensations from Poland's hide or from the Ottomans. Even France might get something in the Southern Netherlands, in Italy, or the colonies. As a rule, generalized hostile reactions of the other powers to the rise of a potential hegemon with the formation of coalitions took place in European history for much greater stuff than what Saxony would do ITTL. Even with the acquisition of the Netherlands, they would at best unify about 2/3 of the HRE under their rule, much less than what Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, or William II attempted to do.
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Post by MarshalBraginsky on Jul 13, 2017 4:29:41 GMT
The republican element in the Netherlands has been a definite minority throughout the vast majority of the Dutch state's existence, since it was a de facto monarchy for 70% of the time before the French Revolution and a de jure one since that. Much the same way, the Dutch had a separate identity after their anti-Habsburg revolt, but in all evidence it is was not any stronger than the one of certain regions of Britain, Spain, or the PLC. If anything, the Netherlands would have been independent for much less time than Scotland or Aragon. Yet this composite character did not stop the unity of Britain or Spain to get entrenched and endure for centuries, and even the PLC fell for domestic and foreign reasons that nothing to do with its multi-national character. I think it is wrong to romanticize the Dutch nationalism in being any more powerful or successful than those other historical examples. In all evidence, its OTL success had much more to do with the dire weakness of the HRE in its late period and the screw-ups of the Habsburg than anything else. I acknowledged myself the Saxon-Dutch kings would have to grant tolerance to Calvinists and respect the autonomy of the Dutch for at least as long it took the other historical successful unions to evolve from personal to real. Provided its happens, however, it is hard to see how and why Dutch nationalism or republicanism should make the Dutch any more difficult to keep bound than the Scots, Catalans, or Lithuanians. As it concerns the reactions of other European powers to a successful Saxon-Dutch dynastic union, yes this event would probably motivate them to seek compensations for themselves as a counterbalance, but it might easily mean seeking Saxony's assent or support for balancing gains of theirs elsewhere rather than extreme hostility to Saxony itself, at least in certain cases and part of the time. Most of them might potentially reap compensations in other areas of Europe that were in the same league as Saxony's acquisition of the Netherlands. E.g. Austria might get its own spoils in South Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, potentially as valuable as the Saxon gains if we take the Italians lands into account. England/Britain could make some deal about the colonies. Russia might seek compensations from Poland's hide or from the Ottomans. Even France might get something in the Southern Netherlands, in Italy, or the colonies. As a rule, generalized hostile reactions of the other powers to the rise of a potential hegemon with the formation of coalitions took place in European history for much greater stuff than what Saxony would do ITTL. Even with the acquisition of the Netherlands, they would at best unify about 2/3 of the HRE under their rule, much less than what Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, or William II attempted to do. Here's something that I am wondering: with the Saxon-Dutch union possibly occurring, would this result in the Dutch relying more on German speaking colonists to help build up any of their settler colonies? Because of the acquisition of access to a huge pool of manpower from Saxony, this might have a major effect on Dutch-Saxon colonialism, although I don't really see the Saxons as the type of nation that could build a settler colony. OTL German Empire had colonies, but they weren't settler colonies. If Poland annexes Prussia, half of the Prussian German population there could migrate to Saxon territory. Maybe some of the German speaking population living in the PLC could be enticed to move to any colony built by the Dutch. I don't know if the Dutch would focus on building South Africa, Australia or North America as their prized settler colony.
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Post by steve59 on Jul 13, 2017 17:19:51 GMT
The republican element in the Netherlands has been a definite minority throughout the vast majority of the Dutch state's existence, since it was a de facto monarchy for 70% of the time before the French Revolution and a de jure one since that. Much the same way, the Dutch had a separate identity after their anti-Habsburg revolt, but in all evidence it is was not any stronger than the one of certain regions of Britain, Spain, or the PLC. If anything, the Netherlands would have been independent for much less time than Scotland or Aragon. Yet this composite character did not stop the unity of Britain or Spain to get entrenched and endure for centuries, and even the PLC fell for domestic and foreign reasons that nothing to do with its multi-national character. I think it is wrong to romanticize the Dutch nationalism in being any more powerful or successful than those other historical examples. In all evidence, its OTL success had much more to do with the dire weakness of the HRE in its late period and the screw-ups of the Habsburg than anything else. I acknowledged myself the Saxon-Dutch kings would have to grant tolerance to Calvinists and respect the autonomy of the Dutch for at least as long it took the other historical successful unions to evolve from personal to real. Provided its happens, however, it is hard to see how and why Dutch nationalism or republicanism should make the Dutch any more difficult to keep bound than the Scots, Catalans, or Lithuanians. As it concerns the reactions of other European powers to a successful Saxon-Dutch dynastic union, yes this event would probably motivate them to seek compensations for themselves as a counterbalance, but it might easily mean seeking Saxony's assent or support for balancing gains of theirs elsewhere rather than extreme hostility to Saxony itself, at least in certain cases and part of the time. Most of them might potentially reap compensations in other areas of Europe that were in the same league as Saxony's acquisition of the Netherlands. E.g. Austria might get its own spoils in South Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, potentially as valuable as the Saxon gains if we take the Italians lands into account. England/Britain could make some deal about the colonies. Russia might seek compensations from Poland's hide or from the Ottomans. Even France might get something in the Southern Netherlands, in Italy, or the colonies. As a rule, generalized hostile reactions of the other powers to the rise of a potential hegemon with the formation of coalitions took place in European history for much greater stuff than what Saxony would do ITTL. Even with the acquisition of the Netherlands, they would at best unify about 2/3 of the HRE under their rule, much less than what Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, or William II attempted to do. As you admit the Dutch republic had a strong identity, both as an outright republic and a decentralised monarchy. To take the example of Scotland, with which I'm most familiar it took a century from a shared monarch to a formal governmental union. If your assuming a similar process for a Saxon-Dutch union its possible but likely to be disrupted by events as the two powers are on the contient with many neighbours. For Britain England/Wales and Scotland are largely immune to the actions of external powers because of their isolation, both geographically and because of military and political circumstances. Even so it could quite possibly have been averted. In on the other hand you have a shorter, more violent union by force not only is Dutch opposition going to be much strong but also this gives the chance for other powers to intervene. In terms of other powers some might agree to some carve up but how much land is available? We have already had several big boosts to Saxon power: a) The merging with Brandenburg b) The conquest of Bohemia c) Possibly annexing much of NW Germany and now d) Annexing the Dutch republic. There isn't sufficient territory for all/most majior neighbours to gain compensation for each Saxon gain so its likely that several powers would oppose the Dutch annexation to avoid Saxony getting an uncountered boost in its power. I think your back to allowing your desires for an objective to result in you ignoring the evidence against that occurring.
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