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Post by futurist on Oct 27, 2018 0:19:44 GMT
How much quicker does the Entente win World War I if the U.S. enters World War I in 1915 after the sinking of the Lusitania instead of in 1917 as in our TL?
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Post by steve59 on Oct 27, 2018 20:56:07 GMT
How much quicker does the Entente win World War I if the U.S. enters World War I in 1915 after the sinking of the Lusitania instead of in 1917 as in our TL?
Either mid-late 17 or early 18 I would suspect, at least unless the change results in a change in allied policy. It will take some time to recruit and train up an American army and that would only really be available by mid-late 16. Possibly a bit later as the allies aren't tooled up as much to equip it this early as their still far from equipping their own armies adequately, even with some support from the US. If they send a squadron to join the Grand Fleet at Scapa as OTL then that might deter the Germans from their OTL sortie that led to Jutland. [Which would mean that the British won't learn about some of their problems with removal of flash protection, unreliable AP shells, fleet communications and night fighting for instance. Also that the USN wouldn't in turn learn about some of their problems].
Also the combined allied forces would need to break down the German lines and considering their not as weakened by the blockade and the fighting of 1916/17 yet that won't be easy. There is the danger that the allies would simply throw more men at the western front without adequate doctrine or heavy artillery. Also would the Germans still launch their Verdun campaign or possibly fall back to the Hindenberg line a year earlier and seek to crush Russia quicker?
Plus if the US enters the war in May/June 15 then the Germans probably continue their USW campaign so does that sink more ships, which would cause problems supplying the allies and bringing a large US army and its supplies across the Atlantic unless they start using convoys earlier?
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Post by futurist on Oct 28, 2018 7:21:49 GMT
How much quicker does the Entente win World War I if the U.S. enters World War I in 1915 after the sinking of the Lusitania instead of in 1917 as in our TL?
1. Either mid-late 17 or early 18 I would suspect, at least unless the change results in a change in allied policy. It will take some time to recruit and train up an American army and that would only really be available by mid-late 16. Possibly a bit later as the allies aren't tooled up as much to equip it this early as their still far from equipping their own armies adequately, even with some support from the US. If they send a squadron to join the Grand Fleet at Scapa as OTL then that might deter the Germans from their OTL sortie that led to Jutland. [Which would mean that the British won't learn about some of their problems with removal of flash protection, unreliable AP shells, fleet communications and night fighting for instance. Also that the USN wouldn't in turn learn about some of their problems].
2. Also the combined allied forces would need to break down the German lines and considering their not as weakened by the blockade and the fighting of 1916/17 yet that won't be easy. There is the danger that the allies would simply throw more men at the western front without adequate doctrine or heavy artillery. Also would the Germans still launch their Verdun campaign or possibly fall back to the Hindenberg line a year earlier and seek to crush Russia quicker?
3. Plus if the US enters the war in May/June 15 then the Germans probably continue their USW campaign so does that sink more ships, which would cause problems supplying the allies and bringing a large US army and its supplies across the Atlantic unless they start using convoys earlier?
1. All of this certainly makes sense. Also, would there be no Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in this TL if the war begins significantly going in the Entente's favor by late 1917? For instance, would Russia's Government get a badly needed legitimacy boost if the front lines began significantly moving before late 1917? In addition to this, might the U.S. Navy be used to help the Brits and their allies in the Gallipoli Campaign? 2. Agreed with your points here. Also, I expect the Germans to try withdrawing to the Hindenburg Line a year earlier in this TL if they think that they can actually pull this off. Of course, I don't know if Falkenhayn (who was the main German commander until Verdun ruined his reputation) would have been as big into the idea of a Hindenburg-style defensive line as Hindenburg and Ludendorff were in our TL. As for trying to knock Russia out of the war, this would be difficult to do before the February Revolution considering that the Russian Tsar kept a tight grip on dissent before that point in time. Plus, I don't know if Falkenhayn would have approved of this--and he'd likely stay around longer without Verdun. Of course, he might ultimately have no other choice but to send Lenin to Russia--though the war might already begin decisively turning against the Central Powers by that point in time. 3. Why wouldn't Britain and the U.S. start using convoys earlier in this TL?
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Post by steve59 on Oct 28, 2018 11:31:19 GMT
1. Either mid-late 17 or early 18 I would suspect, at least unless the change results in a change in allied policy. It will take some time to recruit and train up an American army and that would only really be available by mid-late 16. Possibly a bit later as the allies aren't tooled up as much to equip it this early as their still far from equipping their own armies adequately, even with some support from the US. If they send a squadron to join the Grand Fleet at Scapa as OTL then that might deter the Germans from their OTL sortie that led to Jutland. [Which would mean that the British won't learn about some of their problems with removal of flash protection, unreliable AP shells, fleet communications and night fighting for instance. Also that the USN wouldn't in turn learn about some of their problems].
2. Also the combined allied forces would need to break down the German lines and considering their not as weakened by the blockade and the fighting of 1916/17 yet that won't be easy. There is the danger that the allies would simply throw more men at the western front without adequate doctrine or heavy artillery. Also would the Germans still launch their Verdun campaign or possibly fall back to the Hindenberg line a year earlier and seek to crush Russia quicker?
3. Plus if the US enters the war in May/June 15 then the Germans probably continue their USW campaign so does that sink more ships, which would cause problems supplying the allies and bringing a large US army and its supplies across the Atlantic unless they start using convoys earlier?
1. All of this certainly makes sense. Also, would there be no Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in this TL if the war begins significantly going in the Entente's favor by late 1917? For instance, would Russia's Government get a badly needed legitimacy boost if the front lines began significantly moving before late 1917? In addition to this, might the U.S. Navy be used to help the Brits and their allies in the Gallipoli Campaign? 2. Agreed with your points here. Also, I expect the Germans to try withdrawing to the Hindenburg Line a year earlier in this TL if they think that they can actually pull this off. Of course, I don't know if Falkenhayn (who was the main German commander until Verdun ruined his reputation) would have been as big into the idea of a Hindenburg-style defensive line as Hindenburg and Ludendorff were in our TL. As for trying to knock Russia out of the war, this would be difficult to do before the February Revolution considering that the Russian Tsar kept a tight grip on dissent before that point in time. Plus, I don't know if Falkenhayn would have approved of this--and he'd likely stay around longer without Verdun. Of course, he might ultimately have no other choice but to send Lenin to Russia--though the war might already begin decisively turning against the Central Powers by that point in time. 3. Why wouldn't Britain and the U.S. start using convoys earlier in this TL?
What happens in Russia would depend on the circumstances. Its still deeply isolated from its allies and if the Germans continue the pressure in 1916 while going onto the defensive in the east you might still see the dynasty fall. If so the Provisional Governnment would be fragile as OTL and if, as OTL, it continued being willing to support joint offensives in early 1917 say things could fall apart for it as it did in OTL but a little earlier. However Russia is more likely to survive as either a monarchy - although hopefully weakened enough that it realises reform is necessary - or something like the Provisional Government with probably a weak democratic government. [In the latter case there is still the chance of another civil war, albeit possibly initially started by Romanov loyalists.
An April/May 15 dow by the US is too late to influence the naval campaign against Gallipoli and presuming they still have the same determination their forces will fight only under US command, in full US armies, then they won't be available before the allied withdrawal. Unless the pending arrival of US reinforcements in 16 means that Britain decides to persist with the campaign in Gallipoli. [Although once the Bulgarians had joined the CP and forces the collapse of Serbian resistance chances of success there, as opposed to operations elsewhere in Anatolia were greatly reduced.
Not sure how things would go in 1916 with Germany. Faced with impending arrival of large numbers of US troops, plus the fact that the Britain were starting to reach substantial numbers Falkenhayn might try something like Verdun to break France and try and force a peace not unfavourable to the CPs before this. Or might go with a defence in the west, possibly with a pull back to a shorter line as in OTL Hindenburg position, which might then be called the Falkenhayn line here, while seeking to force Russia out of the war, enabling Germany to free up forces for a powerful defence in the west and hopefully gain needed food and other materials in the east. It could go either way, although an attempt at a deep invasion of Russia while the Russian army is still unbroken would be difficult and could end in total failure especially with the increasing pressure in the west. the Tsar might well seek to keep a tight grip on dissent but if the army is taking huge losses defending in White Russia and the western Ukraine and still being forced back it could be bad for moral. Also a lot of the countries food comes from the latter region so the food shortages in the northern cities could be worse earlier. Difficult to tell either way.
Lenin was sent after the Romanov's fall, because the Provisional Government continued fighting. If he and his colleagues were sent before then their likely to be simply arrested and [hopefully] shot.
The decision to use convoys was a deeply controversial issue as many in the navy especially saw it as a passive/defensive approach. With an earlier US entry creating convoys might come at a similar sort of time, i.e. about a year after the US entry, or earlier or later. The sooner it comes the better for the allies but your still likely to see a lot of MS being sunk before it occurs.
There is one other issue. If the US comes in in say May 1915, how committed are the population to the war? If they have large forces entering the front line in 1916 and very likely having heavy losses how does the Nov 16 Presidental election go? Could you have an isolationist candicate opposing the war. Very heavy losses for a number of reasons. The OTL massive inflation of the US army meant trained men were very, very thin on the ground while the other allies don't have the same level of experience to give advice to the US nor the same level of artillery and air superiority they had in 1918. Also the German army would be in a much better condition in 1916 - even possibly if their still tried a Verdun campaign. As such an Anglo-American Somme offensive is likely to be extremely costly for both powers while if the Germans have retreated to a Falkenhayn line things are going to be markedly worse. While the defences might not be quite as strong as OTL given less time to repair they would be manned by more powerful forces, not having suffered defeat and heavy losses in the OTL spring 18 offensive whereas the allied troops advancing through the wastelands left by the German retreat would be less experience and equipped and they would lack the tanks of OTL.
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Post by mcnutt on Oct 30, 2018 21:35:08 GMT
January 1915, Germany issues a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. February 1915, the Von Jagow Telegram is made public. ( Gotlieb Von Jagow German Foreign Minister 1912-1916) April 1915, Congress declares war. May 1916 AEF arrives in France. September 8, 1916, the Kaiser abdicates. The German Republic sues for peace. September 1, 1916 11 am Armistice goes into effect. November 1916, Wilson is reelected by a wide margin. With Russia at Versailles the treaty may be harder on Germany. There is no Russian revolution. The
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Post by steve59 on Oct 31, 2018 0:37:08 GMT
January 1915, Germany issues a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. February 1915, the Von Jagow Telegram is made public. ( Gotlieb Von Jagow German Foreign Minister 1912-1916) April 1915, Congress declares war. May 1916 AEF arrives in France. September 8, 1916, the Kaiser abdicates. The German Republic sues for peace. September 1, 1916 11 am Armistice goes into effect. November 1916, Wilson is reelected by a wide margin. With Russia at Versailles the treaty may be harder on Germany. There is no Russian revolution. The
Agree with you up to May 1916, if you mean when large numbers of American forces arrive in France. However their still got to be accilmatised for the war and given some basic front line experience and the German forces, unless Falkenhayn has bet the pony on an enlarged Verdun and lost very badly, is going to be a hell of a lot stronger than summer 1918 and sending masses of relatively poorly trained and equipped troops over the top will just increase the carnage on the allied side. Talking about both the US and a fair number of the British here while where is the artillery and other stuff coming from? In 1916, while massive expansion in equipment was under way and a lot being imported from the US the British didn't have enough shells and heavy guns for their own men, nor at the time a really good enough doctrine while the rapid expansion of production meant a lot of problems with shell reliability. I can't see the US forces being equipped anything like enough to make an impact and for their 1st battles their going to be way behind the learning curved.
If the Germans, in response to knowledge of large US reinforcements arriving retire to an Hindenburg line earlier its going to be simply slaughter. Don't think anyone has the doctrine and equipment to break such positions at this point and simply throwing men at them will only increase the casualty rate.
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Post by punkrockbowler805 on Nov 5, 2018 0:52:54 GMT
Roosevelt winning in '12 might do this. He really wanted to get in on World War I and spoke out about the Lusitania as a cassus beli and wanted to get the Rough Riders back together to go fight, though old men doing a cavalry charge in the new warfare conditions would not have ended well.
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Post by mcnutt on Nov 5, 2018 19:41:15 GMT
Public opinion did not support going to war until after unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman Telegram. President TR would have gotten in political trouble for being took pro war.
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Post by steve59 on Nov 6, 2018 12:07:11 GMT
Public opinion did not support going to war until after unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman Telegram. President TR would have gotten in political trouble for being took pro war.
Agreed. Teddy would probably want to go to war in support of the allies but be blocked by isolationists and forcing the issue over Lusitania could go either way. If it works fine, if it doesn't he could spend much of the rest of his term as a lame duck.
One advantage with him as President however might be that the US, especially the army would be better prepared with some more reserves built up which would help with the training of a mass army. Have read that Wilson refused to allow any planning for such actions until after the actual US dow, which didn't help.
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