|
|
Post by futurist on Dec 15, 2018 1:15:07 GMT
What would European and world politics have looked like in the decades after an early Central Powers victory in World War I? I presume that Germany would want to keep the status quo intact (especially considering that Germany will acquire iron ore-rich Briey-Longwy from France as well as some French colonies in the post-WWI peace settlement in this scenario) and will thus want to solidify its alliances with Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire so that there will be a powerful bloc opposing any large-scale territorial revision in Europe and the Middle East. I'm presuming that France would become deeply pacifist as a result of its WWI defeat (the fourth in 110 years) and as a result of its poor demographics relative to other European powers. Thus, France will be eager to avoid new confrontations with any European power and to preserve what is left of its colonial empire. I don't think that either France or Italy would have been willing to join MItteleuropa except at gunpoint due to the fact that there probably simply wouldn't be much in it for them. Post-WWI Franco-Italian relations would probably be strained since Italy would likely enter WWI on the CP side if France looks like it's about to fall and will thus be rewarded with some French territory after the end of WWI--something which is likely to cause a lot of anguish and grief in France. I suppose that Italy--emboldened by its WWI victory in this TL--could eventually try making another grab for Ethiopia, but I don't know if the other European Powers would have approved of such an Italian move. As for Britain, I expect that it would retreat back to its policy of splendid isolation and not worry too much about what happens in Europe. However, it would certainly try to protect its Empire from any threats that might emerge--such as a newly assertive Russia in Asia. Speaking of Russia, I suspect that a lot in this scenario is going to depend on whether the Tsarist system in Russia survives World War I intact or whether significant changes will be made after the end of WWI which result in either the Tsar's power being significantly curtailed or Tsarism outright being completely abolished in Russia and replaced with a republic. If the CPs win WWI early enough, they might be generous on Russia and thus only strip it of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Bessarabia, Kars Oblast, and perhaps some territory in southern Central Asia if Afghanistan enters the war and attacks Russia. In such a scenario, Russia would keep the northern Baltics, Ukraine, and Belarus and will thus have its industrial heartland remain intact after the end of WWI. This could be a problem for Germany considering that, once Russia sufficiently strengthens itself (perhaps by 1950), it could eventually make another move for Galicia. While Germany + A-H + the Ottomans could decisively beat Russia in 1914, it's far from clear that this is going to remain the case in, say, 1950. Thus, I think that Germany and its allies are going to try permanently shifting Russia's attention away from Europe after the end of WWI and towards Asia (excluding the Middle East, which is where the Ottoman Empire will want to remain dominant). This could have some interesting implications for relations between Russia and Britain/Japan. After all, Russia might eventually feel sufficiently confident of its ability to defeat Britain and/or Japan in a war that it would indeed be willing to spark such a war in order to expand its territory and influence even further into Asia. Indeed, I strongly suspect that Germany would enjoy watching Russia and Britain/Japan fight each other while it itself sits, watches, and eats popcorn!  I'm presuming that the U.S. never enters WWI in this scenario (since otherwise it's very hard for the CPs to actually win this war) and thus remains mostly isolationist but with a focus on the Americas and East Asia. Indeed, I wonder if there is anything that could draw the U.S. into a Russian war with Britain and Japan (presumably on the side of Britain and Japan) at some point in time after the end of WWI. Anyway, any thoughts on all of this? |
|
|
|
Post by steve59 on Dec 15, 2018 11:50:24 GMT
What would European and world politics have looked like in the decades after an early Central Powers victory in World War I? I presume that Germany would want to keep the status quo intact (especially considering that Germany will acquire iron ore-rich Briey-Longwy from France as well as some French colonies in the post-WWI peace settlement in this scenario) and will thus want to solidify its alliances with Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire so that there will be a powerful bloc opposing any large-scale territorial revision in Europe and the Middle East. I'm presuming that France would become deeply pacifist as a result of its WWI defeat (the fourth in 110 years) and as a result of its poor demographics relative to other European powers. Thus, France will be eager to avoid new confrontations with any European power and to preserve what is left of its colonial empire. I don't think that either France or Italy would have been willing to join MItteleuropa except at gunpoint due to the fact that there probably simply wouldn't be much in it for them. Post-WWI Franco-Italian relations would probably be strained since Italy would likely enter WWI on the CP side if France looks like it's about to fall and will thus be rewarded with some French territory after the end of WWI--something which is likely to cause a lot of anguish and grief in France. I suppose that Italy--emboldened by its WWI victory in this TL--could eventually try making another grab for Ethiopia, but I don't know if the other European Powers would have approved of such an Italian move. As for Britain, I expect that it would retreat back to its policy of splendid isolation and not worry too much about what happens in Europe. However, it would certainly try to protect its Empire from any threats that might emerge--such as a newly assertive Russia in Asia. Speaking of Russia, I suspect that a lot in this scenario is going to depend on whether the Tsarist system in Russia survives World War I intact or whether significant changes will be made after the end of WWI which result in either the Tsar's power being significantly curtailed or Tsarism outright being completely abolished in Russia and replaced with a republic. If the CPs win WWI early enough, they might be generous on Russia and thus only strip it of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Bessarabia, Kars Oblast, and perhaps some territory in southern Central Asia if Afghanistan enters the war and attacks Russia. In such a scenario, Russia would keep the northern Baltics, Ukraine, and Belarus and will thus have its industrial heartland remain intact after the end of WWI. This could be a problem for Germany considering that, once Russia sufficiently strengthens itself (perhaps by 1950), it could eventually make another move for Galicia. While Germany + A-H + the Ottomans could decisively beat Russia in 1914, it's far from clear that this is going to remain the case in, say, 1950. Thus, I think that Germany and its allies are going to try permanently shifting Russia's attention away from Europe after the end of WWI and towards Asia (excluding the Middle East, which is where the Ottoman Empire will want to remain dominant). This could have some interesting implications for relations between Russia and Britain/Japan. After all, Russia might eventually feel sufficiently confident of its ability to defeat Britain and/or Japan in a war that it would indeed be willing to spark such a war in order to expand its territory and influence even further into Asia. Indeed, I strongly suspect that Germany would enjoy watching Russia and Britain/Japan fight each other while it itself sits, watches, and eats popcorn! I'm presuming that the U.S. never enters WWI in this scenario (since otherwise it's very hard for the CPs to actually win this war) and thus remains mostly isolationist but with a focus on the Americas and East Asia. Indeed, I wonder if there is anything that could draw the U.S. into a Russian war with Britain and Japan (presumably on the side of Britain and Japan) at some point in time after the end of WWI. Anyway, any thoughts on all of this?
futurist
I would disagree on France becoming pacifist as they would be too vulnerable to Germany. Took weak to do much to oppose Germany and its allies and probably occurred but definitely resentful about its defeat and treatment.
Even more so Britain. Such a total destruction of the balance of power in Europe is a existential threat to British independence, even if Britain has escaped largely unscathed in terms of territory and ability to defend itself in the short term - i.e. not massive naval losses or limitations imposed. Unless Germany is exhausted by the war and very busying holding down occupied territories/supporting its weaker 'allies' I would expect it to resume the naval challenge to Britain which would mean a new naval race and one that in the longer run Britain would very likely lose. Also with potentially large colonial gains - I know many German speakers were assuming a large colony in central Africa centred on the Belgium Congo and their existing colonies but quite possibly others as well - this would again pose threats to Britain's own trade routes as would the membership of the Ottomans and probably Italy in such an alliance. As such if Britain has any strength left it would have to commit itself to some sort of cold war situation with this political set up.
Similarly with Russia, unless you have say a weak Czarist state supported by the Germans against widespread unrest, I can't see it taking the route you suggest. As much for Russia as for Britain the German centred alliance, especially assuming it stays strongly conservative and militaristic, which seems likely with it having won the war decisively, is the single great threat. Russia may be weak enough to by cowered for a while but unless its basically hacked apart - which would mean a lot of territory and population to be held down - its going to emerge as a rival which will mean tension. Under those circumstances some sort of de facto defensive alliance between Russia and Britain as the two 'free' states is almost certain. The awkward issue here might be Japan.
Agree that the US will stay largely isolationist for a while longer although as its economic expansion continues its likely to want more access to other markets and even if Britain stays free trade your likely to see a protectionist 'European' trade bloc and a Russian one. This could pull the US into a more internationalist role but how would be difficult to tell. Since its low hanging fruit are the areas outside the control of the two big blocs, such as Latin America and China - where a free trade system is already in place - this could mean tension with Britain more than the other powers.
The other big issue might be how stable are the Austrian and Ottoman empires as both are ruled by minority groups? Especially if either/both have made territorial gains as a result of being on the winning side in WWI.
Steve
|
|
|
|
Post by futurist on Dec 16, 2018 6:43:03 GMT
What would European and world politics have looked like in the decades after an early Central Powers victory in World War I? I presume that Germany would want to keep the status quo intact (especially considering that Germany will acquire iron ore-rich Briey-Longwy from France as well as some French colonies in the post-WWI peace settlement in this scenario) and will thus want to solidify its alliances with Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire so that there will be a powerful bloc opposing any large-scale territorial revision in Europe and the Middle East. I'm presuming that France would become deeply pacifist as a result of its WWI defeat (the fourth in 110 years) and as a result of its poor demographics relative to other European powers. Thus, France will be eager to avoid new confrontations with any European power and to preserve what is left of its colonial empire. I don't think that either France or Italy would have been willing to join MItteleuropa except at gunpoint due to the fact that there probably simply wouldn't be much in it for them. Post-WWI Franco-Italian relations would probably be strained since Italy would likely enter WWI on the CP side if France looks like it's about to fall and will thus be rewarded with some French territory after the end of WWI--something which is likely to cause a lot of anguish and grief in France. I suppose that Italy--emboldened by its WWI victory in this TL--could eventually try making another grab for Ethiopia, but I don't know if the other European Powers would have approved of such an Italian move. As for Britain, I expect that it would retreat back to its policy of splendid isolation and not worry too much about what happens in Europe. However, it would certainly try to protect its Empire from any threats that might emerge--such as a newly assertive Russia in Asia. Speaking of Russia, I suspect that a lot in this scenario is going to depend on whether the Tsarist system in Russia survives World War I intact or whether significant changes will be made after the end of WWI which result in either the Tsar's power being significantly curtailed or Tsarism outright being completely abolished in Russia and replaced with a republic. If the CPs win WWI early enough, they might be generous on Russia and thus only strip it of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Bessarabia, Kars Oblast, and perhaps some territory in southern Central Asia if Afghanistan enters the war and attacks Russia. In such a scenario, Russia would keep the northern Baltics, Ukraine, and Belarus and will thus have its industrial heartland remain intact after the end of WWI. This could be a problem for Germany considering that, once Russia sufficiently strengthens itself (perhaps by 1950), it could eventually make another move for Galicia. While Germany + A-H + the Ottomans could decisively beat Russia in 1914, it's far from clear that this is going to remain the case in, say, 1950. Thus, I think that Germany and its allies are going to try permanently shifting Russia's attention away from Europe after the end of WWI and towards Asia (excluding the Middle East, which is where the Ottoman Empire will want to remain dominant). This could have some interesting implications for relations between Russia and Britain/Japan. After all, Russia might eventually feel sufficiently confident of its ability to defeat Britain and/or Japan in a war that it would indeed be willing to spark such a war in order to expand its territory and influence even further into Asia. Indeed, I strongly suspect that Germany would enjoy watching Russia and Britain/Japan fight each other while it itself sits, watches, and eats popcorn! I'm presuming that the U.S. never enters WWI in this scenario (since otherwise it's very hard for the CPs to actually win this war) and thus remains mostly isolationist but with a focus on the Americas and East Asia. Indeed, I wonder if there is anything that could draw the U.S. into a Russian war with Britain and Japan (presumably on the side of Britain and Japan) at some point in time after the end of WWI. Anyway, any thoughts on all of this?
futurist
1. I would disagree on France becoming pacifist as they would be too vulnerable to Germany. Took weak to do much to oppose Germany and its allies and probably occurred but definitely resentful about its defeat and treatment.
2. Even more so Britain. Such a total destruction of the balance of power in Europe is a existential threat to British independence, even if Britain has escaped largely unscathed in terms of territory and ability to defend itself in the short term - i.e. not massive naval losses or limitations imposed. Unless Germany is exhausted by the war and very busying holding down occupied territories/supporting its weaker 'allies' I would expect it to resume the naval challenge to Britain which would mean a new naval race and one that in the longer run Britain would very likely lose. Also with potentially large colonial gains - I know many German speakers were assuming a large colony in central Africa centred on the Belgium Congo and their existing colonies but quite possibly others as well - this would again pose threats to Britain's own trade routes as would the membership of the Ottomans and probably Italy in such an alliance. As such if Britain has any strength left it would have to commit itself to some sort of cold war situation with this political set up.
3. Similarly with Russia, unless you have say a weak Czarist state supported by the Germans against widespread unrest, I can't see it taking the route you suggest. As much for Russia as for Britain the German centred alliance, especially assuming it stays strongly conservative and militaristic, which seems likely with it having won the war decisively, is the single great threat. Russia may be weak enough to by cowered for a while but unless its basically hacked apart - which would mean a lot of territory and population to be held down - its going to emerge as a rival which will mean tension. Under those circumstances some sort of de facto defensive alliance between Russia and Britain as the two 'free' states is almost certain. The awkward issue here might be Japan.
4. Agree that the US will stay largely isolationist for a while longer although as its economic expansion continues its likely to want more access to other markets and even if Britain stays free trade your likely to see a protectionist 'European' trade bloc and a Russian one. This could pull the US into a more internationalist role but how would be difficult to tell. Since its low hanging fruit are the areas outside the control of the two big blocs, such as Latin America and China - where a free trade system is already in place - this could mean tension with Britain more than the other powers.
5. The other big issue might be how stable are the Austrian and Ottoman empires as both are ruled by minority groups? Especially if either/both have made territorial gains as a result of being on the winning side in WWI.
Steve
1. Obviously France is going to try to defend and secure itself as much as possible after the war--possibly by building extremely massive border fortifications if it can still afford to do this after the war in this TL. However, what I meant is that France is going to be extremely wary about getting involved in any new war after its defeat in WWI. I mean, France fought the Prussians/Germans four times (1814, 1815, 1870-1871, and 1914) within a 110 year time period in this TL and ended up losing all four times. Thus, I certainly don't think that France would want to start any new fights with either Germany or anyone else. Also, obviously France is going to be resentful at losing Briey-Longwy, possibly some other parts of Lorraine, and a lot of its colonial empire to Germany (and possibly some territories to Italy as well). However, it would know that it would be unable to reverse these territorial losses (at least for an extremely long time and possibly permanently) and thus will likely conclude that its best path towards achieving future security is to be extremely defended and protected but also to pursue good or at least relatively good relations with all of its neighbors--especially powerful neighbors such as Germany. 2. Excellent point about a new British-German naval arms race after the war is over. I forgot about that and I suspect that you are indeed correct in regards to this. Now, the question is this--what exactly can Britain offer Russia? For instance, is it going to be willing to send a large army to Russia to help Russia fight the Germans in the event of a future German-Russian war? Basically, I think that Russia is going to keep its hand close to its chest and probe both Britain and Germany for offers of cooperation in the new, post-WWI order. Specifically, I think that Russia is going to hold out for a good deal before it decides who it's going to establish close relations with after the war. Please keep in mind that if Germany and its allies only take Poland and other border territories (Lithuania, Courland, Kars Oblast, et cetera) from Russia while keeping the Russian heartland (Great Russia + Ukraine + Belarus) intact, Russia is going to be appreciative of this fact and is going to remember that Germany declined to dismember it even though it could have done this. Obviously Germany is still going to be a threat to Russia in the future, but Russia might conclude that it should at least be open to the possibility of closer ties with Germany given the relatively pro-Russian attitude that Germany took in the post-WWI peace talks in this TL. That, and the fact that Russia would obviously be capable of defending itself from Germany in the long(er)-run as a result of it having tens of millions of additional people in Ukraine and Belarus who could provide good soldiers and labor for Russia. Also, please keep in mind that, if Tsarism survives in Russia in this TL, there's a possibility that the Russian leadership could try to win their people's forgiveness for WWI by trying to expand further into Asia. In other words, a Russia which loses WWI could end up being even more aggressive in Asia in an attempt to prove that it's still a Great Power. Ultimately, though, I think that what Russia is going to do after the end of WWI in this TL is this--it's going to aggressively and quickly construct a series of defensive fortifications on its new western borders (assuming that it would actually be able to afford to do this, that is) in order to provide insurance that Germany will not try to expand further into Russia. In addition to this, it will try to maintain good relations with both Germany and Britain and try to ensure that Germany and Britain remain hostile to each other so that they will never decide to gang up on Russia in the future. Russia is also going to inquire about the possibility of an alliance with Britain but is probably going to demand significant British concessions in return for such an alliance--such as a British commitment to send dozens of divisions to Russia in the event of a German invasion as well as possibly some concessions to Russia in Asia. For instance, perhaps Britain would allow Russia to annex parts of northern Persia and northern Afghanistan. After all, if Britain and Russia are going to be allies, why exactly would, say, British India still need a buffer zone between it and Russia? Also, Russia might ask Britain to turn a blind eye to a new Russo-Japanese war at some future point in time. 3. Agreed with all of your points here. As I wrote above, I certainly do think that there is a lot of potential in the idea of a British-Russian alliance after this TL's WWI--perhaps an informal one at least at first in order to avoid provoking Germany too much. Still, I wonder which country is going to be most capable of providing a lot of capital to Russia after France's defeat. I would think that the devastation of WWI and the loss of Briey-Longwy would make it harder for Russia to get large amounts of capital from France after the end of this TL's WWI, but I wonder if Germany or Britain is going to be a better replacement for Russia in regards to this. I don't know whether Germany or Britain had more spare capital to give during this time. Also, Russia could probably look for loans in the U.S. as well, though the U.S. might demand significant reforms--such as decent treatment of Russia's Jewish population and the abolition of the Pale of Settlement--as a precondition for significant American loans to be sent to Russia. I do think that Russian-British ties are likely to be even friendlier if the Tsarist regime would get overthrown and replaced by a democratic one, though. Then Britain and Russia could genuinely portray themselves as two democracies combating German autocracy. Plus, a democratic regime in Russia is likely to treat Russia's Jews and other groups in Russia better than the Tsarist regime did--which should please both Britain and the U.S. Also, it would help that a democratic Russia would probably be less inclined towards additional territorial expansion than a surviving Tsarist Russia would be--though this might change if democracy only lasts in Russia for a certain amount of time--after which point some kind of dictatorship could appear in Russia. After all, even after the collapse of Communism in our TL, Russia quickly descended back to autocracy (with even the "democrat" Yeltsin not being much of a democrat considering that he ordered tanks to fire on the Russian Parliament building). 4. Who exactly is going to be in the Russian trade bloc in this scenario? Also, in regards to the U.S., I agree with what you wrote here but also think that a lot might depend on just how assertive Germany is going to be in the Americas after a WWI victory. Take a look at this Wikipedia article: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_German_plans_for_the_invasion_of_the_United_StatesBasically, Imperial Germany might have had dreams of expanding its influence in the Americas and with a WWI victory, it might conclude that destiny is on its side and that thus it should indeed try to expand its influence in the Americas and elsewhere. This would probably be in the form of loans, economic penetration, et cetera--something which the U.S. might object to if it becomes a large enough issue. What I'm getting at here is that an aggressive German policy in the Americas could gradually push the U.S. out of its isolationism in this TL--though I suspect that it would take an awful lot to actually get the U.S. to make military commitments to countries such as Britain and Russia. Hopefully Germany would be smart enough to focus on developing Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and its new colonies which it acquired from France and avoid butting into the Americas too much. Of course, Kaiser Bill's Germany wasn't exactly always known for its rational decision-making.  5. Both Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are probably going to have significant ethnic tensions in this TL after a WWI victory. I don't think that they would be much more severe than they were before the war since I simply don't think that either A-H or the Ottomans will acquire a lot of new territory after the end of the war (Kars Oblast is a pretty marginal territorial acquisition). In the long(er)-run, though, these empires are probably going to need to significantly reform if they want to avoid imploding. Of course, both of these empires could probably rely on the help of German muscle to keep them intact and thus are probably going to have a good amount of time to try reforming before things get really out of hand. Ironically, though, it would be best for these countries if they imploded sooner rather than later since an implosion in, say, 1920 could result in a German-created new order in central Europe and/or the Middle East while an implosion in, say, 1950 might very well have Russia and/or Britain sufficiently confident to militarily intervene in order to avoid giving Germany a free hand in these places. |
|
|
|
Post by futurist on Dec 16, 2018 6:49:44 GMT
BTW, I'm curious--is Britain capable of providing something along the lines of Lend-Lease to Russia in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and/or 1950s in this TL? Or does Britain lack the manufacturing capacity to do this?
|
|
|
|
Post by steve59 on Dec 16, 2018 13:06:50 GMT
BTW, I'm curious--is Britain capable of providing something along the lines of Lend-Lease to Russia in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and/or 1950s in this TL? Or does Britain lack the manufacturing capacity to do this?
Well Britain is still a substantial industrial power, although the combination of free trade and laissaz faire policies in a protectionist and interventionist world had caused a lot of problems. There was a fair bit of building up of the armament and chemical industries for instance and in those different circumstances there might be a more persistent effort to continue this. [OTL a relate to 'back to normal' policies won out over the 'land fit for heroes' and desire for economic and social revival. ] If the latter wins out, despite heavier defense spending, which is almost certain, this would help out and by say the late 30's you could have a considerable economic power, although still almost certainly going to be some way behind Germany. You could well see an imperial tariff system in response to rising tariffs elsewhere and hopefully India and most/all of the dominions joining in, which under those circumstances would help a lot.
If Russia avoids the Bolshevik take-over or other major internal conflict and also keeps areas such as the Ukrainian wheat fields and the Donbas region then its going to be pretty strong anyway by say the late 30s. Again not as powerful as Germany and probably behind in technology but the overall economic is going to be larger - probably considerably - than that under Stalin. Heavy industry might be a bit behind OTL but you have a much better chance of a more flexible economy and almost certainly people who aren't eager to defect to any invader.
The problem for Britain if an Anglo-Russian alliance ended up at war with a German led bloc controlling most of Europe would probably be it would be hanging on desperately itself unless things had gone seriously wrong for Germany. Which is possible but not something you can rely on. Also other than the Arctic route, which has limited capacity and would be vulnerable to any German pressure on Norway, it could only really aid Russia via Vladivostok. Which presumes that there is no problem in the far east.
What you might see however is a lot of British investment in Russia in the 20's and 30's. Not so much railways for military moblisation and attacking westward as in any future conflict Russia would almost certainly be on the defensive. However developing their deeper infra-structure, especially railways to aid economic development and possibly investment in mining and manufacturing. No one else other than possibly the US is likely to help in this and Britain has a lot of experience in such investments around the world. With its own internal development and greater military spending, plus continued investment in traditional areas like S America and China there might not be a lot of money available but as the economy [hopefully] starts building up this would help.
Thinking about it you could see some proxy conflicts in Africa and possibly more importantly China. Britain and the US especially would like to keep it open but if it collapses into chaos as OTL you could see assorted groups vying for influence and possibly even an at least partial partition of the country. A lot might depend on the position of Japan as a natural rival of both Russia and the US but possibly, assuming its taken over assorted German possessions in the Pacific there could be enough tension to keep it in the British camp. Otherwise it could end up allied in some way with Germany or at least an unfriendly neutral.
Anyway initial thoughts.
Steve
|
|
|
|
Post by futurist on Jan 5, 2019 6:37:13 GMT
BTW, I'm curious--is Britain capable of providing something along the lines of Lend-Lease to Russia in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and/or 1950s in this TL? Or does Britain lack the manufacturing capacity to do this?
1. Well Britain is still a substantial industrial power, although the combination of free trade and laissaz faire policies in a protectionist and interventionist world had caused a lot of problems. There was a fair bit of building up of the armament and chemical industries for instance and in those different circumstances there might be a more persistent effort to continue this. [OTL a relate to 'back to normal' policies won out over the 'land fit for heroes' and desire for economic and social revival. ] If the latter wins out, despite heavier defense spending, which is almost certain, this would help out and by say the late 30's you could have a considerable economic power, although still almost certainly going to be some way behind Germany. You could well see an imperial tariff system in response to rising tariffs elsewhere and hopefully India and most/all of the dominions joining in, which under those circumstances would help a lot.
2. If Russia avoids the Bolshevik take-over or other major internal conflict and also keeps areas such as the Ukrainian wheat fields and the Donbas region then its going to be pretty strong anyway by say the late 30s. Again not as powerful as Germany and probably behind in technology but the overall economic is going to be larger - probably considerably - than that under Stalin. Heavy industry might be a bit behind OTL but you have a much better chance of a more flexible economy and almost certainly people who aren't eager to defect to any invader.
3. The problem for Britain if an Anglo-Russian alliance ended up at war with a German led bloc controlling most of Europe would probably be it would be hanging on desperately itself unless things had gone seriously wrong for Germany. Which is possible but not something you can rely on. Also other than the Arctic route, which has limited capacity and would be vulnerable to any German pressure on Norway, it could only really aid Russia via Vladivostok. Which presumes that there is no problem in the far east.
4. What you might see however is a lot of British investment in Russia in the 20's and 30's. Not so much railways for military moblisation and attacking westward as in any future conflict Russia would almost certainly be on the defensive. However developing their deeper infra-structure, especially railways to aid economic development and possibly investment in mining and manufacturing. No one else other than possibly the US is likely to help in this and Britain has a lot of experience in such investments around the world. With its own internal development and greater military spending, plus continued investment in traditional areas like S America and China there might not be a lot of money available but as the economy [hopefully] starts building up this would help.
5. Thinking about it you could see some proxy conflicts in Africa and possibly more importantly China. Britain and the US especially would like to keep it open but if it collapses into chaos as OTL you could see assorted groups vying for influence and possibly even an at least partial partition of the country. A lot might depend on the position of Japan as a natural rival of both Russia and the US but possibly, assuming its taken over assorted German possessions in the Pacific there could be enough tension to keep it in the British camp. Otherwise it could end up allied in some way with Germany or at least an unfriendly neutral.
Anyway initial thoughts.
Steve
1. Thanks for this information. 2. Makes sense. 3. Can't Britain also aid Russia through Persia/Iran? 4. Makes sense. 5. Makes sense. |
|
